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Preface
This thesis analyses strategic firm behaviour in international markets. It extends 
models of entry deterrence with informational asymmetries to scenarios with multi­
national firms. We see that trade policy has not only a direct effect on competition 
but also an indirect effect through influencing the actions of domestic producers.
In writing this thesis, I would like to thank my Supervisor, Stephen Martin, who 
has supported me throughout this long and exhausting process. There are also many 
others who have helped directly and indirectly in producing of this thesis and I will 
mention them in alphabetical order: Jacqueline Bourgogne, Marcel Boyer, Marco 
Haan, Isabelle Maret, Piety van de Nagel, Louis Phlips, Oliver Stehmann, Jessica 
Spataro, Xavier Wauthy, Marc van Wegberg, Arjen van Witteloostuijn.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
For over a decade, new approaches to Industrial Organisation and International Eco­
nomics have begun to dominate the literature. In the former, the strategic behaviour 
of oligopolists, particularly in models of uncertainty, has become prevalent. In the 
latter, a shift from perfect to imperfect competition has led to a more detailed micro- 
based analysis that can deal with the activities of multinational enterprises. Indeed, 
the current focus on the activities of multinationals in both fields illustrates the prob­
lem of strict definitions of subjects. One such issue is that of trade policy and strategic 
firm behaviour.
International economics is generally concerned with how trade policy might be 
used to improve welfare in the economy by manipulating the actions of firms supplying 
their home market. Industrial economics, on the other hand, is concerned with both 
welfare enhancing government policies and the strategic investments of firms. By the 
latter we refer to the ability of firms to affect the actions of rival firms, in order to 
increase their own profits. Of course, there seems no reason to assume that firms 
operating in an international environment are different to those in a closed economy. 
A potential entrant need not be a new firm, it might just as well be a multinational, 
already established in a foreign market. Nevertheless, if we assume that firms in our 
trade models are possessed with the same strategic abilities as those firms found in 
the 10 literature, this must have an effect on trade policy. Or to put it another way, 
will trade policies have an effect on the strategic abilities of firms and if so, what
11
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effect, does this have on welfare?
In order to analyse this issue, we need to decide on (i) what types of trade policies 
we should choose, (ii) what types of strategic ability our firms should be endowed with 
and (iii) what kinds of environments should our firms operate in. With regards (i) 
traditional trade policy is essentially made up of tariffs and quotas although export 
subsidies are also discussed extensively in the literature.1 In what follows we will 
focus on tariffs and quotas, first because they are the most common form of trade 
policy and secondly, they have effect even when the domestic producer does not 
export. However, in (ii) when we consider the strategic actions of firms, we must 
decide on what the outcome of such actions will be. Is the domestic producer’s 
objective to deter entry or to limit it? Does the foreign firm export or invest directly 
(FDI) in a  market, and is it also able to restrict the actions of the domestic producer? 
The issue of exporting and FDI is common in the literature and therefore should be 
included in the research. What we need to know is under what conditions will a 
foreign firm switchs from exporting to FDI. Furthermore, with what abilities should 
we endow our firms in order to influence rivals’ actions.
In the trade literature it is common to assume certain differences between the do­
mestic producer and the foreign entrant, namely firm-specific assets and informational 
differences (Hirsch 1976). The firm-specific asset is some tangible or intangible asset 
that only the foreign firm possesses but which can be bought at a cost, by the local 
firm. On the other hand, the domestic producer has an informational advantage over 
the foreign firm as it knows the home market, the local network, its language, culture, 
political situation and legal system. To obtain this knowledge, the foreign firm must 
pay some sunk cost. We shall focus on the latter as informational advantages are 
something all local producers possess.
Information is an area of industrial economic research that has received a lot at­
tention over recent years. Informational asymmetries in these models usually refer to 
information over costs or market demand (Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Roberts 1986).
1 See Brander and Spencer (1985), Dixit and Kyle (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Grossman 
(1986).
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For a foreign firm which is either exporting to or producing in another country, un­
certainty over costs or market size might seem reasonable. Information regarding 
demand conditions and production costs in another country is not necessarily avail­
able. The standard approach is to assume that the foreign firm buys this information 
(Smith 1987, Motta 1991). However, there is no reason to assume that a foreign firm 
will have to pay for this information if it is in the interests of the domestic firm to 
provide it. In the limit pricing literature (starting with Milgrom and Roberts 1982) 
this is exactly what happens. If the foreign firm’s action (i.e. its output) is dependent 
on market conditions, and that these conditions are unknown, then it might be in 
the interests of the domestic firm to provide this information. The rationale is that 
if the foreign firm makes a bad investment (i.e. invests too much in building a large 
plant when a small plant is optimal), all firms might be hurt. If this is the case, then 
a domestic firm has interests in revealing this information. This is why we need to 
consider limit pricing: it allows information about market conditions to be signalled 
to potential entrants.
The final point (iii) refers to the environment. Should we consider a single mar­
ket or several, should we allow domestic producers to enter the foreign firm’s home 
market, should we endow entrant’s with the same strategic abilities as incumbents 
and should we allow for trade agreements between countries. All of these issues are 
important and we will deal with them in the course of this thesis. We have already 
discussed generally the need to look at the effects of trade policy on the strategic 
behaviour of firms. We now need to look at first the types of trade policies we will 
consider and secondly, at the types of strategic models that will best help us resolve 
these issues.
1.1 International Trade with Imperfect Competi­
tion
Although international economics is virtually devoted to how trade agreements can 
enhance welfare, recent research has focused on imperfectly competitive markets (see
14
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Krugman 1989 for a survey of the literature). Two issues arise: one is the effect, of 
trade policy on the actions of the firm involved (both domestic and foreign producers) 
and the other is the resulting effect on welfare.
Studying the welfare effects of tariffs and quotas in oligopolistic markets has gained 
considerable importance in international economics. Despite the abundance of quo­
tas, most research has been devote to the welfare effects of tariffs (e.g. Katrak 1977, 
Svedberg 1979, Meza 1979, Brander and Spencer 1983,1985 to mention a few). Nev­
ertheless, Fung (1989) shows that under imperfect competition, quotas and tariffs 
might be equivalent. He defines their equivalence as follows:
[a] tariff is equivalent to a quota if, permitting the same import volume, 
the domestic output and prices are identical under the alternative trade 
policies.2
We can see this in figure 1.1. This shows reaction functions of two firms 1 and 
2 that might arise from a linear demand function. The Cournot equilibrium is at x  
where r\ and r2 cross. Suppose 2 operates from another country and that coimtry
1 imposes a quota K  which is less than 2’s equilibrium output. We can see in the 
diagram that the new equilibrium might be at y. However, the same result can be 
achieved by a tariff. A tariff would raise the marginal cost of firm 2 and shift its 
reaction function inwards. If the tariff is chosen carefully, we also reach point y. 
This is how Ring (1989) defines equivalence between a tariff and a quota: the impact 
on outputs and prices will be the same, although the welfare effects may not be 
equivalent.3 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether equivalent tariffs and quotas will 
have an equivalent effect on the strategic behaviour of firms.
Ring’s (1989) assumption of Cournot competition, is itself a restriction. However, 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not only convenient in terms of modeling, but many 
firms may be seen to compete in terms of outputs. For example, in the automobile 
industry, firms must plan production in advance, while facing high costs of holding
2 Originally adopted by Shibata (1986).
3 Tariffs earn revenue which contribute to welfare, quotas do not. However, McCorriston and Sheldon 
(1994) show that auctioned quota licenses may result in equivalent welfare.
15
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Figure 1.1: The equivalence of tariffs and quotas.
cars in stock. Prices only adjust so that sales match production (FYiedman 1983 
p.47-48). Moreover, Bertrand pricing is in itself unreasonable: few firms could sup­
ply the whole market if they set lower prices than their rivals. Of course, capacity 
constraints suggest that this will not be the case. However, allowing firms to operate 
up to their capacity constraints suggests a two-stage capacity-output game, and as 
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have shown, optimal capacities are the Coumot-Nash 
equilibrium outputs. For this reason, it seems reasonable to retain the assumption of 
Cournot, competition throughout the rest of this thesis. Product differentiation could 
be included but this would have no surprising effects on our results.
Two important papers have highlighted the relationship between welfare and im­
ports. First, Brander and Krugman (1983) consider a model of reciprocal dumping, 
where two firms in separate countries decide to engage in international trade, supply­
ing the same product to the market of their rival. One of the most interesting finds of 
this paper is the U-shaped relationship between welfare and the transportation cost 
incurred by the exporter (which of course affects the price of imports). The trans­
portation cost determines the equilibrium output of the exporter: the higher the cost, 
the lower will be the equilibrium output. However, welfare effects are ambiguous as
16
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Figure 1.2: Welfare effects resulting from a reduction of a prohibitively high trans­
portation cost.
we shall now demonstrate. Consider welfare as the sum of domestic producer and 
consumer surplus. First, we set the transportation cost so high there are zero imports. 
The price in the market is P, the monopoly price (see figure 1.2). If transportation 
costs are reduced, some imports will enter the domestic market and total output rises, 
leading to a fall in the market price to Pt. As we can see, domestic profits fall by 
x +  y while the gain in consumer surplus is x + z. Clearly, i l y > z  the loss in domestic 
firm profits is greater than the gain in consumer surplus. This will be generally true 
if imports are very small. Consequently, we see that a reduction in transportation 
costs from a prohibitive level will lower welfare.
On the other hand, now consider the situation where transportation costs are 
very low such that the domestic producer no longer produces in the market. The 
monopoly price of the foreign firm is P  (see figure 1.3). If transportation costs are 
increased, the price in the domestic market increases and the domestic producer may 
enter the market. Its profits are w + y and the loss in consumer surplus is w + x + z. If 
y < x +  z then an increase in transportation cost reduces welfare. For small domestic
mm i imm
17
Q
Figure 1.3: Welfare effects resulting from an increase in transportation costs when 
foreign firm has entry-blockading marginal costs.
production this will be the case.
As we can see transportation costs both increase and decrease welfare, depending 
on their size relative to the marginal cost of the incumbent firm.
Levy and Nolan (1992) noted the same result was dependent on the relative cost 
differences between the domestic and foreign firm. They consider a single domestic 
producer faced by a foreign entrant who exports to the domestic market, where both 
firms may have different marginal costs of production. They show that when there 
are no tariffs imposed on imports, welfare displays a convex relationship with respect 
to the entrant’s marginal cost, denoted C3 (see figure 1.4). The rationale behind this 
is that there is a trade off between the terms of trade effect and the domestic firm 
output effect The former refers to the change in domestic prices from a change in the 
entrant’s marginal cost (as C3 increases, prices in the domestic market rise, reducing 
consumer surplus) while the latter refers to the change in the domestic firm’s output 
i.e. an increase in C3 raises the domestic firm’s output. If C3 is small then we have a 
strong terms of trade effect and a weak domestic firm output effect. The net effect
wFigure 1.4: Relationship between welfare and entrant’s marginal cost (Levy and Nolan 
1992).
of increasing C3 is to lower welfare. On the other hand, if C3 is large, we have a weak 
terms of trade effect and a strong domestic firm output effect. Increasing C3 has the 
net effect of increasing welfare.
It is clear that an increase in C3 reduces the equilibrium output of the entrant. 
Levy and Nolan (1992) then extend the analysis to tariffs. Tariffs raise marginal cost 
and so if we interpret the entrant’s marginal cost as a tariff, we see that only a high 
or low tariff will maximise welfare: indeed, we know that a welfare minimising tariff 
exists! Of course, tariffs earn revenue and this must also be included in the welfare 
function. Levy and Nolan (1992) show that this leads to a concave welfare fimction 
where an optimal tariff can be obtained.
Needless to say, tariffs are just one form of trade policy. Quotas are also a common 
form of trade policy, but they have received less attention in the imperfect compe­
tition literature.4 Fimg (1989) has pointed out the equivalence between tariffs and 
quotas in oligopolistic markets. His results raise three questions. First, can we find
4 Common forms of quota are voluntary export restraints (VER’s). These are voluntary restrictions 
on exports, whilst a quota is imposed. Nevertheless, the effects are the same and if quota rents are 
retained by the foreign firm, the welfare effects are equivalent.
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equivalence for tariffs and quotas in a customs union. Secondly, do tariffs and quotas 
have equivalent effects on the strategic behaviour of firms and thirdly, do these trade 
policies have equivalent effects on welfare?
1.1.1 FDI versus Exporting
Analysing the effects of tariffs and quotas on welfare is just half of the story. An 
issue which has benefited greatly from the use of game theory is the entry mode 
decision. One of the first papers refering to the switch from exporting to foreign 
direct investment is perhaps Vernon (1966). Vernon (1966) attempts to explain the 
increase in post-war US FDI by the product life-cycle hypothesis. He sees the switch 
from exporting to FDI as part of a general pattern in the life cycle of a product. 
The importance of Vernon’s work is the break with the traditional trade view of 
perfect competition. FDI can only be explained if there are market imperfections, 
imperfect competition being one of them. Along these lines Hymer (1976) defines the 
multinational as a firm in possession of some intangible proprietary asset, which can 
be considered as knowledge in the broadest sense of the word. Essentially the decision 
to invest abroad depends on possible diseconomies of scale of centralised production 
compared to the cost economies from producing locally. In fact, this has its origins in 
Coase (1937). Hymer (1976) points out that the benefits of FDI may well be industry 
dependent. Indeed Horst (1972) finds that large firms are more inclined to FDI than 
small firms. Dunning (1977) combines Hymer’s intangible asset with the transaction 
cost approach of Williamson (1967) to develop the intangible asset hypothesis. Here, 
he argues that high levels of R&D, advertising and product diversity intensity favour 
FDI as they reduce costs by internalising risk and exploiting firm specific advantages.
Dunning (1980) extends his analysis by including location, labelling his theory the 
eclectic paradigm. This emphasizes the importance of ownership, location, and inter­
nalisation as factors influencing foreign direct investment. Ownership specific assets 
are dependent on the nationality of the multinational. Location specific assets can 
be both tangible or intangible. For example, they might include cultural, political or 
legal advantages the firm has, as well as technological advantages, marketing skills or
20
general managerial experience. Given the possible existence of market imperfections 
due to entry barriers or uncertainty, a firm might find it advantageous to internalise 
its advantages through FDI.
However, Dunning’s approach has been criticised on the grounds that it is vague 
about the determinants of FDI (Itaki 1991). Buckley and Casson (1981) formalise a  
model illustrating a multinational’s choice between exporting and FDI, where they  
attribute different cost functions to the different modes of entry. They show that th e  
switch from exporting to FDI may depend on market size (Horst 1971, Hymer 1976). 
First, they assume that the fixed cost investment for exporting is smaller than that o f  
FDI. They argue that setting up in a foreign country must always be more expensive 
than a similar investment at home (e.g. cost of learning foreign language, knowing 
laws, customs and regulations — Hirsch 1976). On the other hand, exporting faces 
transportation costs which may make the production costs higher than under FDI. 
W hat is interesting is that when demand is small, equilibrium output is low and so  
exporting is the most profitable mode of entry (because it incurs the lowest fixed 
cost). However, by allowing demand to grow, equilibrium output rises and eventually 
FDI becomes the most profitable strategy.
Nevertheless, the model is simple but clear. Imposing a tariff increases the cost o f  
exporting and thus induces FDI. Smith (1987) and Motta (1991) were able to show 
with a game-theoretic model that this relationship was not so simple. Indeed, they a re  
able to show that reducing a tariff may induce FDI, completely the opposite result, 
obtained by Buckley and Casson (1981). By assuming that neither the domestic 
producer nor the foreign firm are producing in the domestic market, they consider 
the effects of a tariff on their investment strategies. Suppose the domestic firm h as 
such a high marginal cost that it will only earn profits in the domestic market i f  
a tariff is imposed on the foreign firm. The tariff raises market prices allowing th e  
domestic firm to earn positive profits. However, market demand is small enough to  
ensure that the foreign firm prefers to export. Removing the tariff makes the m arket 
unprofitable for the domestic firm, causing it to leave the market (or not enter). 
Furthermore, the foreign firm is now the only producer in the market, which means
itn iitr tii: ? i“*’**’**" .........
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it faces a larger demand and thus will make larger profits under FDI. Therefore, a 
tariff reduction rather than a tariff increase may induce FDI. Motta (1991) extends 
Smith’s arguments to include changes in market size and transportation costs. His 
results emphasize the non-monotonic nature between FDI and tariffs.
However, as we mentioned above, much of the international trade literature does 
not allow domestic producers to influence the entry strategy of the multinational di­
rectly. Given the existence of asymmetric information involved in foreign investment, 
limit pricing models seem a useful tool. Needless to say, if we are to use limit pricing 
as an analytical tool, we should discuss its applicability to international trade.
1.2 Limit Pricing
Bain (1949, 1956) is commonly accepted as having defined the concept of limit pricing 
when he forwarded the idea that an incumbent may be able to select prices lower 
than the profit maximising price in order to deter competitive entry.5 In this way, 
incumbents would trade off present profits for future gains. Central to this is the 
idea of economies of scale. The entrant, a new firm in the market, faces set-up costs 
already covered by the incumbent. This cost asymmetry ensures that the incumbent 
will always earn greater profits than the entrant, thus allowing it to realise economic 
profits without inducing entry. The importance of Bain’s proposition was that it 
endowed incumbents with foresight and strategic behaviour, in contrast to earlier 
theories which had considered the incumbent as passive to entry (Chamberlain 1933).
Bain defined three possible situations. First, ‘blocked entry’ was used to describe a 
situation where the incumbent is able to prevent entry by producing at its monopoly 
output. In other words, the limit output is below or equal to the monopoly output, 
hence there is no incentive for the incumbent to deviate. Secondly, he defined a 
scenario where the incumbent is forced to choose an output greater than its monopoly 
output in order to deter entry in the second period. If the incumbent did not increase 
its production in the first period, then the residual demand of the entrant would be
5 The idea of giving up present profit in order to deter future entry can also be found in Marshall 
(1923), Kaldor (1935), Clark (1940) and Harrod (1952).
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sufficiently high for it to make positive profits. Bain calls this situation ‘effectively 
impeded entry’ although it is commonly referred to as deterred entry in the literature. 
It implies that the incumbent is forced to carry out some pre-entry strategy which 
is different to its static profit maximising strategy in order to deter entry. The final 
case is where the limit price is so low that the incumbent would be better off allowing 
entry. This is known as ‘ineffectively impeded entry’ or-accommodated entry.
Formalising models of limit pricing lead to rather simplifying assumptions about 
the incumbent’s post-entry behaviour. Early theorists, most notably Sylos-Labini 
(1962) and Modigliani (1958), attempted to formalise the notion of limit pricing. L et 
us give a game theoretic interpretation of their work in order to clarify the basic 
arguments that underlie the earlier models. Assume that there is an incumbent (o r 
coordinated cartel) and a single entrant. The game takes place over two periods 
with entry possible in the second period. The products of the firms are both perfect 
substitutes and strategic substitutes. Demand is stable over the two periods an d  
economies of scale are present. The most important assumption, however, refers to  
the output of the incumbent. Sylos-Labini (1962) and Modigliani (1958) assume 
that the incumbent chooses a single output for the two periods. In other words, th e  
incumbent’s output does not change even after entry has taken place. This implies 
that the incumbent may act as a Stackelberg leader and that the entrant will assume 
the follower’s position. It is quite easy to see that if economies of scale are present, 
the residual demand of the entrant may be too small for it to make positive profits. 
The output chosen by the incumbent to deter entry implies a market price, which is 
referred to as the ‘limit price’.
The problem with this model is that the incumbent’s first period strategy lacks 
credibility. The incumbent threatens to produce more than the Cournot equilibrium 
output in the second period and this deters the entrant. However, if the entrant enters 
the market regardless, then the best response of the incumbent would be to produce a t  
the Cournot equilibrium level. We could model two types of incumbent: a tough one  
which will always produce at the limit output and a weak one which will accommodate 
entry, should it take place. Placed in a simple game theoretic model, Gilbert (1987)
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obtains two Nash equilibria: [tough, no entry] and [soft, entry]. It is quite easy to 
see that only one sub-game perfect equilibrium exists, namely [soft, entry] because 
[tough, no entry] does not withstand the ‘testing’ threat of the entrant (see Selten 
1975). We can see that the concept of credibility depends on the expectations of the 
entrant and as we see later, this has led to the most current theoretical interpretation 
of limit pricing.
The credibility problem of the incumbent’s high first period output was solved 
partially by Spence (1977) and Dixit (1979, 1980) by re-interpreting the Stackelberg 
(1934) model as one of sequential capacity choices. The incumbents have two strategic 
variables, namely output and capacity. By investing in capacity in the pre-entry game, 
the incumbent incurs a sunk cost which forms an exit barrier. In the event of entry, 
the entrant believes that the incumbent will use its excess capacity in production. 
The entrant, on the other hand, is new to the market, it cannot invest in capacity. 
For a certain range of fixed entry costs, it may be possible for the incumbent to select 
an output that will result in negative profits for the entrant in the post-entry Cournot 
equilibrium. Thus, investment in capacity by the incumbent informs the entrant of 
the incumbent’s commitment to high production, and if this is the limit output, then 
entry is deterred. In the Dixit model, the commitment to capacity results from the 
ability of the incumbent to shift to a new reaction fimction and thus achieve an 
alternative Nash Equilibrium. Hence, credibility has been given to the proposition 
that the incumbent will raise its output in the post-entry game.
Nevertheless, the Dixit model relies on the incumbent using scale economies to 
deter entry. However, this does not solve Modigliani’s belief that the threat of entry 
will have an effect on pre-entry prices. A major extension in keeping with the limit 
pricing model of Sylos-Labini-Modigliani was made by Gaskins (1971). He models 
an industry which is faced by a continuous threat of entry over time in a growing 
market. Essentially, the incumbents have to find an optimal price that will limit 
the amount of entry. In other words, the higher the price, the greater will be the 
entry into the market. The incumbent therefore, must consider the advantages of 
reducing price (and hence earning lower profits) in an attempt to reduce the extent of
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entry (which consequently raises its future profits). Nevertheless, the Gaskins’ model 
has some limitations. He assumes that the entrants or the competitive fringe are a n  
exogenous variable. There is no maximisation process for these firms, they are merely 
a rival output which is dependent on market prices. Furthermore, Gaskins finds cases 
where the long-run equilibrium price is higher than the limit price. Indeed, dominant 
firms with trivial cost advantages are able to maintain their market share, even w ith  
expanding aggregate demand.6 Furthermore, entry is dependent on current prices 
which indicate current profit, not the profit that the entrant might expect to earn  
having entered the market.
Extensions to the Gaskins model have come most notably from Kamien a n d  
Schwartz (1971) and Flaherty (1980). Kamien and Schwartz consider a stochastic 
entry version of the Gaskins model where the incumbents’ objective (they operate 
as a coordinated cartel) is to maximise present value of expected returns over th e  
indefinite future. The conditional entry probability is a non-decreasing function o f  
current market price and an increasing function of market growth. They show th a t  
the incumbents may reduce price below the monopoly level but that their resulting 
profits will never be below the post-entry profit level. However, like Gaskins, th e  
entry process is still exogenous.
Nevertheless, Flaherty (1980) developed a model of rational entry. The entrant, 
like the incumbent, must find an optimal strategy for its actions given the response 
of the incumbent to the possible threat of entry. However, an open-loop game is  
assumed which means that the firms are committed for all time to their chosen o u tp u t 
paths. The incumbent enjoys increasing returns to scale which allows it to e a rn  
greater instantaneous profits while deterring entry with a low price. Furthermore, th e  
minimum output rate that deters entry also decreases as the output rate adjustm ent 
cost increases. Fortunately, a solution to the commitment problem was found b y  
tinning to models of incomplete information.
Some empirical support can be given to the notion of limit pricing, most of these
6 Ireland (1972) respecifies the reaction function of the fringe firms and shows that (i) the dom inant 
firm will set prices equal to the limit price (ii) market share is constant, and (iii) market share is  
equal to zero if the firm has no cost advantages.
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papers being based on dynamic extensions of the Modigliani-Sylos-Labini model (see 
Gaskins 1971, Kamien and Schwartz 1971 and Flaherty 1980). Examples of these 
are Blackstone (1972) for the photocopier market, Hannon (1979) for banking and 
Strassmann (1990) for the airline city-pair market.
1.2.1 Incomplete Information
The idea that current prices affect the future profits of a potential entrant suggests 
some kind exchange in information. An incumbent is prepared to sacrifice its current 
profits to deter entry from its market which suggests that pre-entry prices act as 
a signal to the entrant. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) provided the basic signalling 
model which has now become central to the theory of limit pricing. They consider 
an incumbent monopolist and a single potential entrant in a two-period game. The 
incumbent has private information about its marginal cost although the entrant’s 
marginal cost is common knowledge. Furthermore, the entrant must cover some fixed 
entry cost. By choosing specific marginal costs for the incumbent, Milgrom and 
Roberts show cases where entry will be profitable or unprofitable. For example, if 
we assume that the incumbent’s constant marginal cost is either c,// or c^ L where 
CiH > CiL then the entrant’s post entry profits can be written
(Citf) > F  > 7Te (dL) (1.1)
where F  > 0 represents the fixed cost of entry. The entrant is assumed to enter only 
if it expects to make positive profits. Therefore, with complete information, entry 
would only take place if the incumbent has a high marginal cost.7
All that remains is to link the unknown incumbent cost type to its pre-entry price
so that the entrant can calculate its expected post-entry profits. This is achieved
using the concept of sequential equilibria (Kreps and Wilson 1982). We need to attach
probabilities to the incumbent’s marginal cost which are updated by Bayes’ rule after
the entrant has observed the first period strategy of the incumbent. Therefore, if there
is a high prior probability that the incumbent has a high marginal cost, -the entrant
7 If F  >  n e ( c i t f )  then entry would be blocked and if ne ( c n )  >  F  the entry would always occur, for 
all incumbent cost types.
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will expect, positive post-entry profits. If, in fact, the incumbent has a low cost., then  
successfully signalling this information to the entrant will result in no entry taking 
place in the second period. Signalling is through lowering the pre-entry price to such 
an extent that a high cost incumbent would find it unprofitable to imitate such a  
strategy. If such a price can be found, then we have what is known as a “separating 
equilibrium”. On the other hand, if the entrant believes that the pre-entry price is  
not correlated with the incumbent's marginal cost, price has no informational value 
and the result is a “pooling equilibrium”.
Limit pricing occurs when the incumbent (whether a high or low cost firm) sets 
pre-entry prices below its complete information monopoly price. Consider first th e  
separating equilibrium where the pre-entry price carries information about the in­
cumbent's cost type. For the existence of a separating equilibrium, it must be the  
case that the low cost and high cost incumbents will choose different first period 
strategies. In other words, the equilibrium must be incentive compatible with a high 
cost firm not finding it profitable to imitate the strategy of the low cost incumbent. 
The incentive constraint for the high cost firm is thus,
*,7/ + <$tt,7/ > nut (Pn) +  (1.2)
where 6 € (0, 1) represents the discount factor for second period profits. On the RHS 
of inequality 1.2 we have the profits that the high cost firm will earn if it imitates 
the first period strategy of the low cost incumbent pn  and as a consequence, earns 
monopoly profits in the second period. On the LHS of inequality 1.2 we see the profits 
that the high cost firm earns if it does not imitate the low cost incumbent's price. 
If the firm is known to be high cost (which it will be if it does not imitate the low 
cost firm’s strategy), then it might as well choose its monopoly price pj/ in the first 
period. As a consequence, it will earn duopoly profits in the second period.
The incentive constraint for the low cost incumbent is similar except that price p,x 
will yield higher profits by deterring entry rather than allowing entry in the second 
period. In other words, we have:
*iL (PiL) +  +  6*° (1-3)
(1.4)
Rearranging equations 1.2 and 1.3 we get:
*tH ~  *iH (Pa)  ^ t _ 7T# -  * ,l (p,i)
-M _  -D ^  0 ^  hf D
77i// niH L niL
By showing that
_ A /  v  _ A /  D  / 1 p t
> niH ~~ H (1*5)
and
* i1H ~ niH (piL) > **1 -  niL {piL) (l.C)
we prove that there is a range of discount rates for which the incentive constraints 
1.2 and 1.3 are satisfied. Inequality 1.5 is a sufficient but not necessary condition. 
In fact, we can allow the inequality to be reversed depending on the loss incurred 
in signalling expressed in equation 1.6. (For a price setting game, see Tirole (1988) 
for a simple proof of inequality 1.5). Nevertheless, inequality 1.6 is in fact the single 
crossing condition of Spence (1977).8 Given that we are interested in cases where a 
low cost incumbent will deviate from its monopoly price in the first period, we require 
Pa < Pl ■ When pn ~ Pl the RHS of 1.6 is zero. However, the LHS of 1.6 is positive 
because p < p^1 and so the condition holds. If we take pn  < Pi then the RHS of 
1.6 will become positive although the LHS will also become more positive. What the 
single crossing condition states is that the high cost incumbent’s profits will fall more 
quickly than those of the low cost firm for prices below i.e. dirm/dpi > dnu/dpi 
or d2n jdpidci > 0.9
The limit price is indeed pn, because this cannot profitably be imitated by the 
high cost incumbent. In fact, there is a range of prices that the low cost incumbent 
can choose from, the upper limit of which is defined by finding some p that makes 
condition 1.2 hold with equality. Similarly, find some p that makes condition 1.3 
hold with equality. Hence, pn  € (p,p) indicates the range of the limit price.10 For 
Pn < Pi! first period distortions will occur in the separating equilibrium, p is also 
known as the least cost separating price because it is the highest price possible that 
supports the separating equilibrium.
8 Sometimes known as the Spence-Mirlees condition or the sorting condition.
9 See Tirole (1988) p.369 for proof of this condition.
I0The set of limit prices does not include the upper or lower bound values. This ensures that 
conditions 1.2 and 1.3 remain inequalities.
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The pooling equilibrium arises when price carries no informational value a b o u t
the entrant has gained no further information regarding the incumbent’s m arginal 
cost. This occurs when imitation by the high cost incumbent, of the first, p e rio d  
strategy of the low cost incumbent will not lead to entry. Entry is something t h a t  
the low cost firm (and entrant) wants to avoid. However, , if the prior probability 
that the incumbent has a low cost is very high, then expected profits (based o n  
prior beliefs) will not cover the fixed entry cost. When nothing is learned by t h e  
entrant about the incumbent’s cost, Bayes’ rule updates using the prior beliefs a n d  
consequently, imitation of the low cost incumbent’s strategy will not lead to entry in  
the second period. The low cost incumbent can use any price it wishes in the first, 
period, although it is usual to assume that it chooses its Pareto efficient price, . 
Imitation will occur when
which is the reverse of equation 1.2. Thus, in the pooling equilibrium, it is the h ig h  
cost firm which deviates from its monopoly price in the first period.
The Milgrom and Roberts model shows that uncertainty is the key to deterring 
entry. However, the limit price itself may not actually “limit” entry because in th e  
case of a low cost incumbent, the firm’s true cost is revealed and entry does not tak e  
place, as would occur if there were complete information. Nevertheless, in the pooling 
equilibrium, entry is deterred by the high cost incumbent imitating the strategy o f  
the low cost incumbent.
The signalling model of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) was generalised in a series 
of papers by Mailath (1987,88,89). He showed the general conditions needed for 
signalling behaviour to arise. Nevertheless, an important assumption was made which 
had significant effects on the results. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) assumed, for 
simplicity, that upon entry, all information would be revealed. In other words, if th e  
entrant believed the incumbent had a high marginal cost and entered the market only 
to find that the incumbent had a low marginal cost, complete information Cournot
the incumbent’s possible cost type. In other words, at the end of the second p e rio d ,
(1.7)
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outputs would prevail. Saloner (1987) assumed that the entrant’s beliefs do not 
change and therefore its output is along an expected reaction function, rather than 
an actual reaction function. Mailath (1989) uses this to show that if two firms operate 
in a market but are uncertain of each others’ costs, they will always find it profitable 
to signal to each other. In other words, signalling is driven not so much by a desire 
to deter entry but a desire to protect own market share. This is an important point, 
particularly if we are to look at the effects of trade policy (which generally restrict a 
foreign firm’s output) on incumbent’s pre-entry strategies.
More recently, limit pricing models have been extended to an international sce­
nario. Incumbents, particularly dominant firms in a market (which are essentially 
the kind of firms we tire dealing with) often operate in more than one market (either 
multinationals operating in geographically separated markets or multi-product firms 
operating in different product markets). Similarly, entrants may have the same char­
acteristics as an incumbent, desiring to either produce in another country or to start 
production of a new product.
Srinivasan (1991) develops a model of a multi-market, incumbent faced by a single 
multi-market entrant. The incumbent typically has either a high or low marginal cost 
which is the same for both markets, thus assuming that the products have a similar 
underlying technology i.e. photocopiers and facsimile machines; computer monitors 
and colour televisions. Geographically separated markets could also be considered.
Srinivasan finds that if the markets are symmetric in demand and cost-type dif­
ferences, then separation by a low' cost multi-market, incumbent will be the same 
whether or not the signalling effort is combined across markets. However, if differ­
ences do exist, then combining signalling across markets will lead to smaller losses for 
the separating low cost incumbent. These differences in markets mean that it may be 
more profitable to set a lower limit price in one market than in the other. Indeed, this 
is exactly what Srinivasan finds. If there exist greater differences in the cost-types 
in, say market A , compared to market B , then the marginal ability to separate in A 
is greater than that in B. Similarly, if the (linear) demand in A is steeper than the 
(linear) demand in £ , then combining the signalling effort will again lead to smaller
mremmmmsmmm
30
losses for the low cost incumbent in the separating equilibrium. As an example, Srini- 
vasan shows that a low cost incumbent may even produce in an unprofitable market 
if sufficient cost or demand differences exist. This is because the cost of signalling 
in this unprofitable market may be less than signalling in the profitable market (due 
to the cost or demand differences). However, after signalling has taken place, the  
incumbent will leave the market in the second period.
One limitation of Srinivasan’s model is that the entrant enters both markets si­
multaneously (given that the incumbent is operating in both markets). It may well 
be the case that an entrant will enter only one of those markets. Hence, the de­
cision over which market to enter becomes an important issue. This question was 
considered by Bagwell (1993). Bagwell constructs a complete information model of 
numerous monopolistic incumbents from different markets or regions that use their 
market price to deflect entry to one of the other markets. The entrant is imperfectly 
informed about the incumbents’ investments into cost reduction and seeks to enter 
markets where the incumbents have high costs. By comparing the prices in each mar­
ket, the entrant enters where price is highest. In fact, his model has little to do with 
that of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) except for the informational linkage he defines 
between pre-entry price and the probability of entry, similar to that used by Kamien 
and Schwartz (1971).
Following the usual two period format, Bagwell considers n identical markets, 
each inhabited by an incumbent monopolist. There is one large entrant which can 
enter only one market, although entry into each market is potentially profitable. In 
order to deflect entry into another market the incumbents are able to invest in cost 
reduction as well as pricing strategies in the pre-entry period. The fact that pre- 
entry investment into cost reduction increases second period profits (whether this be 
in monopoly or duopoly) for the incumbent means that lower pre-entry prices can be 
sustained in the first period. Therefore, low pre-entry prices imply a lower incumbent 
marginal cost which will lead to lower expected profits for the entrant. However, 
Bagwell imposes a strong restriction to the model by assuming that the incumbent 
would prefer not to invest in reducing marginal cost. In other words, first period
.
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profits would be higher if no investment was made.
Nevertheless, the threat of entry induces the incumbents to lower prices which in 
turn leads to higher output. Higher output means that the incumbent will benefit 
more from cost reductions, which induces investment in the first period. If all in­
cumbents have the same pre-entry price, then the entry strategy is random because 
selection is based purely on the observed price. Bagwell obtains the desired result 
that pre-entry price can be lower than the monopoly price and that cost-reducing 
investment is high when there is the threat of entry. Unfortunately, no pure strategy 
equilibrium exists, with the result relying essentially on the entrant’s randomising 
mixed strategy behaviour.
The models of Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Mailath (1989), Srivinasan (1991) 
and Bagwell (1993) provide a useful guide as to how we can use limit pricing in a 
model of international trade. FYom Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we have the classic 
entry deterrence model that can also be used to deter multinational entry. Mailath 
(1989) however provides us with a more subtle contribution. He shows how firms use 
signals to enhance their market share. Trade policy on the other hand, limits market, 
share, clearly suggesting that one will have an effect on the other, and vice-versa. 
If we are to truly understand the effects of trade policy on the strategic behaviour 
of incumbents, we must be careful in whether we choose entry deterrence or market 
share enhancing as our incumbent’s goal. Finally, Srivinasan (1991) and Bagwell 
(1993) show us issues that arise when multimarket entry takes place. Both raise 
the question of what effect do other markets have on limit pricing behaviour. In 
Srivinasan (1991) we see the effect on strategy when the incumbent operates in two 
markets. From Bagwell (1993) we see the effect on the limit price when an entrant 
has several markets to choose from. These papers provide the theoretical base for the 
chapters that follow.
1.3 Where to Next
The aim of this thesis is to bring together international trade in imperfectly com­
petitive markets with strategic industrial organisation theory. With these tools we
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should be able to analyse the impact of trade policy on the strategic behaviour o f  
firms. The thesis consists of 3 theoretical chapters that deal with the issues raised 
above. Chapter 2 is concerned with trade policy in a customs union. It deals with th e  
issue of equivalence of tariffs and quotas in a customs union, as well as equivalence 
in their effects on limit pricing behaviour. The multimarket scenario is similar to  
that of Bagwell (1993) although the methodology lies very much with that of M ailath 
(1989). The results both complement and contrast those of Fung (1989). It goes on  
to explore the welfare effects of differing trade policies, relying heavily on the results 
obtained by Levy and Nolan (1992).
Chapter 3 considers the domestic producer’s ability to influence the entry mode 
of the foreign multinational, via limit pricing. This extends the basic methodology o f 
Buckley and Casson (1981), Smith (1987) and Motta (1991) to a scenario of incom­
plete information, thereby giving the domestic producer the possibility to “defend” its 
home market. We also look at the effects of trade policy on the incumbent’s pre-entry 
strategy and the resulting welfare effects, again relying considerably on the results of 
Levy and Nolan (1992).
Chapter 4 extends the Brander and Krugman (1983) reciprocal dumping model to  
a two period game of incomplete information. Incumbents are equally entrants and 
neither has complete information regarding the other’s marginal cost. Although the 
two market set-up is similar to that of Srinivasan (1991), the model in fact compares 
results of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Mailath (1989). Firms attempt to protect 
their home markets while at the same time, they try to penetrate foreign markets. 
Although under a separating equilibrium, the results of both papers complement each 
other, pooling equilibria yield opposite effects on limit pricing behaviour. Finally, 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with brief summary of the overall findings of the 
thesis and some general indications for future research.
Chapter 2
Multi-Market Entry
2.1 Introduction
European economic integration has for sometime been a hot issue in international 
economics. Free trade areas and customs unions are at the core of the European 
Community’s beliefs for improving European welfare. They support the idea of the 
removal of trade barriers between member states, thus increasing the competitive na­
ture of markets and hence moving the EC more closely to perfect competition (Treaty 
of Rome, articles 3, 9-37). Nevertheless, the Treaty of Rome also provides policies 
to confront possible market distortions, such as collusion, abuse of dominant position 
and monopolistic mergers (articles 85, 86 and the Merger Regulation, respectively). 
Clearly, there are two important aspects to competition policy: not only must it deal 
with the welfare effects of trade policies but it must also deal with the strategic be­
haviour of firms operating in these markets. Both points have received a tremendous 
amount of attention in the academic literature. International economics is virtually 
devoted to the welfare effects of trade policy whilst the formalisation of strategic firm 
behaviour has come, to dominate industrial economics over these last few years. Links 
between these two areas of research began with Krugman (1979), Dixit and Norman
(1980) and Lancanster (1980) when models of imperfect competition were formalised 
in an international trade setting.
Nevertheless, the gap between international economics and industrial economics 
has not been completely filled. Recent developments in industrial economics have
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revealed the importance of information in determining firm strategies (Milgrom a n d  
Roberts 1982, Roberts 1986, 1987 and Saloner 1987). For example, Roberts (1986) 
and Saloner (1987) provide models that help us understand the notion of predatory 
pricing, an abuse of dominant position for which the EC has intervened on several 
occasions (e.g. ECS/AKZO — 1985 OJ L 374/1, 19-22). However, there is scarce 
research on the effects of trade policy on firm strategy when asymmetric information 
might exist regarding market parameters (with the exception of Collie and Hviid 
1994). Given the importance of information and the effect it has on a firm’s strategy 
(and hence competition), it would seem instructive to see how firm strategies a re  
influenced by different trade policies. In this chapter we will focus on the effects o f  
two types of trade policy: national and joint quotas. In this, we attempt to analyse 
the effects of a common external trade policy compared to a national based policy 
within a customs union.
To deal with these issues, we must first focus on the types of trade policies we 
wish to consider and secondly, what kind of strategic behaviour we wish our firms 
to have. By considering limit pricing as the strategic tool of the domestic producers 
we discuss the following three issues. First, do equivalent tariffs and quotas exist for 
a customs union where a uniform external trade policy is established? Secondly, do 
equivalent tariffs and quotas have equivalent effects on the strategic behaviour of th e  
domestic producers? Finally, what are the welfare effects resulting from the different 
trade policies? Clearly, we need to draw on two sources of literature: international 
economics and industrial organisation.
2.1.1 International Trade
International economics is dominated by the issue of optimal trade policies (see Krtig- 
man 1989 for a survey of the literature). The analysis of both tariffs and quotas is 
abundant in the literature. Despite most research being devoted to the welfare ef­
fects of tariffs (e.g. Katrak 1977, Svedberg 1979, Meza 1979, Brander and Spencer 
1983,1985 to mention a few), the analysis of quotas in imperfect competition has 
received some attention. A simple, yet important paper by Fung (1989) shows that
pad
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under imperfect competition, equivalence in quotas and tariffs might exist. Assuming 
Cournot competition, a quota can be seen as a constraint on the foreign firm’s out­
put. However, we know that in the Cournot model, an increase in a firm’s marginal 
cost shifts its reaction function to the left, resulting in a new equilibrium where the 
affected firm produces less than before. As an additive tariff implies an increase in the 
foreign firm’s marginal cost, it too will shift the reaction function so that the foreign 
firm’s equilibrium output is lower. By choosing a tariff carefully, the same output 
reduction can be achieved under a tariff as under a quota regime. Nevertheless, can 
we find a tariff-quota equivalence for a customs union and will such trade policies 
have equivalent effects on the strategic behaviour of the domestic producers?
Another issue that is important from the point of view of trade policy is the rela­
tionship between welfare and imports. First, Brander and Krugman (1983) consider 
a model of reciprocal dumping, where two firms in separate countries decide to en­
gage in international trade, supplying the same product to the market of their rival. 
Among other things, they find that welfare and the transportation cost exhibit a U- 
shaped relationship. Basically, the height of the transportation cost determines the 
Cournot equilibrium amount of imports. By raising transportation costs imports fall. 
The rise in imports affects both domestic firm profits and consumer surplus. Starting 
at low transportation costs and increasing, higher prices lead to a fall in consumer 
surplus but a rise in domestic producer profits. However, the fall in consumer surplus 
outweighs the gains to the home country firm. On the other hand, by starting with 
an almost prohibitively high transportation cost and reducing, Brander and Krugman 
(1983) demonstrate that this also lowers welfare: the lower prices yield gains in con­
sumer surplus which are outweighed by the losses in profit incurred by the domestic 
producer.
A similar result was noted by Levy and Nolan (1992) where they demonstrate the 
U-shaped relationship between welfare and the foreign firm’s marginal cost. They 
show that when there are no tariffs imposed on imports, welfare displays a convex 
relationship with respect to the entrant’s marginal cost. Essentially there is a trade 
off between the terms of trade effect and the domestic firm output effect The former
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refers to the change in domestic prices from a change in the entrant’s marginal cost 
(as the marginal cost increases, prices in the domestic market rise, reducing consumer 
surplus) while the latter refers to the change in the domestic firm’s output, i.e. a n  
increase in marginal cost raises the domestic firm’s output. If the marginal cost is 
small then we have a strong terms of trade effect and a weak domestic firm output 
effect. The net effect of increasing marginal cost is to lower welfare. On the other 
hand, if the marginal cost is large, we have a weak terms of trade effect and a strong 
domestic firm output effect. Increasing marginal cost has the net effect of increasing 
welfare.
However, if we use quotas instead of tariffs, can we obtain similar results? A 
quota, like a tariff, affects production. Under the tariff, the foreign firm’s cost of 
supplying the market is raised, leading to a fall in its equilibrium output while a  
quota is a flat limitation on sales. It would seem likely that a relationship similar 
to that of welfare and tariffs exists between welfare and quotas. Nevertheless, there 
is a difference: quotas do not earn revenue.1 Indeed, most quotas seem to be 
imposed for political rather than economic reasons. For example, one of the most 
notable examples of a national quota is the famous Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), 
negotiated under the auspices of GATT in 1973. The MFA is essentially a collection 
of voluntary export restrictions (VER’s) which sets limits on all developing countries 
exports to the industrialised economies. Moreover, VER’s imply that quota rents are 
captured by the foreign firm. Hence, as quota rents are not retained by the importing 
nations, welfare must exhibit a similar relationship to that indicated in figure 1.4.
Given the non-economic nature of quotas it might be interesting to look at the 
different economic welfare effects of both a national and joint quota scheme. We 
refer to a national quota as a quota on the production of a firm producing in a non­
member country who is exporting to the free-trade zone. A joint quota is a quota 
which restricts imports to the zone but not to each individual country i.e. the exporter 
can sell its produce in whatever market it wishes. We shall attempt to see whether
1 McCorriston and Sheldon (1994) have attempted to calculate the possible welfare gains from 
capturing quota rents in the US cheese market. They show that auctioning off quota licenses may 
theoretically raise welfare although in practice this may not always be the case.
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welfare is enhanced more by the national or the joint quotas.
2.1.2 Industrial Organisation
This is perhaps only half the story. By considering imperfect competition, we should 
also consider the strategic nature of domestic producers. The literature in industrial 
economics regarding the limitation of new competition is considerable (see Gilbert 
1987). In international economics, Motta (1992) and Smith (1987) have made some 
progress in formalising a game-theoretic model of foreign direct investment although 
the incumbent and entrant still remain passive players, neither of them able to ma­
nipulate the strategy of the other firm. An area of industrial economics which has 
allowed for considerable strategic activity involves the control of information. In the 
first chapter, we explained how Milgrom and Roberts (1982) showed how entry could 
be deterred if incomplete information regarding the parameters of the model could be 
exploited by an incumbent. However, it was Mailath (1987,1988,1989) who in a series 
of papers generalised the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) signalling model to show that 
pre-entry strategies could (and would) be used to limit the strategies of rival firms. 
Mailath (1989) shows how an entrant’s equilibrium output might depend on the in­
formation it receives about the market, and thus controlling this information may 
reduce the entrant’s level of production. Therefore, expected output might be small 
implying low future profits, resulting in either entry deterrence (Milgrom and Roberts 
1982), exit (Roberts 1986) or merger (Saloner 1987). Given that tariffs and quotas 
reduce the equilibrium output of the foreign firm, Mailath’s methodology would seem 
more suitable for the analysis.
Nevertheless, Srinivasan (1991) and Bagwell (1993) did integrate the limit pric­
ing model into an international context. Srinivasan (1991) models the behaviour of 
incumbent monopolists when they operate in several markets. However, this chapter 
is most closely related to Bagwell (1993) who considers the investment strategy of an 
entrant when faced with many geographically separate markets. Essentially the en­
trant is looking for the most highly profitable market in which to locate by observing 
the pre-entry prices of the incumbent firms. The novel idea in this paper is in the
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methodology: pre-entry investment into cost reduction leads to lower prices and hence 
signals low expected profits for the entrant. Although dispensing with the standard 
incomplete-information Bayesian framework, it does require the use of mixed strate ­
gies. Furthermore, the entrant is allowed only to set-up in a single market, and th a t  
trade does not exist between the incumbents.
In this chapter we consider a similar model to that of Bagwell (1993), remaining, 
however, with the traditional Milgrom and Roberts (1982) methodology. We s ta rt 
with the premise that it may be possible for the firm to use pre-entry prices to  
restrict the extent of future entry (expected imports). Clearly, any kind of trade 
policy that restricts imports will have an effect on the strategic behaviour of the 
domestic producer. Consequently, trade policy not only has a direct effect on welfare 
but also an indirect effect by affecting the strategy of the domestic firm. We consider 
the effects of both national and joint trade policies on welfare and firm strategy. 
As we study the effects of quotas on a customs union, it would seem reasonable to  
also consider the possibility that domestic producers supply each others’ markets, 
without facing a quota. However, this has significant effects on our results. We study 
the following four scenarios:
• no trade between incumbents
— national quota
— joint quota
• trade between incumbents
-  national quota
-  joint quota
The strategic behaviour of the two incumbents in the pre-entry game, follows 
closely the methodology of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Mailath (1989). Limit 
pricing may emerge as an equilibrium strategy for certain ranges of national quotas. 
We then show that the limit pricing may also occur for joint quotas. Indeed, when
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there is no trade between the incumbents, joint quotas, as long as they bind the 
entrant’s output constraint, will always lead to limit pricing. Nevertheless, the intro­
duction of intra-communitarian trade will result in a different outcome. As long as 
the joint quota always makes the constraint binding, no limit pricing will occur, quite 
the opposite to the no trade model. We also show under which conditions equivalent 
tariffs and quotas have equivalent effects on the strategic behaviour of the incumbent. 
Finally, we see that although quotas tend to lower welfare, there are conditions where 
a welfare maximising quota exists.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we set up a model of asymmetric 
information similar to that of Mailath (1989). Section 2.3 considers the separating 
equilibria that emerge under the different quota regimes when there is no incumbent 
trade in the second period. Within this section we also consider the equivalence 
of tariffs and quotas on equilibrium strategies (subsection 2.3.3) and the effect on 
the limit price (subsection 2.3.4). In Section 2.4 we allow for trade between the 
incumbents to see if this has any adverse effects on the results. Section 2.5 deals 
with the extensive welfare aspects of the model. Section 2.6 looks at an alternative 
interpretation of the model and Section 2.7 concludes.2
2.2 The Model
Consider two countries 1 and 2 which provide a market for a homogenous product, 
produced by incumbent monopolists 1 and 2 in countries 1 and 2, respectively. Firm 
3 is an exporter that may enter markets 1 and 2 in some stated period. Each firm 
faces an inverse linear demand function denoted p1 — 1 -  Ql where i € {1,2} , Ql = 
q\ + 9J + 73 f°r 7i> ?2» 73 > 0. We assume constant marginal costs for all firms, denoted 
Ci,C2 € {cl,Ch\  where c# > ct and C3 > 0. For simplicity, if incumbent 1 has a low 
marginal cost, we shall refer to it as 1L. Furthermore, denote 0 € {L>H} so that firm 
i of cost cb can be written i9 for i G {1,2} and 0 e {L, H}. The entrant’s marginal 
cost C3 may be larger or smaller than that of the incumbents but its value is always 
common knowledge to all firms.
2 The assumption of free entry excludes pooling equilibria from the analysis.
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The game takes place over two periods. In the first, period firm 1 is an incumbent 
monopolist hence Ql = <7} > 0, ql,ql = 0. In the second period entry might take 
place, by both firms 2 and 3. However, the entrant is uncertain of the incumbent’s 
cost types although we assume that the incumbents know each other’s cost type.3
At the beginning of the first period, the entrant has prior beliefs i 2 € [0,1] 
that incumbent i has a liigh marginal cost and (1 — Pt=i,2) £ [0, 1] that i has a low 
marginal cost (¿6(1 ,2}). At the end of the first period, the entrant has observed the 
first period output of each incumbent and can therefore, update its priors. Posterior 
beliefs are thus 1>2 € [0, 1] and (1 — ¿*¿*1,2) € [0, 1] for high and low cost types 
respectively.
2.2.1 Second Period Profits
Let us consider the post-entry game. As we are interested in the effects of trade 
policy, we need to impose both tariffs and quotas on the entrant’s production. Tariffs 
can be easily dealt with. A simple additive tariff will raise the entrant’s constant, 
marginal cost by the same amount. To study the effects of a tariff, it is sufficient 
to study the effects on strategies (of all firms) by varying the marginal cost of the 
entrant. On the other hand, a quota restricts the entrant’s output. Therefore, the 
entrant maximises the following:
n i =  .„ .
_  ( 2. 1)
" £ x X .m = U 1° -  c3 -  (m'iH  +  (1 -  Mi) 9,'i) -  <75] <7.1 -  F
subject to (i)
> ql (2.2)
or (ii)
K > q \ + ql (2.3)
where F > 0 is the fixed entry cost and i 6 {1, 2}. Note that F  is paid only once 
and does not depend on the number of markets entered. As we see, the entrant does 
not know the incumbents’ marginal costs, it relies on the expected (observed outputs
3 This may seem restrictive but it simplifies an already complex model.
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(prices) in the first period). The output of a high cost incumbent 1 is denoted q ^  
and similarly for 2. (In the case of a tariff, the constraints are not binding — all 
equilibrium values are reported in the appendix.)
The problem facing incumbent 1, of cost type 9, in the second period, in market 
1, is given by,
*}J (i}, 92.9a) =  (a -  ce -  q\ -  q\ -  93) 9! (2-4)
If there is trade between the incumbents, then in the second period market 1 is a 
triopoly. However, if no trade takes place between firms 1 and 2, then q\ = 0 and we 
have a duopoly situation between firms 1 and 3. In the foreign market, if we have a 
tripoly we maximise,
*1» (9?. 92.93) =  max (o -  c* -  q\ -  q\ -  q\) q\ (2.5)
In the Appendix we calculate the equilibrium outputs and profits for all three firms. 
The equilibrium outputs when no quota exists and when there is no trade are given
by,
of firm 1 / /,
* _ (Qil — I
2a +  c3 -  /iicw -  (4 -  /¿i) cL)
br _  (9i// — ( 2a + c3 — (1 + fq) Ch — (3 — //i) cl
and of firm 3:
93 (Mi) a — 2 c3 + tijCH +  (1 -  Mi) cL 3
( 2 .6 )
(2.7)
(2.8)
We can see that as the entrant calculates its expected profits using beliefs /q. Thus, 
/q enters into the incumbent’s equilibrium output. FVom now on, we shall define 
the incumbent’s output by q% to indicate that it is a best-response to the output of 
the entrant. However, the entrant’s output changes depending on the type of quota 
which indeed leads to changes in the incumbent’s output. Nevertheless, it will suffice 
to show the changes in the entrant’s output in order to indicate the different restilting 
profits. If the entrant faces a national quota, it produces at that quota K \  If it faces
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*Î , for i j  = 1,2
no trade
no quota 
quota 
joint quota
*¡0 (9Î0. 93 (Mi)) 
’iì\>(9ÌS.K'1)
*10 (9ÌS. 93 (/¿I,ft))
trade
no quota 
quota 
joint quota
*19 (910,920,93 (Ml,P2)) 
*19 (9l0,920,-ß"1)
*19 (9Î0, 920, 93 (Ml, P2))
Table 2.1: Summary of Equilibrium Profits
a joint quota, it produces,
_i / \ _  (Mi ”  M2) (ch ~  cl) + 3K9s vMi,M2j --------------------------------- (2.9)
The entrant’s output depends on mi, /¿2 and K. In Table 2.1 the equilibrium profits 
are denoted for the different, equilibria discussed.
Having described the second period entry game, let 11s now turn to the first period, 
to see what strategies are available to the incumbents. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) 
show how pre-entry prices can influence the expected profits of the entrant. A low 
price implies a low marginal cost (given demand is known) and due to the single 
crossing condition of Spence (1974), it is always possible for a low cost incumbent to  
find a price low enough that cannot be profitably imitated by a high cost incumbent. 
As we use outputs in this model, a low price is the result of a high output. Therefore, 
we shall be looking for outputs that are able to provide information to the entrant 
about the incumbents’ marginal costs.
To simplify the model further, we assume small fixed entry costs so that entry is 
always profitable in the second period, whatever the cost types of the incumbents. 
This allows us to focus on the entrant’s output allocation given the quota imposed.
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2.3 Equilibrium with No Incumbent Trade
In a separating equilibrium both incumbents reveal their true cost. type. The entrant 
updates its beliefs using Bayes’ rule. For consistency of beliefs Bayes’ rule states:
QiL QiH* M* ($l) = 0 and fa (<?,•ƒƒ) = 1
9.x =  9,'//> Hi (9.x) =  Hi (g'iu) = Pi
The first statement (first line) of Bayes’ rule is required for a separating equi­
librium, while the second statement (the second line) is a requirement for a pooling 
equilibrium. As entry is always profitable in this model, pooling equilibria will not 
result. As in Mailath (1989), low cost incumbents always have an incentive to signal 
their cost type.
2.3.1 National Quota
Let us consider the case of firm 1 in market 1. We require conditions that show that it 
is profitable for a low cost incumbent IL to produce a first, period output that cannot 
be imitated by a high cost incumbent 1H and thus enjoy a smaller entrant output in 
the second period. This is similar to Mailath (1989). For example, in the first period, 
firm 1 chooses some output qlL yielding profits n\L (<}u,)- In the second period, firm 1 
acts as a Cournot player (in the sense that it does not deviate from the single period 
equilibrium) and earns profits tt\l g3 (fafj where fa  refers to the beliefs that firm 
3, the entrant, has about firm l ’s cost type. Note that dq^/dfa > 0 which means that 
the entrant will produce more if it believes the incumbent to have a high marginal 
cost. Firm 1 simply reacts according to its reaction function. If firm 1 is able to 
convey the message in the first period that it has a low marginal cost, it will earn 
7TJƒ (gi£, q3 (0)). However, if firm 3 is convinced that firm 1 has a high marginal cost, 
then firm 1 earns tt}l {q^ l Q^z (1)) < k\l (<?il,93 (0)). The reason why 1L earns lower 
profits if the entrant believes it have a high marginal cost is because this belief causes 
the entrant to produce more in the market than it otherwise would, i.e. dq$/dc\ > 0. 
Therefore, firm 1L has an incentive to inform firm 3 of its cost type. However, 1H 
has an incentive to imitate 1L because it can earn n\H (q^Hy q$ (0)) > ir\H (qm, 9a (1))
44
(this time the entrant produces a lower output than it would have done in the case o f 
complete information). Clearly, we need to find an output level in the first period that, 
ensures higher profits for 1L by signalling and which cannot be imitated profitably 
by firm 1H.
The incentive constraint of 1L is given by,
*\l (Qil) +  6tt{l (qiLM (0)) > n\L +  6x\L ( q ^ K 1) (2.10)
On the LHS we see the first period profits of IL for some output q\L followed by 
the Cournot equilibrium duopoly profits. On the RHS, we see the monopoly profits 
of firm 1L when it produces at its monopoly output in the first period, and as it 
has not signalled its cost, type, Bayes’ rule no longer applies and out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs allow us to assign whatever values we wish. We assume that firm 3 considers 
the incumbent to have a high marginal cost. The reasoning for this is that if it were 
profitable for 1L to signal, it would have done so. Therefore, by not doing so, the 
incumbent in market 1 cannot have a low marginal cost.
For 1 if , a similar incentive constraint exists,
n IH {Qu ) +  K t f  (?u/) 93 (0)) < Tr}// +  67r]H ( * ,  f f1) (2.11)
This time, we require that the high cost type incumbent prefers not to imitate the 
strategy of the low cost type incumbent. In other words, its profits are higher if it plays 
its monopoly output in the first period (earning monopoly profits) and then accepting 
a smaller market share in the second period. Although higher profits can be earned 
imitating the low cost incumbent’s output, the accompanying losses overwhelm the 
gains. This is virtually the same scenario as Mailath (1989) although his first period 
is a duopoly. Nevertheless, it is a signalling model to gain market share, not to deter 
entry.
Conditions for a separating equilibrium arise from rearranging inequalities 2.10 
and 2.11 in terms of 6, hence,
___________________^1 h  ~  (giQ___________________> 6 > ___________________~  *\l ( 12)
*i/i 93 (0)) -  ItJh (9ih . K l) ~ *1L (9iL, 93 (0)) -  it]L (9u,, K 1)
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If we can find S > 0 such that 2.12 holds, then a separating equilibrium exists. Two 
conditions sufficient for separation emerge from 2.12. First,
A h -  A h (Oil) > A l -  A l (Oil ) (2.13)
and,
A l (Oil , 03 (0)) -  A l (q*L, K ‘) > A h ( tfHl q3 (0)) -  A h (qfi,, K l) (2.14)
Inequality 2.13 reappears several times in the text and so we state the following: 
Lemma 2.1 The inequality
A h -  A h (Oil) > A l ~  A l (oil)
always holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma is in fact the single crossing condition due to Spence (1974). It implies 
that a low cost firm will find it less costly to deviate from its monopoly output in the 
first period than a high cost incumbent.
Note that if the constraint is too small, there may be no advantage to the low cost 
firm in signalling its low cost type. If the quota is so small that the entrant always 
produces up to the constraint for both types of incumbent, first period signalling will 
not affect second period profits. The entrant’s output will be the same whether it 
competes against either a high or low cost incumbent, hence, there is no incentive for 
the low cost firm to reveal its cost type. Therefore, limit pricing will only occur if 
K ' > $3 (0), where q3 (0) is the unrestricted complete information Cournot equilibrium 
output of the entrant.
Proposition 2.1 For K 1 > (0), i G {1,2}, at least one separating equilibrium
exists for the national quota where limit pricing takes place.
Proof. See Appendix.
Of course, this says nothing about the actual value of the quota, only that limit 
pricing may occur when K * > ql3 (0) and that if K x < ql3 (0), limit pricing will not 
emerge as an equilibrium strategy. Before discussing the effect of the quota on the 
limit price, let us first turn to the imposition of a joint quota.
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2.3.2 Joint Quota
The incentive constraints for the incumbents when the entrant is subjected to a jo in t 
quota follow a pattern similar to that for national quotas. For the case of the jo in t 
quota, it may or may not bind when the incumbent has a low marginal cost. For 
the national quota, a binding constraint when competing with a low cost incumbent 
meant that the low cost firm had no incentive to signal its cost type. However, this is 
not the case for the joint quota, as we shall see. We obtain two incentive constraints, 
depending on whether or not the constraint binds for the low cost firm when it signals 
its cost type in the first period. We have,
*\l (Qil ) + S*}L ( l u ,  93 (0)) >  +  6* \l (9u . 93 (0, p2)) (2 .15 )
and
*\l (911) + Sv\L (9u . 93 (0, p2)) > *\L +  fiTrii (9ft, g3 (1, p2)) (2.16)
A point of interest for the joint quota is that limit pricing still occurs even when the 
constraint is close to zero (i.e. the entrant’s total output is very small but positive). 
This is because the entrant is free to allocate its output to either of the two markets 
in whatever proportions it desires, depending on the relative residual demand it is 
likely to face. We see this in the entrant’s allocation rule indicated in inequality 2.9. 
Similarly, the incentive constraint for the high cost incumbent is,
Mil) +  ^ ! « ( 9 iz..93(0)) < *\h + 6k\,, (9^,93 (I.P2)) (2.17)
and
*\h (9ii.) + <W/i(?i//.93(0,p2)) < tt' ih + ^ I h (9ui,93(l,p2)) (2.18)
The only difference in Case (ii) is that the incumbent must consider 2’s cost type in 
its optimisation problem because this affects the entrant’s output allocation.
P ro p o sitio n  2.2 For K  > 0 , at least one separating equilibrium exists for the joint 
quota.
Proof. See Appendix.
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The fact that a separating equilibrium exists is not surprising given the similarity 
with Mailath’s oligopoly signalling model. The low cost type incumbents are able to 
ensure their market share by signalling. However, when a joint quota is imposed, the 
incumbent cannot guarantee its second period profits. All that is certain is that, the 
entrant will know each incumbent’s cost type by the end of the first period.
Typically, a range of outputs (and hence prices) exists which supports the sepa­
rating equilibrium. However, it seems reasonable to assume that an incumbent will 
choose an output that yields it the highest first period profits without upsetting the 
separating equilibrium. This is known as the least cost separating output and is de­
rived by finding a pre-entry incumbent output that makes inequalities 2.11, 2.17 and 
2.18 hold with equality. We obtain,
a f  =  +  f t  [*}» ( A ,  93(0)) -  n\H ( * ,* > ) ]  (2.19)
for the national quota and
qi = ° 2C"  + f t  [tt,h (<^,73 (0)) -  wl„ (1,#)] (2.20)
and
qJJ =  a c„ + ^js ^  (9jr/i93 (oiP2)) _  7riH qj (1, p2))] (2.21)
for the joint quota where is the least cost separating output under a national quota, 
qf is the least cost separating output when the constraint only binds when the entrant 
believes it competes with low cost incumbent and q^J when the constraint always 
binds, regardless of the incumbent’s cost type. Whereas the least cost separating 
output is always dependent on the size of the quota imposed, the least cost separating 
output under the joint quota of firm i is also dependent on Pj, the prior beliefs that 
the entrant holds regarding the other incumbent’s cost type.
2.3.3 Equivalence in Strategic Behaviour
At this point, we can ask ourselves if an equivalent tariff would have the same effect 
on signalling as a quota. We know that an additive tariff t increases the entrant’s
48
marginal cost and therefore reduces its equilibrium output i.e. dql/dc$ < 0. F irs t, 
consider the national quota case. Assume an additive tariff yields an entrant equi­
librium output ql(pi,t) in market 1, where q\ is dependent on the expected c o st 
type of the incumbent plus the tariff. Clearly, we require that (7] ( 1 ,0  =  K 1 and so  
(0, < K l . However, q\ (0, t*) < q\ (0) because dq\/dt < 0 which implies
niH (?!ƒƒ* 93 (0)) < (*?!ƒ/! (CM*)) (2.22)
(ch -  Cl ) <  0 (2.23)
Hence, qN (t) > qN which means that the limit price is lower for all quota equivalent 
tariffs. Furthermore, if the national quota is reduced such that K l < <7] (0) then =  
(7}/7 which implies that a non-distortionary separating equilibrium exists. However, 
this is not true for an equivalent tariff as differentiating the profit function of IH  
yields
d2’1'}//buf ■ <73 (/‘i .o )  1
dc$dfi\ 18
which implies that increasing t in order to reduce the equilibrium output of the entrant
in line with a reduction in the quota, increases the distance between tt}w {cfca, q$ (0, £))
and 7r\Jf (M))- Therefore, dq^/dt > 0 and d q ^ /d K l > 0.
Let us now look the joint quota. The entrant’s allocation to each market must
also be achieved by a tariff imposed on both markets. We therefore have
^  ^  /i ) =  ~ (Ch ~ c^) +  __ a -  2 (c3 +  ¿) + MiCtf + (1 -  jit) cL ^  24^
6 3
which rearranges to
2 1 3
t'* = -a  + -  [(/¿i +  fij) ch + (2 — -  /ij) cL] — ~K — C3
This implies that £** is the same for both market =  1,2. Therefore, a joint tariff 
exists which yields the equivalent output in both markets as under the joint quota. 
As above we see that q\ (1, P2) = 93 (1,£**) but that q\ (0) < q\ (0,£**) which implies 
that the limit price will always be higher under a quota-equivalent tariff.
However, if we reduce the joint quota so that it is always binding, we see that 
q] (0) P2 ) = <73 (0, t**). In other words, the equivalent tariff will yield a similar strategic 
response in the incumbent, but only when the constraint is always binding.
We can summarise with the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.3 Equivalent tariffs and quotas for both national and joint trade poli­
cies have opposite effects on the limit price. Whereas an increasing tariff lowers the 
limit price, an equivalent, increasingly restrictive quota raises the limit price. How­
ever, when we consider small joint quotas where the entrant’s output is always binding, 
an equivalent tariff will yield an equivalent response in the incumbent’s actions.
Above, we noted that in order to obtain limit pricing behaviour, we need to restrict 
the range of the national quotas. We stated that a national quota must bind the 
entrant’s output if the incumbent has a high marginal cost, but that the constraint 
no longer binds when the incumbent has a low marginal cost. For the joint quota, the 
separating equilibrium exists whether or not the quota binds when the incumbent 
has a low marginal cost. However, we need to define the range of the joint quota 
which causes the constraint to bind. Consider the position from market 1 when the 
constraint no longer binds. If 1 signals a low cost type then g] (0) = (a — 2C3 + Cl) /3. 
However, XL does not know what the entrant’s output in market 2 will be although 
it knows its expected output q\ (p2) =  (a -  2C3 +  p2Cfj +  (1 — p2) Ci) /3. If K  > 
K  = £3 (0) + (p2) then XL expects'that the constraint is not binding and that the
entrant will produce its Cournot equilibrium output in both markets. We also need 
to define a minimum for the constraint. This is simply K. = 93 (0) + q% (0). Hence, 
for K <  K  < K  the constraint created by the joint quota is binding.
We can now turn to the analysis of the limit prices that result from a joint or 
national quota.
2.3.4 The Extent of Limit Pricing
K l > 3K  4- (1 -  P2 ) (cu -  ci) 
6
(2.25)
Proposition 2.4 For K l ,K 2 6 (/£, K ) and K 1 4- K 2 = K  then
Proof. Consider q? = qJ. Then
—1 <
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*\h (?&. 93(1,^ ) )
“ (1 ~Pj)(cH ~CL)
K i
< H {$H * 93 (11 K *) )
I  3(A'J - K l)
>  ( l - p j ) ( c t f - c L) +  3/C
< 6
|  9i(l.Pa)
Therefore, K x > q'3 (1, ¿>2) implies q? > qƒ. ■
This makes sense: if the incumbent expects a lower entrant output under the jo in t  
quota compared to the national quota (implied by K ' > ql3 (ljpa)) then there are less 
incentives to signal cost type. Note that if K 1 =  K 2 then K * < q\ (l,Pj) so t h a t  
qJ > qN.
A further remark to make refers to q^Jr the least cost separating output when th e  
constraint is always binding for the joint quota.
C orollary 2.5 The limit price falls as the joint quota decreases in size i.e, dq^J/ d K  <.
0.
Proof. We consider a joint quota that is always binding. Find some q^J that makes 
inequality 2.18 hold with equality. Rearrange to get,
A h
A n  ~
(lu i 1 (O.ft)) -  An  ( ? u /.93  (1 ,P2))]
- . '« ( a n (2.26)
We can use ^  as a proxy for the limit price. Substitute in the parameter values and  
differentiate $  with respect to K  to get,
1
~QK ~  ~24 {CH ~ C^ < 0  <2 27)
Therefore, as K  falls, rises. In order for equality to remain, a rise in must be 
linked with a rise in q^J. Hence, |  K, j #, j qjJ, i.e. dq^J/d K  < 0 which means that 
as the joint quota falls in size, the limit price also falls. ■
When the quota is always constraining the entrant’s output, no matter what the 
incumbent’s cost type, a national quota of a similar size will result in no limit pricing 
behaviour. Moreover, the joint quota may stimulate pre-entry signalling from the low 
cost incumbent when under a national quota, this would not occur.
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2.4 Equilibrium with Incumbent Trade
In this section we allow the incumbents to enter each others’ markets, without re­
strictions, in the second period. As above, we study the effects of a national and joint 
quota on the strategic behaviour of the incumbents. The results are similar to those 
obtained in the previous section, with the exception of the small joint quota.
2.4.1 National Quota
Let us move on to the separating equilibrium for both national and joint quotas 
when the incumbents also engage in international trade. The incumbents enter each 
other’s markets in the second period, unconstrained by the national quota. Firm 
3, on the other hand, is constrained by the quota. However, this means that the 
entrant could face two high cost incumbents, two low cost incumbents or both cost 
types. To ensure that the low cost incumbents have an incentive to signal in the first 
period, we assume that the quota is larger than the complete information equilibrium 
output the entrant would produce when facing two low cost incumbents. However, if 
the quota is to constrain the entrant’s output it must be smaller than the complete 
information equilibrium output when facing at least one high cost inciunbent for sure. 
It is assumed that the incumbents know each others’ costs.
The incentive constraint for the low cost incumbent 1L is,
A l Mi ) + i7ru  Mil, 920,93 (0)) > +  6it\L (<&, <&, K l) (2.28)
Similarly, the incentive constraint for the high cost incumbent IH  is
n iH  M i )  +  ( 9 i / / i  9 2 / / i 9 3  ( 0 ) )  <  n \ H +  6 n \ H ,  9 2 / / >  K l )  ( 2 . 2 9 )
As we can see, the constraints for the separating equilibrium are very similar to those 
in the no trade model. However, we obtain second period tripoly profits instead of 
duopoly profits. Solving equation 2.28 for equality, we get:
a - c L
[ r i i  ( 9 1 1 . 9 2 0 , 9 3  ( 0 ) )  -  n \ L (<&><&>K l )]2 (2.30)
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and then solving equation 2.29 similarly yields,
v a — Cft 
2? = - ^  + \jb ~\H9' (<?i/ƒi Q2H1Q3 (0)) — 92//> h l)] (2-31)
As in the previous section, for some first period output. € (fl^flf^) a separating 
equilibrium exists. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that
^IL (*?!£> *720» 93 (0)) {filit Q2H1 93 (0)) “ (flu/» Qw> ^ 1)
(2.32)
for the separating equilibrium to hold. Substituting in the parameter values we find 
that equation 2.32 simplifies to ch > c i, hence a separating equilibrium exists.
The fact that the incumbents enter each other’s markets changes little in the 
signalling game. Indeed, this situation is similar to Mailath’s (1989) n firm example 
of signalling, with the exception that one of the firms does not signal and its capacity 
is constrained. However, the result we obtain is more interesting when we compare 
it with the case of the joint quota, explained below.
2.4.2 Joint Quota
For the joint constraint we need to consider the case where the quota only binds if the 
incumbent has a high cost and when the constraint always binds, regardless of the 
incumbent’s type. In the former, the low cost incumbent has the following incentive 
constraint:
L (Qil) + &tt\l (flu, g20,03 (0)) > *\l + ^ 0 .^ /2 )  (2-33)
and the high cost incumbent,
(9li<) + ^ lH  (fll/Zi 920» 93 (0)) < 7r}// + (il//» 920» K /%) (2.34)
Signalling still takes place because market share gains can still be made by sepa­
rating. As above, sufficient conditions for a separating equilibrium are,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ *}11 -  A h  ( 9 u . ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > 6
ftlH (l7l//i 929. 93 (0)) — A h (9iH> 9'20> ^f/2)
__________ At. -  At, (9il )__________
A l  ( 9 i i i 9 2 « . 9 3 ( 0 ) )  —  A l  ( 9 i l i  9 2 9 .
> (2.35)
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By Lemma 2.1 the numerator of the LHS is greater than that of the RHS. However, 
we need to check the denominator to see if,
»}L (9ii. 92®. 93 (0)) -  v\L ((&,<?£. K/2)
> *1H ifluii 929.93 (0)) — 2t}h , ?2S> ^ /2 )  (2.36)
Again, substituting in the parameter values and simplifying reduces equation 2.30 to 
cu > cL, hence a separating equilibrium exists. Again this result is similar to the 
previous section. We see that the presence of another firm in the market does not 
upset the separating equilibrium, although it may lead to non-distortionary pre-entry 
strategies.
The least cost separating output is given by
2/ = +  \]6 fa»«* ( 9 u / . 93 (0)) -  (<&„<&,, K/2)] (2.37)
which is similar that of the free trade case, with the exception that if the incumbent 
signals a high marginal cost, the constraint is binding and the entrant allocates the 
same quantity to each market. The difference in the least cost, separating outputs is
given by
af 1  aT
n iH0' (dir, 02W» ^"*) §  n iH0' (fllf/J Q2 H * K / % )
K /2  |  K*
Clearly, if K l > K /2  then qj7 > q* but because K  = K 1 4* K 2 it. must also be that 
K /2  > K 2 which implies > q£.
However, when the constraint is very small, so that it always binds, the results are 
quite different. When there was no intra-communitarian trade, a small national quota 
K x < K_ led to an absence of limit pricing behaviour. The entrant’s output would 
not change on entry into the market due to the constraint imposed on its output, 
thus removing the need to signal cost type. Nevertheless, when an equivalent joint 
quota was imposed, limit pricing could still emerge as an equilibrium strategy. If we 
consider trade between the incumbents, a very small national quota has the same 
effect as in the no-trade case. However, a joint quota will have a similar effect.
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Proposition 2.6 For intra-communitarian trade, when the joint quota is very small, 
such that the constraint, K, always binds, there urill be no limit pricing.
Proof. The incentive constraints for the low and high cost types are:
+ ^ IL  (?1L> ^ 201 > 7r{i, +  ^ IL  ^20’ (2.38)
and
^Ih Wii) + ^7ri// (91//) 925» (2.39)
respectively. As we see, the low cost firm gains nothing by signalling its cost type. 
This applies for the high cost firm. Therefore, there will be no limit pricing. ■
What we see is that when the joint quota is very small, limit pricing never takes 
place. This is the opposite result to the same quota when there was no trade between 
the incumbents. The reason for this is that when the incumbents trade, the resid­
ual demand for the entrant is the same in both markets. Indeed, regardless of the 
incumbents’ actual cost types, the demand that the entrant faces is the same and so 
it allocates its restricted output equally between the two. In other words, both high 
and low cost type incumbents choose their monopoly outputs in the second period 
because the entrant’s output is so small that it will produce up to the quota, whatever 
their cost type might be.
The effects of trade policy on the incumbent’s actions are similar to those of 
the previous section. However, when the quota is small so that the entrant always 
produces up to its constraint, regardless of the incumbents cost types, no limit pricing 
occurs. With a similar tariff, we would still obtain limit pricing behaviour because 
firms would still have an incentive to protect their market shares.
Joint quotas force incumbents to act more strategically than under the national 
quota system because it forces them to consider the strategies of firms in other mar­
kets. As we have seen, symmetric quotas will lead to a lower limit price (higher least 
cost separating output) under a joint quota than under a national quota. However, 
if national quotas differ significantly between countries, this relationship could be 
reversed.
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2.5 Welfare Effects
We should now look at the welfare effects of imposing the different types of quota. We 
ignore the analysis of the effect of tariffs on welfare as this has already been dealt with 
extensively by Levy and Nolan (1992). In some sense, the results here complement 
their findings for tariffs, by illustrating the welfare differences that emerge when 
equivalent quotas are applied. Furthermore, we can look at the welfare effects of 
strategic changes in the firms’ behaviour. In order to do this we need to consider 
both first and second period welfare.
Welfare is assumed to be the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We can ignore 
the profits earned by the entrant as it does not produce in the market. Furthermore, 
we assume that quota rents are captured by the entrant. Inclusion of quota rents 
implies that each government sets a price for the quota. However, choosing prices 
find quotas that maximise welfare is beyond the scope of the present analysis (see 
McCorrist.on and Sheldon 1994 for a detailed analysis).
2.5.1 First Period .Welfare
In the first period, the incumbents are the sole producers in the market. We can show 
that any kind of first period price distortions will raise first, period welfare. Denote 
first period welfare by the function W} (q) which is the sum of producer and consumer 
surplus i.e.
w? (?) «  *! (?) +  r  P (?) d q - P  (?) ? (2.40)
Jq= 0
As ttJ (q) ~  [P (g) — c] q we can differentiate with respect to q to obtain
^  =  P ( ? ) - c >  0 (2.41)
The incumbent’s price is strictly greater than its marginal cost. Otherwise, it would 
obtain zero first period profits which cannot be compensated by discounted future 
profits. Looking at the different quota cases we can easily compare first period wel­
fare. Furthermore, we see that the second order condition d2W}/dq2 = P' (q) < 0 
implies that the welfare function is concave: as output rises, welfare increases before
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eventually decreasing. However, as we restrict ourselves to P (q) > c then welfare is  
always increasing in q. Using the results from the previous section we can state th e  
following proposition.
Proposition 2.7 First period welfare in each market increases under a joint quota  
only when <73 (l,pj) > K '.
Proof. If <73 (l,pj) > K* then q^ > q1^. By concavity of the welfare function w ith  
respect to output
AW', =  W{ (2iw) -  WJ (g/) < 0 (2.42)
Therefore, we can state
AW{ — < 0 if <?3 ( 1, Pj ) > K' 
> 0 otherwise.
(2.43)
for i = 1,2 i ^  j. ■
Problems arise when q\(l,P j) > K l but iK h p j)  < K 2, A joint quota will 
increase welfare in market 1 but will lower it in market 2. However, welfare gains 
may outweigh losses, depending on the relative least, cost separating outputs.
What about the effect, of the quota on first, period welfare, via the limit price? 
Differentiating the welfare function with respect to K 1 we get
d\Vl dqN£ÎÎJ- =  (P (<7) - c ) ^ | l r  > 0 (2.44)dIO d K l
In other words, as we increase the quota the least cost separating output increases and 
welfare increases. Note that because no quota yields the highest least cost separating 
output, there is no quota such that dW }fdK l =  0. The second order condition gives
d2Wl
< 0 (2.45)
5 ( /C )2 d q " d K l '  ' d ( K ' f
as dP /dqi < 0, dq1^/d K l > 0 and d2q ^/d  (K 1)2 <  0.4 Therefore, as the quota 
rises, welfare increases but at a decreasing rate.
q%sTS__
4 Using the equilibrium values 
dqN
dK1 ?3 (0)) (9?/ƒ» tf1)]
>0
wapjii ffHB BlWli. uggnumigaa
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In the case of intra-communitarian trade, q\ (1, pj) = K /2  so that welfare in both 
countries is identical under the joint quota. However, welfare is different under the 
national quotas only if K l ^  K 2. If K l > K 2 then the welfare in country 1 will be 
higher than that of country 2 because q^ > q^. Of course, we showed above that when 
the incumbents engage in trade, K l > K/2 > K 2 which implies q^ > q^ — q^ > q^. 
In order to see the full effect on welfare, let Us look at figure 2.1. Consider q* = y 
and q^ =  z and q£ = z*. We can see that welfare is always higher under the joint 
quota, as the gains in one market offset the losses in the other i.e. By concavity of 
the welfare function, we can see that
> W ' ( i i )  + Wi  (siO
2W i(g f) > W} (2" )  +  W} (2" )
W ?0tf) > 5 E ^ ( 2 . n )
Given these results, what kind of simple policy can we suggest? The government 
knows that signalling is at its most pronouced when the quotas are large. If both 
countries set K x = K  then welfare will be the same tmder a national quota system as 
under a joint quota system, as long as pi = p2- Hence, q1^ =  q£ = q£ =  q£ . Needless 
to say, if pi ^  p2i then ^  q* and welfare will be higher under national quotas.
2.5.2 Second Period Welfare
Second period welfare is a little more complex as we need to consider the effect of the 
entrant’s output on welfare. A quota is set by a government before the first period 
of the game. At this stage only prior beliefs can be used to estimate the incumbent’s 
cost type, First, let us look at the effect of a national quota on welfare. Summing
d { K ' ) 2
_________ v \ h  K l ) y/6________
V~6
(<?!ƒƒ *93 (0)) -  tfjw
< 0
and
w
•
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1
1
1
1
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Figure 2.1: First period welfare as a function of the least cost separating output.
consumer and producer surplus in the second period yields
t 1 ( a -  (PiCH +  (1 -  Pi)cL) + K l \
+ 2 [ -----------------2 ) (2.46)
The higher the output of the entrant (implied by a liigher A'1), the lower will be 
the domestic producer’s profits, but the larger will be consumer surplus. Therefore, 
restricting the entrant’s output will have the same effect on welfare as marginal cost 
does, as described by Levy and Nolan (1992), As we discuss the case where the quota 
is always binding, let us consider C3 so small that the domestic producer just remains 
in the market i.e. C3 = 2c* — a + e (where e is small). Imposing a quota raises prices 
and allows the domestic producer to enter the market. The relationship between the 
welfare and the quota can be seen in figure 2.2. In fact, we can think of this function 
depicting the maximum quota possible for all levels of entrant margined cost i.e. think 
of the maximum quota K. Note that as the marginal cost of the entrant rises, we 
must restrict the range of quotas, thus limiting our analysis to the LHS of figure 2.2. 
The horizontal part on the RHS of figure 2.2 represents the point, where the quota is 
no longer binding for a very low cost entrant. If the entrant had a higher marginal
x  z  y Kx '  z '  y '
Figure 2.2: Relationship between second period welfare and entrant’s output.
cost, this horizontal part of the welfare function would start some where to the left 
of the present line.
To illustrate the effects of a quota on welfare, assume that the entrant has a very 
low marginal cost, so that we can impose a large quota which might put us at z in 
the diagram. Increasing the quota to y will yield higher welfare while restricting it to 
x  will reduce welfare. On the other hand, if the entrant has a rather high marginal 
cost, the quota will be smaller, perhaps zf. Here we obtain the opposite result. By 
increasing the quota to y! welfare falls while restricting the quota further to x* raises 
welfare.
However, we must also note that the marginal costs of the incumbent firms may 
also differ. Of course, this will have an effect on the welfare function, as we can see 
in figure 2.3. Denote the welfare function of a country which has a high (low) cost 
incumbent by Wf? (\VL) we see that Wl lies above W/j and that \V'H > \V'L. The 
fact that lower marginal costs imply higher welfare is obvious: low costs lead to both 
lower prices and higher profits. The difference in the slopes of the two functions can 
be seen by differentiating the welfare function with respect to K m. For example, for
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country 1 we have
tW î to u K 1) 1 / , , ,  J r \
-----ôjçi-----  =  2 '  - * » )
=  - l ( a - ( PicH + ( l - Pl)cL) - 3 K l) (2.47)
We see that welfare is falling (rising) for qfy > iC1(< K l) and that the slope of.the wel­
fare function is increasing in the incumbent’s cost i.e. denote Ci =  (p,c// 4- (1 — px) Cl ) 
then d2W2 /d K ldci =  1/4 > 0. Let us summarise the result in the following proposi­
tion.
Proposition 2.8 Welfare is maximised by (i) free trade when C3 < C\ and (ii) by a 
complete embargo when C3 > c\ .
In other words, if the entrant’s marginal cost is less than that of the incumbent, 
then gfj < K l. However, due to the convexity of the welfare function, welfare rises 
as K l increases. Clearly, free trade yields the highest welfare. On the other hand, if 
C3 > ci then q% > K 1 and welfare is falling in K 1, hence a complete embargo would 
yield the highest level of welfare. With these results, economic reasons to impose 
quotas seem difficult to find unless import licenses can be imposed (McCorriston and 
Sheldon 1994).
It is now possible to study the second period welfare effects of a national and 
joint quota. Under the joint quota, the entrant’s total output is constrained and its 
allocation between the two markets depends on the relative differences in the marginal 
costs of the incumbents. Therefore, we denote welfare under a joint quota by
W'2{puP2lK) = f  ~ i^ 7p‘ ~ ± 1 P ~ 7pi- +  p2>
’6a -  ((5pi +  pi) cH + (6 -  5pi -  pi) cL) + 3K s 2
12 (2.48)
The difference in welfare between a national and joint quota is thus
AWi =  IV,1 (c„ K ') + W* (a,K*) -  W} (ci,c2, tf )  -  W2 ( d . c ,  K) 
— [(Pi — ftjicw -C i) -  3 ^ *  -  A'2)]
X [(Pi -  Pi) (C// -  Ci) +  (K 1 -  K 2)] (2.49)
61
Figure 2.3: Relationship between welfare and entrant’s output for a high and low cost 
incumbent.
Therefore, if A W 2 > 0 (AVV2 < 0) then joint quotas reduce (increase) welfare.
We can see that there are two effects at work, the differences in the national 
quotas and the differences in marginal costs between the two countries. For example, 
when pi = p2 equation 2.49 reduces to Z(Kl — K 2 ) 2 /16 which is always positive, 
hence AW2 > 0. On the other hand, when K l ~ K 2 equation 2.49 reduces to 
- { p \ -  P2 ) (ch -  cl) 2 /16 which is always negative for p\ P2 , hence AW 2 < 0,
A more general explanation for these two results can be seen using figures 2.2 
and 2.3. First, K l ^  K 2 and cj = C2 = c is implied by figure 2.2 taking K l = x 
and K 2 — y (or K 1 = x' and K 2  =  t/). As the marginal costs are the same, the 
entrant will allocate the same output to each market under the joint quota, where 
(K l + K 2) ¡2 — z (or z'). As the costs are the same, we know that
m ( Pl,P2, { K 1 +  K 2)  f t )  =  W i  (p , ( t f 1 +  K 2)  f t )  (2.50)
a w 2 =  £  w i (ft, / c )  -  £  wj ip., f e  k *) / 2)
=  Wi (ft, K l) +  W 2 (ft, K 2) -  Wi (ft, (A-1 +  K 2) f t )
Hence
02
-W ] (p „ (K l + K 2 ) /2 )  (2.51)
Using the fact, that the welfare function is convex to the origin, we know that
Wi (ft, (K ' + K 2) /2) < (ft, K 1) + l-W 2 (ft, K 2) (2.52)
which implies AW 2 > 0.
Secondly, when K l = K 2  and pi ^  P2 we must turn to figure 2.3. We begin 
at, K l = K 2 — z (or z'). When the joint quota is imposed, the entrant allocates 
resources according to the relative marginal cost differences between the incumbents. 
The country with the highest marginal cost will face the largest entrant output. If  
Pi > p2 then country 1 welfare is represented by Wfj. The joint quota will lead to a  
reallocation of resources such that the entrant will produce y (or y') in 1 and x  (a:') 
in 2 (note that y -  z = z ~  x). Whether we take z or z! as our starting point, welfare 
always rises because the slope of W i is always less than that of W//. In other words, 
the. move from z to y for 1 produces higher welfare gains than the losses incurred in 
2 resulting from a move from z to x.
Suppose K l ^  K 2 and p\ ^  p2 - Clearly, the two effects discussed above will work 
against each other. Looking at equation 2.49 we see that if K 1 > K 2 and Ci > C2 
then AW 2 > 0 if 3 (K 1 — K 2) > (p\ — pj) (Ch — Ci) > 0. To understand, let us do 
the following manipulation. FYom 2.49 we have
=» 3 (K 1 — K 2^  > (pi — P2 ) (cm — ci)
=> ^  (Pi -  Pa) fa* ~  cL) [ k 2
3
=> 2K 1 > (pi ~ ^  ^CH ~  +  K 2 +  K 1
3
¿¿I > (pi ~  P2 ) (ch -  cl) + 3 (K 2 + K 1)
6
=> K 1 > q l(p u p2)
In other words, if we consider the change in entrant output, following a move from 
a national to a joint, quota, welfare will fall if the entrant allocates less output to 
the high cost market. On the other hand, if more output is allocated, then welfare 
improves imder the joint quota scheme. Similarly, if K 1 > K 2 and P\ < p2  then
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AW2 > 0 if (K l — K 2) > (p2  — Pi) (ch — cl) > 0. Manipulating will again yield that 
AW2 > 0 if K 1 > q2 (pi, P2 ) i.e. welfare falls with the joint quota if the reallocation is 
less than the largest national quota. This again is due to the convexity of the welfare 
functions. Any output allocation between K 1 and K 2 will lower welfare. However, 
allocations outside this range will raise welfare under the joint quota.
Joint quotas can offer welfare gains only if the output allocation lies outside the 
range of the national quotas. Indeed, this result also holds if we introduce incumbent 
trade in the second period. Using the equilibrium values we see that
Aly2 =  ! ( t f . _ K ’) 2 > 0  (2.53)
for A’1 7^  K 2. In other words, the joint quota always reduces welfare when incumbent 
trade takes place. When there is trade between the incumbents, the entrant always 
allocates the same output to each market i.e. q3 (pi, P2) =  (A'1 + K 2) / 2. Clearly, 
(K l + K 2) / 2  6  (K l}K 2) which means that welfare must fall under the joint quota.
Let us summarise the results of this section with the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.9
A Wo
- { i
> 0 î/^3 (P1.P2) g [A'1, A"2] 
0 otherwise
The result is driven by the convexity of the welfare function. Policy conclusions 
suggest that a joint quota is preferable when there are cost differences between the two 
domestic producers. This leads to a more competitive allocation of goods between the 
markets. However, a complete embargo or no quota at all would yield even greater 
welfare.
Nevertheless, we noted earlier that first period welfare is concave with respect to 
the quota while the second period welfare is convex. If we added together the first 
and second period welfare functions and differential with respect to K 1 we obtain an 
optimum if
d (W l + Wl)
d K l = (p (a (2.54)
The first term is always positive and the second can be both positive and nega­
tive. As long as the first term is not too positive, we can find some K* such that
d(\V{ + Ur2l) /d K l = 0. All we need to know now is whether this is a maximum o r  
a minimum. The second order condition for a maximum is
a n v }  __ a p  a /  , .  . P t f
d ( K ' f  d t f d K 1 '  yq> ’ d ( K ' f < 0 (2.55)
which could certainly be satisfied for 6  small enough. Of course, a quota which 
maximises welfare could only exist if > K . In this situation, the entrant’s marginal 
cost is relatively high, requiring a relatively small maximum quota. However, due to  
the convexity of the welfare function in the second period, a complete embargo would 
be more welfare enhancing. However, this would stop pre-entry limit pricing and thus 
lower first period welfare.
Setting national quotas equal to each other enhances first period welfare. In the 
second period, if cost differences exist, a joint quota will produce higher welfare. 
However, this only leads to the same first period welfare as the joint quota if p\ =  p2* 
On the other hand, if pi =  p2 then unequal national quotas yield higher second period 
welfare. But then this yields lower first, period welfare.
2.6 An Alternative Interpretation '<
An alternative interpretation of the national and joint quota scenario can be applied 
to the analysis. Consider the following situation. The entrant is a multinational 
enterprise which sets up plants in two geographically separate markets. We might 
think of the quota as a capacity constraint that a multinational entrant faces when it 
sets up production in a country. The capacity constraint might represent maximum 
plant production: when the entrant is faced by a high cost incumbent it has excess 
capacity; when faced by a low cost incumbent its output is constrained.5 The two 
countries might form a free-trade agreement allowing the multinational to export, 
and import between the two depending on demand. We can allow or restrict trade 
between the two markets by the incumbent firms, depending on the technologies we 
endow them with.
5 If the entrant builds the plant, knowing only prior beliefs, then the optimal plant size will equal 
the expected output and hence will not lie on the reaction function.
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As we see, little differs from the former analysis: we can restrict, the entrant’s 
output which affects the strategy of the incumbent. If two markets can be supplied, 
then the same allocation rule must also exist for the entrant. The difference in the 
size of national quotas can be seen in the different sizes of production units. Of 
course, if these are the same, opening up free trade between the two countries can 
only enhance joint welfare. Even if plant size is determined by prior beliefs, welfare 
will never decrease, and at the worse, it will remain the same.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has considered the effects of trade policy on the strategic behaviour of 
domestic producers vis-a-vis foreign competitors. First, we were able to show that 
the equivalent tariffs and quotas may not have equivalent effects on limit pricing be­
haviour. Indeed, when national quotas are considered, a tariff lowers the limit price 
while an equivalent quota raises it. Furthermore, when quotas are always binding, 
regardless of the incumbent’s marginal cost, no limit pricing behaviour will be ob­
served: On the other hand, the tariff always enhances signalling, until a prohibitive 
tariff deters entry entirely. We were able to show that a joint quota does have an 
equivalent tariff and that if the quota is very small, the tariff and quota will have an 
equivalent effect on the limit price. Thus, the results of Fung (1989) can be extended 
to equivalent firm strategies but only for a single restrictive case.
Secondly, we compared the effect of national and joint quotas on the limit price. 
We saw that quotas of similar sizes did not always have similar effects on the in­
cumbents’ first period strategies. If the incumbents did not engage in trade and if 
national quotas were of equal size, the limit price under a joint quota was found to 
be lower than under a national quota. However, if national quotas differ in size, this 
result may not always hold. Essentially, if the allocation of entrant output imder a 
joint quota is greater than under a national quota, then the limit price will be lower 
imder the former regime compared to the latter. This makes sense: the higher the 
entrant’s output, the lower the incumbent's expected profits and hence the greater 
the incentive for a high cost firm to imitate the strategy of a low cost incumbent.
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Consequently, the low cost firm must find a lower limit price in order to reveal i ts  
cost type. When we allowed for incumbent trade in the second period, limit pric­
ing still existed as an equilibrium strategy with the national quota. However, under 
a joint quota scheme, no signalling would take place because the incumbents were 
tumble to affect the equilibrium output of the entrant.
Thirdly, we turned to the analysis of -welfare. "We saw that, “first, period welfare 
is concave while second period welfare is convex with respect to the quota. Quotas 
basically raise pre-entry prices in the separating equilibrium, lowering welfare. On 
the other hand, we foimd that second period welfare is optimised by either free trade 
or a complete embargo on imports. The former is the case when the entrant has a  
lower marginal cost than the incumbent. Its production in the market reduces the 
incumbent’s profits but this is outweighed by gains in consumer surplus resulting 
from lower prices. In contrast, if the incumbent has a lower marginal cost than 
the entrant, then restricting the entrant’s output further raises welfare: the loss in 
consumer surplus from higher prices is outweighed by the gains in the incumbent’s 
profits. The comparison between national and joint quotas allows us to conclude two 
things: if prior beliefs differ, the joint quota raises total expected welfare; if national 
quotas differ, a joint quota lowers welfare. Differences in beliefs imply a difference in 
expected costs which means that the joint quota will lead to a better allocation of 
resources. Welfare may fall in one of the markets but the overall effect will be positive. 
On the other hand, if beliefs are the same for both markets, but national quotas differ, 
the reallocation of resources under the joint quota lowers welfare because the losses in 
one market do not compensate for the gains in the other market. This is because of 
the convex nature of the welfare function, reflecting the fact that removing the quota 
increases welfare at an increasing rate.
Trade policy attempts to enhance welfare in an economy. However, as it affects the 
strategies of all firms, there are also indirect effects on welfare. First period welfare is 
never enhanced by a quota whereas it is by a tariff. On the other hand, if a quota is to 
be imposed for political reasons, a joint quota will generally improve welfare. Second 
period welfare depends on the belief (cost) differences between the firms. Either a
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complete embargo or free trade yield the highest levels of welfare. However, if quotas 
are to be imposed, then as long as the differences in beliefs about costs are large 
and that the differences in national quotas are small, a joint quota may yield higher 
welfare levels. Furthermore, by considering the case where the entrant’s marginal cost 
is smaller than that of the incumbent’s, it might be possible to find an optimal quota 
which maximises two period welfare. Therefore, restricting the entrant’s output leads 
to welfare losses in the first period (due to a higher limit price) which are balanced 
by the welfare gains in the second period.
Appendix
2.7.1 Second Period Incomplete Information Equilibria
No Quota, No Incumbent Trade
First, let us consider the case of no trade and no quota imposed on the entrant’s 
output. A duopoly will result in both markets 1 and 2, so let us consider market 
1, the home market of firm 1. In the second period, firm 1L, firm 1H  and firm 3 
maximise,
tt}l (9it, <73 (Mi)) =  max (a -  cL -  q\L -  g] (mi)) 9u  (2.56)
9l L
*IH (?!//> 93 (Mi)) -  max (a - c H -  q\H -  93 (Mi)) <Ah (257)
and
(9i0>920, 93 (MiiM2)) **
«, “ P  (“ -  CJ -  (m 'h + (1 -  « )  <Al) -  93) Qz ~ f  
for each market for i E {1,2}. The total profits of firm 3 will be
II3 =  *3 (910> 920,93 (Mi»M2)) +  *r!(gitf, 920,93 (Mi* M2)) 
The first order conditions for IL, 1 if,and 3 are thus,
C?7rJ
dq~  = a - c L -  2 q\L -  9J =  01L
dn}
dq -  cH -  2q\H - q l  = 01H
(2.58)
(2.59)
(2.60)
(2.61)
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and
dn 1
= a -  c3 -  inqliH ~  U -  Mi) 9il -  2g3 < 0 
respectively. The reaction functions of firm 1 and 3 are given by,
6r a - C e - q 3 
<?10 — o
(2.62)
(2.63)
and
<?3 (M.) =  (2.64)
respectively. Note that the entrant’s output depends on its beliefs and firm 1. What­
ever output the entrant produces the incumbent reacts along its reaction function. 
When all information is revealed, we will write the unrestricted complete information 
Cournot equilibrium output for firm 1 as simply qig. When outputs are written within 
a profit function which denotes the market where the profits are made, we discard 
the market qualification.
Solving, we get the unrestricted Cournot duopoly output in market 1 of firm 1L,
2a -t- c3 -  ji\Cii -  (4 -  fii)cL 
6
(2.65)
of firm l /f ,
and of firm 3:
<?iH “  ^
2a +  c3 -  (1 + Mi) cH -  (3 -  mi) cl
<73 (Mi) = a — 2c3 + Mic/z +  (1 “  Mi) cl
( 2.66)
(2.67)
As the output of firm 3 is dependent on the beliefs that it holds about the incumbents’ 
marginal costs, we write its output as a function of Mi» the probability that firm 1 
will have a high marginal cost. The expected profits of the entrant are,
*3(<7ie,?3(Mi)) = — 2c3 +  MiC// +  (1 — Mi) CL) (2.68)
for market 1. The duopoly profits of the incumbent are given by
»i. (flS.fc {/..)) = 2^- i-^ + .2c3.-p-(lTM »)c,y  (2 69)
where 9 6 {L, H}. We can see from the symmetry imposed that the duopoly profits 
of firms 2 and 3 in market 2 will depend on /12 in the same way as they do for market 
1 for firms 1 and 3,
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National Quota, N o Incumbent Trade
When the quota is small enough so that the constraint is binding, the entrant pro­
duces the quota, K'ior each market, i £ {1,2}. From above, we can use the same 
maximisation process for firms 1 and 3. However, this time the quota is less than 
the entrant’s Cournot output. As the entrant would like to produce as close to the 
Cournot output as possible, it will produce at the level of the quota, hence q\ = I \ \  
The entrant’s post-entry profit is given by equation 2.58 by substituting q\ for K l 
and qm and q1L for their respective reaction functions, in equations 2.65 and 2.66. 
This yields,
*3 (?S. ■ft'1) =  f °  ~  2Ca +2~1~ — CL K 1 (2.70)
for both markets 1 and 2.
The duopoly profit of the incumbent is simply (${£) , hence,
*?. (flS,ft-1) =  (2-71)
Similar profits can be calculated for firms 2 and 3 in market 2.
Immediately, we see that the duopoly profits of the entrant only depend on beliefs 
if the constraint is not binding. If the constraint is binding for all incumbent cost 
types, the entrant will just produce up to the constraint in the post-entry game. As 
we shall see later in the analysis of the separating equilibrium, sufficient conditions 
for limit pricing rely on the size of the quota imposed.
Joint Quota, No Incumbent Ti*ade
When a joint constraint is imposed by both countries the entrant’s output is depen­
dent on the relative differences in the incumbents’ marginal costs. The joint quota 
means that firm 3’s total output in both markets 1 and 2 is restricted. In other words, 
ql + q% = K. Given this relationship, we can write q\ =  K  — q\ and substitute it out 
of the maximisation process. We can rewrite the entrant’s maximisation over the two 
markets, presented in equation 2.59 as,
n 3 = maxTr] ($i0,$20,?3 (n 1,^ 2)) +  *3 ($10,920, K  -  q\ (/¿i,/i2)) (2.72)
70
The first order conditions for the entrant under the joint quota are hence,
-  (a -  c3 -  m i n  "  (1 -  M2) gh  ~ 2 (hT -  93)) =  0 (2.73)
substituting in the first order conditions of the incumbents (from equation 2.60 and 
2.61 and similarly for firm 2), we obtain the equilibrium allocation for firm 3 in market
1,
1, \ (Mi — M2) (c/f — Cl) + 3K /n iA\
93 (Mi > M2 )  ----------------- g------------------ (2*74)
and similarly for market 2,
2 / \ (M2 “  Mi) (ch — cL) +  3K
<& (MiiM2) = ----------------- 7------------------ (2.75)
Equation 2.74 is the same as 2.9 defined in the text. If beliefs are the same for each 
market (i.e. fx 1 =  /xj), then the entrant divides its output, equally between the two. 
However, if /q > p2 then the entrant will allocate more output to 1.
When the entrant’s output binds to the constraint, firm l*s output is,
Qib (Mi,M2) 6a -  6cg -  (^1 -  M2) (cH ~ cL) -  3/\ 12 (2.76)
and similarly for firm 2 in market 2. Again, when the constraint does not hold, we 
have the unrestricted Cournot output exactly as in the previous case i.e. for firm 1 
in market 1, equilibrium output would be qi$ (/q).
The profit of firm 3 is therefore found by substituting all the equilibrium values 
into,
1 f br 1 / R mi ~  M2) (c/i — cl) 4* 3K
^3 (9lJ>93 (M1jM2)J =  ---------------g---------------
6  (a -  2 c3 +  cL) + (ch ~  cL) (5/xi + p2) -  3K  
12
(2.77)
when 93 +  q$ =  K. Similarly, firm 1 earns,
7r19 («5.93(Mqpa)) - 6 a -  Gee -  (¿q -  P2 ) {ch ~ cL) -  3K  12 ): (2.78)
Note that firm 1 uses p2 instead of p2 in estimating the entrant’s output allocation 
in the second period. This is because firm 1 knows what it will signal (that is its
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decision) but it does not know what firm 2 in market 2 will signal, regardless of 
whether 1 knows 2’s true cost type. Of course, as we have no pooling equilibria and 
both incumbents know exactly what the other is likely to do, then we could in fact use 
/¿2 because, for example, a low cost firm will separate in the first period. Nevertheless, 
in other to keep things a little more general in the sense that the incumbents may not 
know exactly the strategy of the other, we shall use p? as Vs signal to the entrant. 
This changes little in the analysis.
No Quota, Incum bent TVade
When the incumbents trade, the second period complete information equilibrium will 
be characterised by a tripoly in both markets. Again firm 1L, firm 1H  and firm 3 
maximise,
= max (o -  cL -  q\L -  q\L -  q\) q\l (2.79a)
?! L
921.193 (Mi)) =  max (o -  C |f -g lff-9 2 L “  93) 9*ƒƒ (2.79b)
Wh v
*\l {Qih , <?2L>(fo (V2 )) = max (a -  c* -  q\H “  292/. “  93) 92/, (2.79c)
^ //( iiH , 92//, 93(^1)) = max (a -  c0 -  q\H ~ 2q\H -  93) <i\h (2.79d)
and
U'3 (q? ,q? , qT) =
max (a — ce — (p iQih + U “  Pi) 9il) 93“  (2.80)
(P2<?2 // + (1 “  P2) 92J  “  93) 932 - F
First, we consider the case where there is no constraint. The first order conditions 
for 1, 2 and 3 are thus,
^ il (9il,92L,93(^0)
W iL
( 9 l / / ,  92/. 1 93 (M l) )
H IHL
( 9 i / / ) 9 2 t* 9 3  ( ^ 2 ) )
ô Qi l h
& * \h ( 9 i / / i 92 //» 9 3  (M i) )
ôQihh
a —ci — q\i “  292l ~  93 = 0 
a -  ch — 9i// “  292£ “ 93 — 0 
a — Ctf — ?{// “  2<?2Z. ~ 93 ~ 0 
a -  ch ~  9i // — 292tf “ 9 3 — 0
(2.81a)
(2.81b)
(2.81c)
(2.81d)
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for all types of firm land,
Qyfl
—- i  =  a — Cz -  P1P2 (?}/ƒƒƒ +  ~ /^ 1 (1 — M2) ( ilHL +  ?2Lh )
-  (! “* Pi) M2 (<7l£,/i +  “
(1 -  Pi) (1 -  P2) (iiw, +  9j££) -  2931 -  0 (2.82)
for firm 3. These can be solved simultaneously to yield the following equilibrium 
outputs,
( a 1  ^<h LL f ^  (3 (a +  c3) -  P2 (cH -  cL) -  p icH) -  \cL ^
Qihl J2 (3 (a +  c3) — P2 (ch — Ci) -  pic#) + \c i  —
Qilh ^  (3 (a +  c3) -  p2 (c/f -  cr,) -  fiidf) -  |c L +  \cH
QiHH J2 (3 (a +  C3) -  P2 (ch -  Ci) -  PiC//) -  -  \c H
?2 LL = “  (3 (a +  c3) — P2 (c// — 0^) -  piC//) -
<Alh (3 (a + c3) — P2 (ch — Cx,) -  pic//) -  §Ci, +  |c w
qIhl ^  (3 (a + c3) -  p2 (cff -  Ci,) -  PiC//) + gCi, -  ¡c/i
?2 HH H (3 (a + c3) “  ^ 2  (ch -  cL) -  pjC//) -  |c L -  ±cH
K 93 J ^  (a -  3c3 +  (pi + p2) (ch -  cL +  2ci,)) j
Note that in order to save space, we add a second subscript to the output of the 
incumbents. For example, (i) q\LL is the Cournot output of firm 1 in market 1 when 
firm 2 has a low marginal cost; (ii) q\HL is the output of a high cost firm 2 in market 
1 when firm 1 has a low marginal cost.
The equilibrium profits for the entrant and the incumbents are found by substi­
tuting the equilibrium outputs into the objective functions for each type. Therefore, 
the equilibrium profits of the different types of firm 1 are
^ ill ~  'JJJ (3c3 +  3a +  /i2ci + y.\Ci — pic# — P2ch — Gci) 2  (2.84)
ffihl = ^ 4 4  (®C3 +  3a +  /X2Cx, +  pi cl — p iCh — P2Cfi + 2cl — &Ch ) (2.85)
lh == Y4 4  (^c3 3a +  P2CL +  Pici — piCfj — (1 2 CH + 4ch — IOcl) (2.86)
niHH = J4 4  *f* 3a +  fi2 cL +  Pici — piC// — P2Ch — 2ci — 4Ch) (2.87)
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Due to the symmetry of the model, firm 2 will enjoy the same profits in its home 
market. Furthermore, as there is no cost of entry for the incumbents, their profits in 
the foreign market will be the same as their home profits, hence 7r}^ =  7r*e0, where 
9 ,e e { H ,L ) .  Notice that these profits are in fact, best response profits to firm 3’s 
output.
National Quota, Incumbent Trade
If a national quota is imposed by country 1, then firms 2 and 3 will be obliged to 
restrict their output. If the quota is set at K l then the output of both 2 and 3 in this 
market will be K 1. This simplifies somewhat the calculations for equilibrium. Using 
the profit functions displayed in equations 2.79, firm 1 of type 9 can expected to earn:
A bo* =  max ( a - c e -  q\ee, -  q^ 00> -  K ') q\e9, (2.88)
for i € {1,2}. Similarly for firm 2 in market 1. Using the first order conditions for 
the incumbents from the previous section, we get the reaction functions,
& ( ^ » , K i) =  a ~ C0~ 9^ , ~ K ' (2.89)
for i fj  G {1,2}, i /  j, and 6,6' G {H} L}.  Solve this for firms 1 and 2 to obtain,
(K*) =  a ~ 2c* t c° ' ~ K ' (2.90)
which yields profits,
(«Sr. A*.*1) = 2C<,^ C8' - Ar')2 (2-91)
Joint Quota, Incumbent Tfcade
When a joint quota is imposed, it is would be natural to assume that there exists free 
trade between the incumbents. Therefore, the incumbents can produce up to their 
Cournot equilibrium outputs. However, firm 3 is not part of the trade agreement and 
therefore must decide on where to allocate its output optimally. The optimisation of
the entrant is
n3 =
max (a -  c3 -  (m }// + (1 -  Mi) Qil) “  (M2qIh +  (l “  M2) ?2l) “  9s) <Ï3
93
+  (a  — c3 -  ( m iÇi // +  (1 ~  Mi) Qil) ~  (M2Î2h +  (1 ~  M2) qIl ) ~~ ^3 ) ?3 “  F
(2.92)
subject, to
A' -  ql + (2-93)
Substitute the constraint into the objective function to remove <73 (i.e. q% = K  — 93) 
and differentiate to get the first order conditions.
a -  c3 -  + (1 -  Pi) q\L) -  ( m \ H +  (1 “  M2) qh.) "  2?3
= a -  c3 -  + (1 -  Mi) q2n )  “  +  i1 “  M2) qh) - 2 ( K  -  <?J)
(2.94)
Remember that, the incumbents are identical in the sense that q\H — q\H =  q§// = q\fj 
and similarly for low cost firms 1 and 2. Therefore, cancelling on both sides reduces 
to,
ql =  K/2 1 (2.95)
This is because on entry, the entrant expects each market to be occupied by an 
incumbent 1 of cost type cq and an incumbent 2 of cost type c*, for 9 € {L, H}. 
Therefore, whatever market it enters, the residual demand will be the same and so 
the entrant divides its constrained output equally between the two markets. This 
result is quite different to the no-trade model where the cost type of the incumbents 
affects the entrant’s output allocation to each market. When the entrant produces 
K / 2 in each market, the incumbent earns,
» ¿ r  W 2 )  =  C° Y  K' 2 ) 2 (2-96)
2.7.2 Proofs
P ro o f for Lem m a 2.1: Considering the case of limit pricing (i.e. strategies where 
<?i > Qi l ) the single crossing condition (Spence 1974) shows that it is more costly for
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a high cost firm to increase its output than it is for a low cost firm. Essentially, this 
requires that the slope of the low cost incumbent's profit when producing above the 
monopoly output is greater (less negative) than that of the high cost firm.
Show that 7T\l — 7Til (<7i) < K\h — Kih (<7i) for (j\ > qn. Monopoly profits are given 
by tt\l = max (a —ce — qi&) qw which yields equilibrium output ql0  = (a — c*) /2 and
A _ _
profit 7Ti$ = (a — cq) /4. Therefore,
^\l r  < (qi) (2.97)
yields,
( o _ c il)  < -  (a — Ca — (¡i)qi (2.98)
and rearranging gives us,
“ (cH -  cl) (2a -  cH- c L -  4qi) < 0 (2.99)
for (2a — ch — cl) /4  =  (qn +  9iw)/2  < <h. Therefore, a sufficient condition is that
> <liL‘ ■
P roof for Proposition 2.1:
N ational Q uotas We need to show that an incumbent 1L, can find an output that 
sustains the inequalities expressed in equations 2.28 and 2.29. Denote ^  and as 
the outputs that solve equations 2.28 and 2.29 for equality, respectively. If 
then we can find some q^ e f°r which the incentive constraints hold. The
solutions for q^ and gf' are:
?T =
a -  cl
+ 0 ))-» ii  ( & ■* ') ]  (2100)
and ___________________
=  2- 1 0 . +  y i [ ^ Jd & .« ( 0 ) ) - * i i r  («& •* ')]• <2101)
it is sufficient to show that
*\l (giL, <h (0)) -  n}L (q?L, K l) > v\h (?1H. ?3 (0)) *',H (?!«. K ') ( 2. 102)
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to complete the proof. By substituting in the parameter values we can write:
-  cL -  kj (0 )j 2 _  ^a - c L - ^ ( l ) j 2
which reduces to Ch > c Therefore, tjff < q* which implies a limit price can be 
foimd.
Proof for Proposition 2 .2:
(2.103)
Jo in t Q uota For the joint quota, we need to find q{ and q^. First, when the 
constraint does not bind when the low cost firm signals, we must solve equations 2.15 
and 2.17 for equality, respectively. Similarly, the solutions are:
+  \JS [ " i t  (9U..93 (0)) -  it¡ i  (<£.,93 ( l ,p ) ) ]  (2.104)
and
J a ~ C H  .
3, =  +
- 1 2 
Again, it is sufficient to show that
n\H {qihiQs (0)) -  ( çÎ//>93 (1. P2) ) ]  - (2.105)
A l  <73 ( 0 ) )  -  Tv\ l  ( 9^ ,  93 ( 1,  p 2) )
> A h (?w/.V3 (0)) -  *\„ (qb1'„,q3 ( l .f t) )  . (2.106)
As above, this reduces to Ch > c/> Secondly, assume the constraint is always binding. 
We need to solve equations 2.16 and 2.18 for equality, respectively. The solutions are:
-JJ =  + ^  [7T>t  (9 * , 9 3  (o, p2)) -  n\L (qll, q3 (1,«,))] (2.107)
and
l i J =  — +  V6 H «  ( 9 i h < 9 3 -  A h (9 it7»93(1,P2>)] (2.108)
Again, it is sufficient to show that
niL ( s i l i  93 (0, p2))  -  *\l ( i l l * 93 ( l i  P2))
^  *■]\n (ii//) 93 (0,pa)) -  7i\H (I1P2)) . (2.109)
which reduces to cH > cL, which concludes the proof. ■
Chapter 3
The Mode of Entry
3.1 Introduction
The switch from exporting to foreign direct investment (FDI) and its welfare effects 
have long been a point of interest for international economists. Recent work (Smith 
1987, Motta 1992, Horstmann and Marknsen 1987,1991) has emphasized the game- 
theoretic nature of the investment decision, illustrating the strategic importance of 
trade policy. However, despite the oligopolistic modeling of these papers, little has 
been said about the strategic role of the domestic producer. It is common in Industrial 
Organisation to model incumbent firms with some kind of entry deterrence capability 
(e.g. Spence 1977, Dixit 1980 consider capacity as an entry deterring variable). It 
would seem reasonable to believe that the potential entrants considered in these 
industrial economics papers may well be multinational enterprises which have a choice 
of entering the market via exporting or FDI. Thus, it is the aim of this chapter to bring 
together two areas of research, namely strategic investment models and multinational 
investment models, and to show their effects on trade policy.
From the former we consider the well-known limit pricing model of Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982). They show how uncertainty over certain parameters can be exploited 
by a fully informed firm in order to deter market entry. From the latter we consider the 
Smith-Mott a model of a tariff-jumping multinational enterprise (Smith 1987, Motta 
1991). Both show that no simple relationship exists between the cost variables and 
the exporting-FDI choice.
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This chapter has several important findings. First, with uncertainty, a domestic 
producer can determine the mode of entry of a multinational entrant. Secondly, pre- 
entry prices may be lower with uncertainty than with complete information. Third, 
tariffs influence the entry mode directly and through their impact on the incumbent’s 
behaviour.
3.1.1 Literature
Let us first consider the relevant material on exporting and FDI before turning to 
the strategic capabilities of the incumbent. The literature on the switch between ex­
porting and FDI begins with Vernon (1966) who modeled FDI as part of the product 
life cycle. However, Hymer (1976) suggests that multinationals possess some intangi­
ble asset which is best exploited by retaining this advantage within the organisation. 
Dunning (1977, 1980) extends this to include two other factors: localisation and in­
ternalisation advantages, which he calls the eclectic paradigm. Dunning’s intangible 
asset hypothesis has subsequently been modeled as a form of sunk cost, an asset 
already in the possession of the multinational (Helpman 1984, Markusen 1984).
Cost advantages and market size were specifically modeled by Buckley and Casson
(1981). They used the idea of growing demand as a means to illustrate the switch 
from exporting to FDI. Exporting represents a low fixed cost but high production 
costs (i.e. cost of transportation, tariffs etc.). FDI, on the other hand, avoids these 
extra running costs by producing in the target market. However, the construction 
of a new plant with the added cost of setting up in a foreign country (Hirsch 1976) 
involves a relatively higher fixed cost. Buckley and Casson argue that when demand 
is small, profits are low and thus FDI may not be able to cover its investment costs. 
However, as demand grows, expected profits under FDI grow faster than those under 
exporting and hence at some point, a switch takes place.
Nevertheless, it was Smith (1987) and Motta (1992) who first modeled the entry 
mode decision in a game-theoretic setting. They considered two firms: a potential host 
country producer and a foreign multinational. Both firms have the choice of entering 
or not entering the home market while the multinational has the added possibility
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of entering via exporting or FDI. The results are quite extraordinary. Whereas a 
tariff may induce FDI, its removal may have the same effect! Essentially a tariff 
raises the profits of the host country producer so we might obtain an equilibrium 
where both firms enter the market (the multinational via exporting). Removing the 
tariff lowers the host country producer’s profits, perhaps to the extent that it can no 
longer produce profitably in the market. It exits (or in fact, never enters) and the 
multinational is now a monopolist. However, due to the increase the multinational’s 
market share, it prefers to invest directly in the host country (similar to Buckley 
and Casson’s argument that as the market size grows, FDI becomes more profitable). 
Needless to say, such results have important implications for trade policy.
However, the results obtained by Smith (1987) and Motta (1992) are based on 
two potential producers, both considering entry into a market. (Motta does consider 
a sequential version of the game although the strategy of the host country producer 
is still limited: either enter or not enter.) It might seem more reasonable to consider 
the case of a host country incumbent facing a multinational entrant. This allows us 
to explore the strategic investment capabilities of the incumbent vis-à-vis the entry 
mode decision of the entrant, so far unexplored in the literature.
We must ask ourselves two questions. First, what is the best outcome for the 
incumbent: exporting or foreign direct investment, and secondly, how might the 
incumbent influence the multinational's decision? If we consider the two firms as 
Cournot output-setters, then it is easy to show that a firm’s profit is increasing in its 
rival’s marginal cost (see Tirole 1988). Given the higher marginal cost of exporting 
(transport costs, tariffs etc.), it is clear that an incumbent would prefer to face an 
exporter.
Of course, in order to answer the second question, we need to know under what 
conditions the multinational will choose exporting over FDI (and wee-versa). The 
driving force behind Motta (1992), Smith (1987) and Buckley and Gasson (1981) is 
market share. The larger the market share, the more likely a firm will choose FDI 
in order to exploit economies of scale. Empirical papers, notably Pain (1993) and 
Cushman (1985) have found a significant link between market size and FDI. Given
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this evidence, and the commonly assumed notion that, the domestic firm knows its 
home market better than the multinational (Hirsch 1976) it seems reasonable to model 
the export-FDI decision as a game of incomplete information (Harsanyi 1967-8).
This scenario is common in entry deterring models of limit pricing where the 
entrant is uncertain of its post-entry profits, namely Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
Nevertheless, these models are limited because they do not consider the mode of 
entry of the entrant. In this paper, we combine the informational asymmetries of 
the limit pricing models with the multinational entry models associated with foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and exporting. In order to generalise the model to large and 
small production processes, we consider two types of entry technology, one of low 
fixed cost and high marginal cost (exporting) and the other of high fixed cost and 
low marginal cost (FDI).
Government policy through the use of tariffs may have considerable effects on 
the, strategic behaviour of the incumbent. The research on the effect of tariffs has 
been extensive. Welfare gains to domestic countries resulting from tariffs have been 
shown to exist for domestic countries when demand is either linear (Katrak 1977 and 
Svedberg 1979) or non-linear (Meza 1979 and Brander and Spencer 1984). However, 
the introduction of incomplete information to these optimal tariff models is scarce 
(see Collie and Hviid 1994). A key article in this analysis is that of Levy and Nolan 
(1992). They show the welfare effects that result from tariffs when the incumbent and 
entrant have different marginal costs. Their results showed that tariffs may lead to 
higher or lower welfare, depending on the relative size of the entrant’s marginal cost, 
vis-a-vis the incumbent’s marginal cost. As we shall see, this plays an important role 
in the limit pricing model.
Having discussed the entrant’s motivations regarding entry, we should now turn to 
the incumbent’s strategic capabilities. We propose to show that the limit price may 
be used by the incumbent to signal information about its cost and hence influence 
the mode of entry. As we discussed in Chapter 1, limit pricing conveys the idea 
that current prices might signal future profitability. Moreover, Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) formalised this idea showing that the pre-entry price can be used to signal
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the expected size of future demand. If demand (residual demand in an oligopoly) is 
expected to be small, then expected future profits are small and hence entry might 
be deterred. If residual demand is expected to be large (and hence high expected 
profits) then entry might take place. It is straightforward to see the possible link 
between limit pricing and the entry mode. A small residual demand would mean a 
lower equilibrium output for the entrant, and exporting would be more profitable; a 
large residual demand would mean a higher equilibrium output for the entrant and 
hence FDI would be the more profitable strategy.
However, we must be sure that the motivations for signalling are intact. Entry 
deterrence clearly leaves the incumbent with higher second period profits. In order 
for signalling to occur in the entry mode model we must be sine that incentives 
exist. However, we should note that under exporting the entrant’s marginal cost 
is higher (due to transportation and possible tariffs) implying higher market prices. 
This will clearly benefit, the domestic producer. Thus, the simple assumptions made 
by Buckley and Casson (1981) regarding the cost function under exporting and FDI 
suggest that the former yields greater incumbent profits than the latter. Under these 
circumstances, if there is uncertainty regarding the incumbent's marginal cost (which 
seems particularly reasonable for a foreign potential entrant), then there may well be 
conditions under which the incumbent finds it profitable to engage in limit pricing 
behaviour in order to influence the entry mode decision. As we shall see, this may 
indeed be the case.
In Section 3.2 we define a signalling model showing the conditions where signalling 
emerges as an equilibrium strategy. Section 3.3 demonstrates that limit pricing may 
influence the mode of entry. In Section 3.4 we show the existence of a pooling equi­
librium where a high cost firm is able to deter FDI by imitating the strategy of the 
low cost firm. Then in Section 3.5 we look at the effects of a tariff on the limit price. 
Section 3.6 is concerned with the welfare aspects of the model and in Section 3.7 we 
indicate an alternative interpretation. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
Let. us consider a model where there is an incumbent monopolist (the host-country’s 
domestic producer) denoted firm 1 and a single potential entrant (the multinational), 
firm 2, which has a protected home market. We assume that the goods produced 
are perfect and strategic substitutes. Assume an inverse linear demand function 
p(Q) = a — Q where Q = qi + <72, (?i > 0, <72 > 0). The entrant has the choice of 
two production technologies, exporting and FDI. The plant cost X  is assumed the 
same for both modes of production, with the difference that FDI incurs an extra 
sunk learning cost, A (Motta 1992). The total fixed cost of FDI is thus given by 
Z = X  + A.
The marginal cost of operating a plant is given by c\ . However, exporting incurs 
greater variable costs than FDI because of transportation, s > 0 and tariffs t > 0. 
Therefore, the marginal cost of exporting is given by Cx — cz + s + t. Our aim is 
to show that for certain equilibria, exporting is preferred to FDI and vice-versa. Let 
us show that for some range of <72 £ [0, q] exporting is less costly than FDI and for 
<72 > <7, strictly more costly.
The cost function of firm 2 under exporting and FDI is given by C {q2 ,X )  — 
(cz +  s + 1) q2  +  X  and C(q2 ,Z) =  cz q2 +  X  +  A, respectively. When <72 = 0, 
C  (0, X ) > C  (0, Z). As we increase <72, the cost functions will eventually cross at 
<72 =  <7 =  A /( s -M). For <72 > 7 FDI is the least costly entry mode. A similar 
result can be obtained for general convex cost functions (see Mailath 1989). This 
is essentially the argument that Buckley and Casson (1981) used to indicate the 
switch from exporting to FDI. However, we need to develop the arguments a little 
further for our oligopolistic model. Nevertheless, it is clear that if the entrant’s 
Cournot equilibrium output is high (<72 > <7), the entrant’s total cost is lowest if it 
enters via FDI. On the other hand, if the entrant’s Cournot equilibrium output is low 
(<72 < q), then exporting yields the lowest total cost. To summarize, the cost function 
of the multinational can be given by C  (<72,T) =  CtQ2 +  T  where cj € {c*, cz j  and 
T  G {X ,Z }  represent its marginal and fixed costs, respectively.
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Of course, in a duopoly the size of the equilibrium output of firm 2 depends on the 
equilibrium output of firm 1. Although firm 2 has a choice over the type of technology 
it will choose when it enters the market, firm 1 does not. Indeed, firm l ’s equilibrium 
output falls as its own marginal cost rises. Therefore, if the marginal cost of firm 1 
is relatively high, then its equilibrium output will be relatively small. Therefore, the 
residual demand facing firm 2 will be relatively high. If the residual demand is high, 
firm 2 expects a high equilibrium output if it enters. Therefore, it selects technology 
Z  because this gives it the highest profits when the equilibrium output is high.
Let us be a little more precise about the cost function of firm 1. As an incumbent 
firm, we assume that firm 1 has already covered its fixed set-up costs. Ass\ime that 
the marginal costs c$ of firm lare also constant where c$ e  {c^c//} , ch > c/,. For 
simplicity, we shall often refer to a high cost incumbent as IH  (and similarly 1L for low 
cost type). Let us consider the second period equilibrium. It is a fairly standard result 
that the entrant’s Cournot equilibrium output rises with the incumbent’s marginal 
cost. Therefore, a high cost incumbent implies a high equilibrium output and vice- 
versa for a low cost incumbent. We need to show that this could be sufficient to 
influence the entrant’s choice of entry technology.
However, the entrant does not know the incumbent’s marginal cost. In the first, 
period, the incumbent can select some output that is observed by the entrant. Having 
observed this output, the entrant then decides on how to enter the market. We assume 
that entry is always feasible, whatever the incumbent’s cost type. Denote p € [0,1] 
as the prior probability that the incumbent has a high cost and (1 -  p) € [0, 1] as 
the prior probability that the incumbent has a low cost. Posterior beliefs which are 
up-dated using Bayes’ rule are denoted similarly by /x € [0,1] and (1 -  p) € [0,1]. 
The decision by the entrant to export can be expressed by E  : (0, Q) —* {0,1} where 
E  =  1 signifies that the entrant will export into the market and E = 0 implies FDI. 
This states that the entrant’s entry mode is dependent on the incumbent’s pre-entry 
output which allows the entrant to infer the incumbent’s cost type (at least in the 
separating equilibrium).
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Notation
0 €  {H ,L} cost types of the incumbent
T € { X ,Z } Fixed costs of the entrant
Cq,Ct incumbent and entrant marginal costs
prior and posterior probabilities that incumbent is high cost
qw monopoly output of incumbent 16
Qi first period output of incumbent
*19 monopoly profit of incumbent 10
*19 (fa Cl) second period duopoly profit of incumbent 10'
*2 (fa Cl) second period expected duopoly profit of entrant
A upper bound of Z  — X
A lower bound of Z  — X
Table 3.1: Notation
3.2.1 Second Period Profits
Before we can look at the signalling game in the first, period, we need to know the 
second period profits for all the firms. In the second period, both firms compete as 
Cournot output setters (remember, entry is never deterred). An incumbent of cost 
type 0 €  { H ,  L }  can be denoted 10. I t’s equilibrium profits are given by,
*\e (fa cT) =  max ( a - c e - q x -  q2) qi (3.1)
Note that the incumbent’s second period profits are dependent on its own marginal 
cost, c$, the entrant’s beliefs about its marginal cost, /¿, and the marginal cost of the 
entrant, c2.
The entrant (multinational) on the other hand, maximises expected profits. In 
other words, the entrant does not learn the true cost type of the incumbent on entering 
the market: beliefs determine the profit maximising output. Therefore, the entrant’s 
equilibrium expected profits are given by,
* 2  (fa cT) = max ( a - c T - q 2 -  M\H -  (1 -  p) 9u) -  T  (3.2)92
I III, ■ I, ■ —
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The difference is that we do not include the actual cost type of the incumbent in the 
entrant’s expected profits. Moreover, we are not concerned with the entrant’s actual 
profits as expected profits determine the entry mode decision. Further, note that we 
do not write explicitly the fixed cost T  of the entrant in its profit function: this is 
implied by ct- The first order conditions for firms 10 and 2 are,
fori9 (p»Qr) 
dqi
for2 ( |i ,c r )
dq2
a — C0  — 2 q\ -  q2 = 0
a -  cT -  2 q2 -  fiqiH -  (1 -  =  0
(3.3)
(3.4)
We can rewrite the first order conditions as,
(  \
a - cl 2 0 1
a - C H = 0 2 1 ?I H
a — C T j  ^ 1 - / i  p. 2 j
< ^  )
(3.5)
(remember, there are two types of incumbent 10) which yields the following equilib­
rium outputs,
2a +  2cr -  V-Ch ~Cl {4 -  /x)
<hL =  -------------------- g--------------------
2a + 2cT — c i  (1 -  p) — cH (3 +  p) qu,  =  ------------------------------------------
a -  2 cT +  pcw + (1 - f t )  cl
(3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)
The equilibrium profits follow,
_ , , ( 2 a  +  2c2 - i i c H - c L ( i - i t ) \ 2
= I ---------------- g---------------- I (3.9)
*i*(p ,cr) =  | 2°  +  2c» - ci i 1. - >‘) — (3.10) 
=  ^ - 2 c 2 +  M y ( i - p ) c t y _ r  ( 3 n )
Note that the equilibrium profits are simply the square of the equilibrium outputs.1
We need to show imder what conditions the entrant will prefer to use technology 
X  or Z. If 7r2 (/i, cx ) > t2 (p, cz ) then firm 1 will enter the market via technology
1 Of course, this is only true for the entrant if we ignore the fixed entry cost T .
*• "E*
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A\ However, if the opposite is the case, then technology Z will be used. Entry will 
always take place, no matter which technology is selected. The profits that firm 2 
makes depend on the cost type of firm 1.
3.2.2 The Entry Mode Decision
Following Motta (1992) and Smith (1987), the entry mode decision is dependent on 
the expected residual demand. We need to show that when the incumbent has a low 
marginal cost, the entrant is faced with a small residual demand and thus prefers 
to enter the market via exporting. On the other hand, if the incumbent has a high 
marginal cost, then the entrant faces a large residual demand and enters via FDI. 
We (ian show that when incumbent costs are low, technology X  is preferred by the 
entrant. This occurs if,
7T2 (0,Cx ) > *2 (0,CZ) (3.12)
and 7T2 (1,  Cz )  > ^2 (1 , Cx) (3.13)
Explicitly, using the values above, we can write,
c -
-  2cx + ci Al1
(N fa — 2cz +  ^ (3.14)
( -
— 2  cz + cn 
.* 1
) 2 - Z  > (ra — 2cx 4- C/ / \ 2 Y (3.15)
which can be rearranged to eliminate the fixed costs giving us (c// — ci) (cx — cz ) > 0. 
Remember, cx — cz + s + ¿, hence (c// — Ci) (s + t) > 0.
The above implies that
7T2(0,cz ) -  7T2 (0, cx) > tt2(1 , cz) -  7T2(l,Cx) (3-1C)
By considering a continuous range of marginal costs for both firms, we can show 
that c?27r2 (/i , ct) / 9cj5/i < 0.2 As the entrant’s profits fall monotonically and 
continuously in ct and rise monotonically and continuously in /i, choosing any ct G
2 Rearranging, we have,
T ^ 2 X  (0 ) — * 2 Z  (0 ) >  W2.Y (1 )  — ^ 2 2  (1 )
which is the same as,
*2 (0,C .v) -7T 2 (0 ,C z )  >  7T2 (1 ,C X ) -  7T2 (1 ,C Z)
re
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{cz*cx} where cx > cz and {i € {0,1} is sufficient for equation 3.16 to hold. Indeed, 
we can show this to be true by substituting in the equilibrium values,
d 2 * 2  4 \ n
—  = - - {cH - c L)<  0 (3.17)
The difference in fixed costs for the two types of technology is A, the sunk infor­
mation cost incurred when setting up in the host country. From 7t2 (0, c* ) — 7t2 {0, cz) 
we can calculate the upper bound,
A = 4/9 (a — cx — cz + ch) (cx ~ Cz)
and from 7r2 (1, c^ ) — tt2 (1 ,cx) the lower bound for
A = 4/9 ( a - c x  - c z  + cL) (cw -  cL)
(3.18)
(3.19)
Therefore, as long as c// > ci and cx > cz we can find some A € (A, A) which 
satisfies the inequalities required governing the entrant’s mode of entry.
Given that it is in the interests of an incumbent to signal that it. has a low marginal 
cost, 1L must find a first period output that cannot be profitably imitated by IH. 
If this is possible, then the entrant is able to gain complete information about the 
incumbent’s cost type and thus select the appropriate mode of entry.
3.2.3 Optimal Strategies
In the first period the incumbent is a monopolist. It is aware of the entry mode 
decision of the entrant and attempts to influence this according to its capabilities. 
The limitations on the incumbent’s first period strategy are its actual marginal cost,
This can be written as,
rex 
J CjS
C* 07T2(O,Cr ) ,dCT >
and again rearranging gives us,
dcr
fCX
Jc2=C
1 F* d2*2 (fi'Cr) 
dfidcrƒ ƒJu=0jCT~
dff2 (1,cr) 
dcr
dc-pdfi < 0
dCT
C ~cr.
I
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the prior beliefs of the entrant and a tariff (if any). Following Milgrora and Roberts 
(1982) we look for a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982).
The incumbent has to optimise the following:
qi 0  £ argmax {nie (qie) + 6  [E tt1& (/¿, cx ) + (1 -  E) tti5 (/i, cz ))} (3.20)
for 6  £ {H, L) , E £ {0,1} , p £ [0,1] and T  £ {X tZ}. As we see, the incumbent, 
whatever its cost type, must choose some first period strategy that will influence the 
entrant’s mode of entry.
The entry conditons for the entrant depend on its expected profit in the post-entry 
game. Let us first impose the conditions we require. Optimality for the entrant is 
given by,
E=<  1 if Tr2 (ji,cx ) > 7t2(m, cz) j
0 otherwise
for 0  € {H, L} , E  € {0,1}, ^ 6 [0,1] and T  6 {X , Z \.
Finally, for Bayes’ consistency of beliefs, we have,
If 9i// ^  Qil then p (qU{) -  1, p (qlL) = 0
If <1\H = q\L -  q\L then p (qUi) -  p  (qu) = P
Bayes’ rule instructs the entrant on how to deal with the first, period incumbent
output it observes. If qm ^  qiL the entrant should be able to deduce the incumbent’s
cost type. For example, if the entrant observes //, the incumbent has high marginal
cost and p = 1 ; otherwise if qn  is observed, then the incumbent has a low marginal
cost and p = 0. A high cost incumbent will typically play its monopoly output, in the
first period when qm ^  However, if some other output qi $ (qin,qn) is observed,
the entrant, assumes that the incumbent has a high marginal cost. If qw — then
output chosen in equilibrium is uninformative and hence, the posterior belief of the
entrant is the same as its prior, i.e. /z = p. As is commonly assumed, the pooling
output is taken to be the monopoly output of the low cost type incumbent, <71 3
Again, if some output of equilibrium output is observed q\ ^  qn  the incumbent is
3 Please note that q\g is taken to be the monopoly output of firm 16. However, q\g is the first 
period output of firm 10. Fir limit pricing in the separating equilibrium, we obtain q n  >  q n  and 
q \H  = q i H ,  hence, q lL  ^  Q\H- In the pooling equilibrium, q iL  =  q i t  =  q\H >  q i H .
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assumed to have a high marginal cost. The collection {qie,2(q\e) ,fi{qi$)} forms a 
sequential equilibrium.
To summarise, the entrant prefers to export if it believes the inciunbent has a 
low marginal cost. The incumbent must find some strategy which will maximise its 
profits. In a separating equilibrium, this implies that XL must find an output (price) 
that cannot be imitated by 1H.
3 .3  S e p a r a t i n g  E q u i l i b r i u m
In the separating equilibrium, the entrant is fully informed about the incumbent’s cost 
type. As the entrant chooses exporting when faced with a low cost incumbent, and 
that exporting is the desired mode of entry for the incumbent, a high cost incumbent 
has an incentive to imitate the strategy of a low cost incumbent. If this occurred, 
the entrant would learn nothing about the incumbent’s cost and would base its entry 
decision on its prior beliefs. However, if priors are such that,
E =  1 if 7r2(p,cz ) > tt2{p,cx )
then the entrant will enter the market using FDI. Clearly, if a low cost incumbent can 
avoid this, it will find a strategy that cannot be imitated by a high cost incumbent. 
The incentive constraint for the low cost incumbent is given by,
TTlL (ili) +  ¿7r1L (0, Cx) > 7Til + X\L (I, Cz) (3.22)
The LHS of equation 3.22 states that the low cost incumbent can find some output in 
the first period that will indicate it has a low marginal cost with certainty, i.e. qn  ^  
qui. Consequently, the entrant updates its posterior beliefs so that E (ji — 0) = 1, 
and therefore enters the market through exporting. On the other hand, the RHS of 
equation 3.22 indicates the incumbent’s profit if it does not signal its type in the first 
period. The entrant then believes that the incumbent, has a high marginal cost i.e. 
E  (fj. =  1) = 0, and enters the market via FDI. However, the incumbent in reality 
has a low marginal cost and so that its best response is to move along its reaction 
function and earn its best response profits.4
4
For the high cost incumbent, we need to ensure that it has no incentive to imitate 
the strategy of the low cost incumbent.
Tfih (qil) + (0,c*) < h +  ^ 1  (I1C2) (3.23)
On the RHS of equation 3.23 the high cost incumbent produces its monopoly output 
in the first period and earns complete information profits in the second period, i.e. 
9 m  — Qih- R finds this strategy more profitable than imitating the output of the low 
cost incumbent which is expressed on the LHS of equation 3.23. The entrant believes 
the incumbent to have a low cost and enters the market via exporting. However, 
as the incumbent actually has a high marginal cost, it must shift along its reaction 
function in the second period to maximise profit. Note that itm (ji, cx ) > nm  (jz,cz) 
which is an incentive for the high cost incumbent to imitate the strategy of the low 
cost incumbent. It is this possibility that leads to limit pricing as it forces the low 
cost incumbent to find a pre-entry output that cannot be imitated by the high cost 
firm.
Rearranging the incentive constraints gives us the following condition for a sepa­
rating equilibrium,
y\H -  ttih ~  n iL Q?il) ^
TTl// (0, Cat) -  7TJ ( l ,C z )  “  7Til  (0 ,C x) - 7 T u ( l , c z )
If 6  can be found that satisfies 3.24, then a separating equilibrium exists. Indeed, two 
sufficiency conditions for 3.24 are
TTl// — 7TIH (4il) > XlL — L (<7lZ,) (3.25)
and
[ttil(0,cx) -  niL(l,cz)} > [tti//(0,Cx) -  ttih (1,cz)] (3.26)
We can now state the first result.
P roposition  3.1 c# > ci and cx > cz are sufficient conditions for the existence of
a range of discount factors over which a separating equilibrium exists.
We do not make the common but simplied assumption that on entry, all information is revealed. 
Here we follow Saloner (1987) and Martin (1995).
Tl HIM
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Proof. Condition 3.21 is implied by the inequalities 3.25 and 3.26. If these hold, we 
can find some 6  > 0 that satisfies the separating equilibrium.
First, show that x u  -  n \i(q \) < — Kih (<1 i ) for q\ > q \ i5 Monopoly
profits are given by 7Tji ~  max (a — c$ — qx$) q^ which yields equilibrium output 
q\$ = (a — cq) ¡2 and profit nw — (a — Ce) /4. Therefore,
KlL — TTlL (<7l) < nlH -  TTltf ($l) (3.27)
yields,
( ^ ) 2 -  (a -  cl -  9,) 9. < - { a - cm-  9,)?. (3.28)
and rearranging gives us,
i  (ch — ci) (2a — ci/ — Ci — 4<7i) < 0  (3.29)
for (2a -  ch — ci) /£ = (qu + qm) /2 < q\. Therefore, condition 3.25 holds.
Secondly, show that inequality 3.26 holds. Substitute in the equilibrium profits
and simplify to get,
[ttu (0 ,cx ) - ttil(1,Cz)) -  [tti//(0,cx ) -  tt1w ( l,c z )] > 0
<=> 7; (ch — ci) (ch -  Cj, + 2 (cx — Cz)) > o (3.30) G
It is sufficient that ch > Ci and Cx > Cz f°r 3-20 to hold. ■
We have our first, result which is that we can find conditions where pre-entry 
prices affect the entry decision of the multinational. What is interesting is that the 
cost of becoming informed about the market is bourn by the incumbent and not the 
multinational, and that the information is received before the entry decision is taken. 
This contrasts the traditional view of informational cost (e.g. Motta 1992) which is 
incurred only by the multinational when it chooses FDI. However, the information 
presented here is different to that of former papers where the cost of information is 
known before hand.
In the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) paper, entry is either deterred or accommo­
dated. Their limit price is negatively related to the entrant’s cost: a fall in the
5 Single crossing condition (Spence 1974).
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entrant’s cost reduces the incumbent’s post-entry profits and increases the high cost 
incumbent’s incentives to imitate the low cost incumbent’s strategy. Consequently, 
the low cost incumbent selects an even lower limit price.
Let us now compare these results with the entry mode model. First, we need 
to calculate the upper and lower bounds of incumbent outputs that will satisfy the 
separating equilibrium. Find some q[ that equates inequality 3.22 and q'{ that equates 
inequality 3.23. Equating and rearranging, we obtain,
4  =  (P,cx ) - 7t1l (1, cz)J (3.31)
4* =  — + (°>cx) “  k \h (! ,cz)] (3.32)
Note that q" < qr and that q" > qiH for 8 > 0. It is normally assumed that the 
low cost incumbent will produce at the least cost separating output, q, the smallest 
output possible that does not overturn the separating equilibrium, where
f Qil if 4' < Qil
I q" otherwise
This simply states that a separating equilibrium may exist at monopoly prices and 
lower, depending on the parameters chosen. Of course, if q = qiL> we do not observe 
distortionary prices: the monopoly price is a sufficient, signal. However, it is more 
interesting to focus on equilibria where <7" > qn  as this represents the idea that a 
firm must give up some present profit in order to deter entry. ,•
This output fixes the limit price as being the highest price that the incumbent can 
charge without inducing the employment of technology Z. Note that q is dependent 
on ch, cl, cx and cz- Milgrom and Roberts (1982) obtain,
S-MkR = — +  }/^ faff “  (l>cr)] (3.33)
where nm  is the monopoly profit of a high cost incumbent, and 7xm (1, ct) represents 
post-entry duopoly profits for fixed cost T  (assuming that £ > qu)- The impor­
tant thing to note is that the entrant’s marginal cost enters only into t:\h (1 , c-r): an 
increase in the entrant’s marginal cost leads to an increase in the incumbent’s profits,
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reducing the least cost separating output, and raising the limit price. In other words, 
dowf _/dc2 < 0. However, for the entry mode model, we obtain the opposite result. 
Remembering that cx — cz + s + t we can differentiate the bracketed terms inside 
the root in equation 3.32 with respect to cz to get,
d[x \H  (O.cx) ~  ^ l// ( l , cz)] _  (c// — cl) +  2 (s 4 -1) 
dcz  9
Therefore, dq/dcz > 0. In contrast to the result of Milgrom and Roberts (1982), an 
increase in the marginal cost of the entrant increases the post-entry profits of FDI 
but increases more so the post-entry profits a high cost incumbent can obtain facing 
an exporter.
However, the limit price of Mailath (1989) wotild have similar properties. In the 
Mailath (1989) paper, signalling occurs to preserve market share, with entry always 
taking place. Consequently, the rival firm’s marginal cost always enters into the firm’s 
ex-post profit function.
3.4 Pooling Equilibrium
In the pooling equilibrium, no information is revealed about the incumbent’s cost and 
so the entrant updates using its prior beliefs. Such a situation might occur if prior 
beliefs are such that the entrant always enters the market via exporting. The entry 
decision for the entrant is thus,
1 if tt2 (p,cx ) > X2 (P,Cz)
& —
0 if *2 (p,cx) < * 2  {p,cz )
If,
71*2 (p ^x )  > 7r2(p,cz ) (3.34)
the entrant expects higher profits by exporting. Clearly, both types of incumbent 
prefer this scenario as the entrant will enter the market with the high marginal cost 
of exporting, which will raise market prices. Consequently, we might believe that 
there is no incentive for the low cost incumbent to reveal its cost type as this will 
have no effect on the entry mode. However, this is not always the case. Although the
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entrant may choose exporting over FDI, it still must maximise its expected profit as 
even after entry, the incumbent’s cost type is not revealed (Saloner 1987). Hence, the 
entrant producers more than the complete information Cournot equilibrium output, 
when facing a low cost incumbent.
The output of an entrant in a pooling equilibrium is,
_ ✓  _  a ~  2cx  +  PCh +  (1 -  p) cL /0 o r X
<12 {P) ------------------ 2----------------  l3-35)
where the entrant uses exporting but estimates using its prior beliefs the marginal 
cost of the incumbent. Clearly, this will affect the low cost incumbent’s profits as the 
entrant will produce more in the pooling equilibrium than it would in the separating 
equilibrium (i.e. q2 (p) > <72 (0))* Therefore, if a low cost incumbent produces at its 
monopoly output in the first period, the following inequality must hold for pooling 
to be worthwhile,
m  ( ? )  + 6tt1l (0, cx ) < t t i l  + Sn1L (p, cx ) . (3.36)
Inequality 3.36 defines a pooling equilibrium. However, we should check to see if a 
range of p € (0,1) exists such that inequality 3.36 holds. In other words, we need to 
show that for some range of p the incumbent will find it more profitable to pool than 
to separate. From the separating equilibrium, we require,
ttil (<?) +  (0, cx ) > 7til + SiriL (1, cz ) (3.37)
Rearrange to get,
<5 (ttu  (0, cx ) -  tt1l (1, cz )) > tt1l -  tt1l (g) (3.38)
Now rearrange 3.36 in a similar way,
n l -  71-1 l (?) > (5 (n1L (0, cx) -  m  (p,cx )) (3.39)
We can now compare the two period profit of the incumbent in the separating and 
pooling equilibrium by equating 3.38 and 3.39 to get,
TTii (0, Cat) -  7TU ( 1  ,cz) >  m  (0. cx) -  * \ l ( p , c x ) (3.40)
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This simplifies to,
n\L (p, cx) > ^lL (1»c2) (3-41)
Astt1l (p,cx ) > 7r1L (1, cx) becauseOt^ xl/ dp < 0and7ru  (l,cx) > k\l (Rcz ) because 
d7Tn/dc2 > 0, inequality 3.41 holds for all p < 1. Therefore, if prior beliefs are such 
that an entrant will always enter via technology X, the low cost incumbent will always 
pool.
The high cost incumbent must have an incentive to imitate the strategy of the 
low cost incumbent if there is to be pooling. Therefore, we require that,
ttih (qil) + 6kih (p , c x ) > vin + SniH(l,c z ) (3.42)
If this inequality is never the case, then there would be no limit pricing in the sepa­
rating equilibrium: the low cost incumbent would never have to deviate from its first 
period monopoly output in order to separate from the high cost incumbent. However, 
inequality 3.42 is not exactly the reverse inequality of equation 3.23. Note that al­
though the entrant enters via technology X, it chooses this technology given the prior 
beliefs that weight its expected post entry profits. Therefore, the prior beliefs fix the 
output that the firm produces in the second period. In the entry deterrence model 
of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) entry does not take place in the pooling equilibrium 
and so the entrant’s output is zero.
This means that the low cost incumbent prefers to play some first, period strategy 
that can be imitated by the high cost incumbent because this does not affect the choice 
of mode of entry. We can calculate the value of p needed for a pooling equilibrium, 
by substituting in the values for the profits in equation 3.34 and rearranging for p,
(3.43)9A — 4 (a +  cL — 2cz — s — t) (s +  t)
------= P> P4 (s + 1) (cjf — cl)
This indicates the upper bound on the prior probability that the incumbent has a low 
marginal cost. If this condition is satisfied, then the entrant will enter via technology 
X.
However, although the entrant, produces with technology X, is it. convinced with 
probability p that the incumbent has a low marginal cost. Remember, the entrant’s 
expected profits under the two technologies are expressed in equation 3.34.
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Our second important result is that pooling equilibria exist. The implications of 
this are that a high cost incumbent can lower its pre-entry price and as a consequence 
an inefficient entry mode is chosen. In the Smith-Motta model, the entry mode is 
always efficient in the absence of government policy. However, as we can show here, 
inefficient outcomes may occur due to incumbent behaviour, thus suggesting a need 
for state intervention.
3.5 Tariffs
So far we have not looked at the effect of the tariff t on the incumbent’s first period 
strategy. We first, need to look at the effect of the tariff on the entry mode decision: 
what effect does it have on the strategies of the incumbent and entrant,.
First, let. us consider the effect, of a tariff on the incumbent’s pre-entry strategy. 
The tariff is part of the exporter’s marginal cost, hence 7 (/i, Cx) (/*, &z + s + 1) 
(i.e. cx = cz +  -s + £), which is the incumbent’s profit when exporting is the mode of 
entry. The least cost, separating output is given by,
q  = —2“ ^  +  11 cz + s -f t) -  7rl f f  (1,02)) > Qi l  (3.44)
As a tariff raises the exporter’s marginal cost,, dnm  (0, cz + s + t) /d t > 0. In turn, 
this implies that dq/dt > 0. By increasing the tariff, the profits that a liigh cost 
incumbent, earns, when exporting is the mode of entry, increases, increasing the firm’s 
desire t,o imitate the low cost incumbent strategy.
However, this cannot be true for all levels of t. Clearly, an infinite tariff would 
make exporting impossible and as a result, the entrant, would choose FDI. On the 
other hand, reducing the tariff may lead t.o a no-distortion separating equilibrium: 
pre-entry monopoly prices are sufficient to signal cost type. For example, it might be 
that for t =  0,
q = qiL > 2C// +  \jb ( ttih (0yCz + 5) -  tfitf U T c z )) (3.45)
Therefore, an increasing tariff may have three effects. First, it may lead a low cost, 
incumbent to price below its monopoly price in the first period in order to sustain
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the separating equilibrium. Secondly, as the tariff rises the limit price falls and third, 
at some point the tariff gets so high the entrant always chooses FDI: we obtain tariff 
jumping.
Nevertheless, if tariff jumping occurs what is left for the incumbent to do? Should 
it set monopoly prices in the first period? In fact, limit pricing may still continue for 
the simple reason that although the mode of entry cannot be affected by pre-entry 
prices, the entrant’s output can still be limited. This is similar to Mailath (1989) 
where firms signal their cost types in order to enhance or protect their market share.
The least cost separating output for the incumbent might now be,
Q =  ° H + \/<5 (**!/ƒ (0,cz)-7T|/,(l,cz)) > qiL (3.4G)
Clearly, Tt\n (0,cz) > ttih (1 ,cz) which means that as long as q" > qu distortionary 
prices may still be observed in the first period. Of course,
*1H (0,Cz + S + t) — (l,Cz) > TTiff (0,Cz) -  7TUt (l,Cz) (3.47)
which means that the limit price suddenly rises when tariff jumping occurs. Figure 
3.1 illustrates the relationship between the limit price and the tariff. As the tariff is 
increased, the limit price falls and exporting remains the mode of entry. However, at 
some point the tariff is so high that the entrant switches to exporting and the limit 
price jumps up. Figure 3.1 has been drawn to show the possibility of distortionary 
pre-entry prices even after tariff jumping will occur (i.e. p < P\l)-
In the pooling equilibrium, we assume that, the low cost incumbent, plays its 
monopoly output in the first period and exporting takes place in the second pe­
riod. A high cost incumbent will imitate this strategy, and hence we obtain limit 
pricing (where the high cost incumbent produces at the low cost monopoly output).
Clearly, if the tariff does not affect the equilibrium, the limit price will remain the 
same: the low cost incumbent still plays its monopoly output.
However, what effect does the tariff have on the equilibrium that the incumbent 
chooses? We can now show how the tariff affects the range of prior beliefs that 
support the pooling equilibrium. In the pooling equilibrium, the entrant exports into
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Figure 3.1: Change in Limit Price due to an increasing Tariff
the market because of the inequality,
7*2 (p, CZ + S + t)>  7T2 (p, cz ) (3.48)
(Note that cz + s + t *= Cx)- We know that by raising p we should find to p that 
yields equality (because tt2 (1, c*) < 7t2 ( \ ,cz )). p represents the highest value p that 
supports the pooling equilibrium (note that it is possible for p = 0). Therefore, in 
the pooling equilibrium, p < p i.e.
7T2 (p, cz  +  S + 1) =  7T2 (p , Cz ) (3.49)
where t, s, cz  >  0. Set t =  0. Now we obtain,
tt2 (p, cz + a) > tt2 (p, cz) (3.50)
as exporting becomes more profitable. The new highest value of p that yields equality 
can be denoted as p' so that,
tt2 (p', cz +  s) =  tt2 (p;, cz) (3.51)
Again, it must be that f/ > p. Therefore, the range of prior beliefs that support the 
pooling equilibrium can be extended by reducing the tariff. If prior beliefs under the
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tariff were p > p then we would have a separating equilibrium as the entrant would 
enter via FDI if it is uncertain over the incumbent’s true cost. By reducing the tariff, 
the government increases the entrant’s profits under exporting. If as a result p' > p 
then the incumbent pools with the result that the entrant always exports into the 
market.
As we can see, the government has considerable influence over the strategies of 
the incumbent. Not only can it affect the mode of entry but it can also influence the 
incumbent’s first period strategy. A tariff policy can have two effects. By increasing a 
tariff a government reduces the range of beliefs that support the pooling equilibrium. 
If the incumbent is pooling, then a tariff increase may overturn the equilibrium and 
the incumbent may separate as a result. On the other hand, reducing a tariff increases 
the range of beliefs that support the pooling equilibrium and so we may observe a 
switch from separating to pooling in the first period. In order to understand which 
equilibrium is preferable, we need to look at the first and second period welfare that, 
emerge in both types of equilibrium.
3 . 6  W e l f a r e  I m p l i c a t i o n s
Let us now turn to the welfare effects of limit pricing in the mode of entry game. We 
need to consider welfare changes over the two periods, using the discount, factor to 
weight second period welfare. Welfare is defined as the sum of local producer profit, 
consumer surplus and tariff revenue. Following Motta (1992) we ignore the profits 
earned by the multinational under FDI.
There are two cases to consider: what are the welfare effects of a tariff when 
exporting is the mode of entry and of tariff-jumping FDI. However, before considering 
the effect of the tariff we should consider first welfare under the two types of equilibria 
that emerge. In the separating equilibrium we have complete information in the first, 
second period and firms produce at their Cournot outputs. In the pooling equilibrium, 
the entrant does not learn anything about the incumbent’s cost and therefore is forced 
to use its prior beliefs. Given our definition of welfare above, we can state immediately 
the different welfare outcomes between the two types of equilibria. These results are
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quite standard to the literature on limit pricing (see Tirole 1988).
First, when the incumbent pools, the output of the entrant is the same regardless 
of the incumbent.’ s cost type. This is because the entrant maximises its expected 
profits according to its prior beliefs. Consequently, if a tariff were introduced, the 
resulting government tariff revenue would be the same regardless of the incumbent’s 
actual type. However, the output of a high cost incumbent is lower than under 
complete information which means that profits and consumer surplus are lower. As 
for the high cost incumbent, its output is higher yielding higher profits and a larger 
consumer surplus. Now let us look at the effect on welfare from imposing a tariff.
3.6.1 A Small Tariff
First, let us consider exporting. An important paper here is that of Levy and Nolan 
(1992) where they show that in a simple duopoly where the entrant is an exporter, 
a small tariff unambiguously increases social welfare (also see Brander and Spencer 
1984). There are two positive effects: a terms of trade effect and a domestic firm out­
put effect. Intuitively, the tariff reduces the entrant’s output, and raises the domestic 
firms profits. Although consumers lose out on higher prices, this is compensated by 
the tariff revenue earned by the State (which could be redistributed to consumers or 
used to subsidize local production). We need to consider both the separating and 
pooling equilibrium in order to evaluate the effects of a tariff on welfare. As gov­
ernment policy is set before the first period, only prior beliefs can be used in the 
estimation of second period welfare. Writing second period welfare according to the 
definition above we have
ƒ“? 1+92
W i(p,cx,t) =  *Ti*(P»Cff)+ /  p  (Q) dQ -  P (Q) Q 4* tq2 (3.52)
where the 3-tuple function W2 (p, cr,t) expresses expected welfare given the incum­
bent’s cost type (expressed by p), the entrant’s marginal cost (cr — which includes 
the tariff when we consider exporting) and the tariff revenue (implied by t > 0). 
Using the equilibrium values obtained earlier, we obtain the expected welfare
-  2 (pcH +  (1 -  p) cL) +  cTs 2
W2(p,cx ,t)  =
;)
1 0 1
1 / 2a  — c t  — ( p e n  ~f (1 P )  c l ) \
+ 2 \  3 )
±( a -  2ct + (pch +  (1 -  p) cl) \
+ l 3 ) (3.53)
As we consider exporting, ct = cx (where cx = c^-f s -M). Differentiate IV2 (/i, cx, t) 
with respect to t to obtain
dW2(p,cXi f )  a - c z - s
- f  = 0 (3.54)
dt 3
for p e {0,1} ,c& e  {c/ / ,cl}. The second derivative is dW^/dt =  -1  < 0 which tells 
ns that t* = {a — cz — -s) /3 is a maximum: the optimal tariff. For t < (a — cz — s) /3 
welfare is always improving with the tariff (Levy and Nolan 1992). However, this is the 
situation under complete information where both firms are producing their optimal 
outputs. If the incumbent pools in the first period, then the entrant maximises its 
expected profits using its prior beliefs.
In the pooling equilibrium, the entrant uses its prior beliefs to maximise its ex­
pected output. However, what about the government? If the government knows 
the cost type of the incumbent, then a welfare maximising tariff might reveal the 
incumbent’s cost (see Collie and Hviid 1994). Suppose the government knows the 
incumbent’s cost type although pooling took place in the first, period. The welfare 
maximising tariff for a high cost incumbent would be
dWqi (p, cx, t') _  a - c z - s  _  (cH -  cL) (1 -  p) _  _  0 
dt 3 C
(3.55)
while for a low cost incumbent we would obtain 
dW2L(p,cx ,t") a - c z - s
dt
+  pCH -  t" =  0 (3.56)
We see that there are three optimal tariffs depending on the incumbent’s actual cost
i.e. t" > t* > t\  Therefore, if the government knew exactly the incumbent’s cost 
in the pooling equilibrium it would choose a welfare maximising tariff that would be 
associated with a given cost type, thus revealing the incumbent’s marginal cost. Of 
course, we must now ask ourselves the question as to whether welfare is improved 
by revealing the incumbent’s cost ?(I.e. are there incentives constraints that satisfy
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a separating equilibrium.) This issue has been dealt with in considerable detail by 
Collie and Hviid (1994) where they show the existence of separating and pooling 
equilibria in a game where a government sets tariffs. We shall make the assumption 
that the government uses only the information it receives at the end of the first 
period. Therefore, the optimal tariff is the same as for the separating equilibrium, 
t* =  (a — cz — s) /3.6 7 What we see here is that pooling will lead to lower second 
period welfare compared to the separating equilibrium because the estimated optimal 
tariff given the entrant’s output will be either too high (when the incumbent has 
a high marginal cost) or too low (otherwise). However, as far as the government 
is concerned, the estimated change in welfare from a change in tariff is the same, 
regardless of whether we are in a separating or pooling equilibrium. Nevertheless, a 
pooling equilibrium may increase or decrease welfare depending on relative differences 
between the firms’ marginal costs. The result is similar to that of Levy and Nolan 
(1992). They show that welfare has a U-shaped relationship with respect to the 
entrant’s marginal cost. A similar relationship holds with respect to the incumbent’s 
marginal cost and hence the prior beliefs in the pooling equilibrium. Thus, the second 
derivative can be written
d2W2(pycx,t)
dp2 — (CH — cl)2 > 0 (3.57)
which tells us that the function is convex, and that a minimum exists at
dp
=  0 (3.58)
yielding
, 1 2a — 3c/, + ct _
P — 77------------------  > u3 cH - c L (3.59)
However, p* > 1 which means that for p € [0,1] expected welfare is decreasing in 
p? Therefore, expected welfare is highest when p =  0 and is the same as woidd be 
obtained under a separating equilibrium. As pooling yields lower expected welfare
6 Under a  separating equilibrium, the incumbent’s cost is c h  or C£,. In the pooling equilibrium the 
government and entrant estimate it to be c$ =  p en  +  (1 — p) c l -
7 1 > 3 2aZ f X CT * *  ~ ( a ~  ch ) >  a ~  2 Ch  +  c t  which is a contradiction as the RHS is positive.
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under the pooling equilibrium, the government might find it worthwhile forcing a 
separating equilibrium. This might be achieved by reducing or removing the tariff.
So far we have only looked at. welfare in the second period of the game. However, 
to get a true estimate of the total welfare effect of a tariff, we need to consider first, 
period welfare.
We illustrated earlier that a tariff can lower the limit price in the first period. Let, 
us check the effect this has on first period welfare. Using the chain rule, the effect 
of a tariff on first, period welfare is dW \/dt =* {dW\/dq^ {dq/dt}. We know that 
dq/dt > 0 so we need only consider the effect of q on W\ (£)). First period welfare 
is given by
Wi (2 (t)) =  [P (2) -Co] 2 +  / * 0 p  (9 (0) dR - P  (2) 2 (3.60)
Taking the derivative with respect, to q we obtain
dWi (t)
dq
= a — c g -q > 0 (3.61)
> 0 (3.62)
as 2 < o — ce.8 Therefore,
flWj (2 (0 ) _  dWidg
dt dq dt
Hence, a tariff which increases the least cost separating output above the incum­
bent’s monopoly output, raises first, period welfare. Therefore, a tariff policy that 
stimulates limit pricing behaviour increases first and second period welfare.
On the other hand, by increasing the tariff we reduce the range of beliefs that 
support a pooling equilibrium which eventually may lead to a switch to a separating 
equilibrium. As we have seen, this will lead to higher welfare in both periods. Nev­
ertheless, in order to see whether separating leads to higher welfare we need to check 
welfare under FDI.
3.6.2 Tariff-Jumping FDI
Mot.t.a (1992) and Levy and Nolan (1992) also look at the welfare effects of tariff- 
jumping FDI. As Levy and Nolan (1992) consider firms with asymmetric costs under
8 If q >  a  — c& the incumbent would earn negative profits.
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FDI, their analysis is similar to the one we follow here. They consider two cases 
for the entrant’s marginal cost: tariff-induced FDI and cost-induced FDI, the former 
being where s < 0 such that t > |s| and the latter where s > 0.9 Their idea of 
tariff-induced entry assumes that exporting involves a lower marginal cost than FDI. 
The tariff reverses this relationship hence making FDI cheaper than exporting (thus 
tariff-induced FDI). Cost-induced FDI assumes s > 0 so that FDI is always cheaper 
than exporting, for all t > 0.
Their results are as follows. First, a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
FDI to be welfare enhancing is that the entrant’s production cost be less than some 
critical value c. This emerges from the U-shaped relationship that exists between the 
entrant’s marginal cost and welfare. This implies that the welfare effects of FDI are 
ambiguous and that inward FDI may be immiserizing unless the entrant operates at 
a lower cost than the incumbent. Secondly, when considering tariffs, they show that 
FDI is immiserizing unless the tariff being jumped was itself welfare enhancing. This 
simply means that if a tariff is being jumped because it’s so high then consumers will 
enjoy lower prices in the market. Nevertheless, lowering the tariff in this situation 
would improve welfare. Finally, cost-induced FDI can be welfare-reducing.
Welfare under FDI is the sum of incumbent’s profits and consumer surplus (Levy 
and Nolan 1992, Motta 1992). Initially, we set the tariff at zero to look at the effect 
of the welfare changes with respect to the entrant’s marginal cost under FDI (i.e. 
t = 0). Similar to Levy and Nolan (1992) we can calculate the critical value of Cz- 
The derivative of W2 (p, cz , 0) with respect to the entrant’s marginal cost is
d W 2 (/¿, c z ,0 )  =  c z - ( / i C / /  +  ( 1 - m) cl)
dcz  3 =  0 (3.63)
We see that d2W 2 (/r,cz,0) /d<?z  =  1/3 > 0 so that we have a minimum and the 
critical value is cz = pc# *F (1 — /x) c/,. This defines the U-shaped welfare relationship 
with respect to the entrant’s marginal cost. Consider the first result of Levy and 
Nolan (1992). As cz < c*, welfare will improve under FDI if and only if Cz < 
f-LCtf +  (1 — /¿) cl- If the entrant has a higher marginal cost than the incumbent, the
9 s  < 0 may arise if the home country of the entrant provides an export subsidy.
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switch from exporting to FDI will lead to lower welfare. However, we should now 
compare welfare under FDI to that obtained with a tariff. We have seen above that 
a tariff enhances welfare so that a switch to FDI will lead to a loss in tariff revenue 
as well as reducing the incumbent’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, under FDI 
s — 0 so that the incumbent’s production costs are even lower. If cz < cz + s < ci 
then welfare is improved by reducing the transport costs. Clearly welfare is influenced 
by two effects: the change in the tariff and the change in transportation costs. The 
change in welfare from a tariff is given by
d\V2 (v,cx >t) 
tit
a — cz — s 
3 - t  > 0 (3.64)
while the change in welfare from a reduction in s is
dW2(fi}cx ,0)
ds
cz  +  s -  (mch +  (1 -  m) cl ) ~  t 
3 < 0 (3.G5)
for cz + s < cz . We can show than dW2 (fi,cXjt) jd t  > d\V2 (/i,c*,0) /d s  as rear­
ranging the above yields
a -  2 (cz  + s + t) +  (ficj{ + (1 -  n)  cL) > 0 (3.6G)
This tells us that a unit change in tariff has a greater effect on welfare than a unit 
change in transportation costs. Hence, if t > s then FDI will always lead to lower 
welfare than can be obtained under a tariff.
Now consider the case where s < 0. Levy and Nolan (1992) argue that this will 
reduce welfare unless the tariff itself is immiserizing. Asstime s < 0 and t > 0 such 
that cz + s + t > cz > cz 4* s (i.e. t > |s|). Therefore, FDI is more profitable t.o 
the entrant only if the tariff is in place. The arguments above are now reversed. If 
cz +s < cz then a switch to FDI (by imposing a high tariff) will lower welfare. Simply, 
FDI means a loss in tariff revenue and the incumbent’s competitive advantage i.e. 
dW2 (¡i,cz  +  s, t) jd t > 0 as well as raising the entrant’s production cost by removing 
the exporting subsidy i.e. d\V2 (fi,cz , 0) /d s < 0. Of course, if cz + s > cz  we might 
be able to obtain the opposite result, as long as s is sufficiently large. In other words, 
FDI is welfare improving if the incumbent has a considerable competitive advantage
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a — 24, cL — 6, ch = 8, V =  5 
cz  = 0,s = 9, A = 110,6= 1
Qil 9.00 92 (0, Cz + s + 1*) 2.00
Qih 8.00 r 5.000
i t  (**) 15.85 A(t*) 113.78
2,(0) 9.37 4 ( f ) 100.00
WlL(q ( f ) ) 159.69 W t(0 ,cx , r ) 122.00
W1L (? (0)) 124.8 W2 (0,cz ) 134.00
Table 3.2: Results of Separating Equilibrium (A) Caption
and that t < s. However, if t > |s| welfare falls with FDI because the loss in tariff 
revenue is greater than the gain from raising the entrant’s marginal cost.
We should now look at the differences that emerge due to incomplete information. 
First, it is clear from the Levy and Nolan (1992) analysis that FDI improves welfare 
only when the saving in transportation costs is considerable (for the case where s > 0). 
However, even this result may be reversed if we consider limit pricing behaviour. As 
we mentioned above, if an prohibitive tariff is imposed to induce FDI and that this 
improves second period welfare, first period welfare falls because dW i/dt > 0. We 
can show that depending on the parameter values we use, first period welfare loss 
may or may not dominate second period welfare gains.
Consider a tariff t' such that the entrant will always choose FDI as the mode of 
entry i.e. tt2 ( 0 , cz  +  s +  £') < 7t2 (0,c^ ) although the optimal tariff t* would yield 
7r2 (0» cz  +  s + 1*) > *2(0, cz ). In other words, under an optimal tariff exporting 
remains the mode of entry for a low cost incumbent while the prohibitive tariff t1 > t* 
induces FDI for both types of incumbent.
We can see in Table 3.2, welfare is greater in the second period when FDI is the 
chosen mode of entry i.e. IV2 (0, cz ) > W2 (0, cx, t*). In the symmetric information 
equilibrium, a government would want to set a high tariff to induce foreign direct 
investment, in order to benefit from the increased welfare. However, if we consider
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a -  24, q , =  G, c// =  8,
= 2, s =  4, A = 69.5,6 = .5
Qil 9.00 Q2 (0,cz +  s +  £*) 2.00
Qih 8.00 V 6.00
2 , ( 0 12.35 A (f) 83.11
2, (°) 9.08 A ( 0 71.11
W1L(q ( f) ) 146.06 W^(0 .cx,**) 126.00
**?t(2(0)) 122.22 W2(0,cx) 111.11
Table 3.3: Results of Separating Equilibrium (B) Caption
first period welfare with signalling, we see that the welfare gains from imposing a 
high tariff may not be so beneficial after all, i.e.,
(g (**)) +  « ( 0 ,  cx , ¿*) > W'l t (2 (0)) +  6W2 (0,c2)
159.69+122 > 124.8 +  134.00 (3.67)
281.69 > 258.8 (3.68)
Thus, the gains from signalling in the first period may outweigh the gains from FDI
in the second period.10 Nevertheless, this is not the only case. In Table 3.3 we see
that for a different choice of parameter values, second period welfare may be lower 
when FDI is the chosen mode of entry. In the symmetric information equilibrium, a 
government would never set a high tariff to induce FDI as this would result in lower 
second period welfare, regardless of the gains from signalling in the first, period. We 
can see that for the case where welfare might improve with FDI this is not always 
the case when limit pricing is present.
Let us now turn to the pooling equilibrium. According to Levy and Nolan (1992) 
a simple policy conclusion is that an investment project should only be accepted 
when the company is ‘contributing’ a superior technology. However, in a pooling 
equilibrium the true value of the incumbent’s marginal cost is unknown. Posterior
10In the welfare analysis, the entrant’s fixed cost Z  of entry into the market has been ignored. It’s 
inclusion would lead to even lower second period welfare if FDI is the chosen mode of entry.
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beliefs are updated using priors i.e. /j =  p and so the marginal costs might be as 
follows:
ch > pcH +  (1 -  p)cL > cx  > cz > cL
Given the government’s beliefs about the incumbent’s marginal cost, FDI might en­
hance welfare because the production technology is superior i.e. pcn+( 1 — p) ci > cz- 
Unfortunately, it might be that the incumbent has a low marginal cost thus reversing 
the result. A simple solution to this would be to allow FDI only if Cz < cx < c/,. This 
ensures that we are always on the negative sloping part of the welfare function where 
a reduction in the entrant’s marginal cost always leads to an increase in welfare.
Finally, what about using a tariff to force a change from the pooling to the sep­
arating equilibrium? The problem here is that a government that does not have 
complete information about the incumbent’s cost cannot be sure about the final wel­
fare outcome. If the incumbent has a low marginal cost, a tariff can be set which will 
induce a separating equilibrium. This will certainly improve first period welfare and 
if exporting yields higher welfare than FDI, second period welfare will also improve. 
On the other, if the incumbent has a high marginal cost, FDI will be the mode of 
entry and there will be no signalling in the first period. As a result, welfare will be 
lower.
3.7 An Alternative Interpretation
It is possible to re-interpret. the exporting-FDI model as a choice between two types 
of technologies. It is not uncommon for plant sizes to differ within the same industry. 
One reason for this might, be to do with size of the market. Consider an incumbent 
monopolist facing a single potential entrant. The entrant can either enter on a large 
scale or small scale depending on the residual demand it will face. For example, if 
the residual demand is small, the entrant’s post-entry profits will be small and so it 
will be unwilling to make a large plant investment. If the plant size is small we might 
imagine that the firm is unable to exploit fully the possible economies of scale and 
so production costs might be quite high. On the other hand, if residual demand is
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large, post-entry profits will be high and so the firm might prefer to make a large 
fixed investment in order to exploit economies of scale. As a result, fixed costs might 
well be larger under larger scale production than under small scale production. On 
the other hand, the economies of scale obtained under large scale production mean 
that marginal costs may be lower than under small scale production. Clearly, large 
scale and small scale production resemble FDI and exporting respectively.
If informational asymmetries exist as in the exporting-FDI model, then the same 
results can be obtained. Limit pricing may emerge as an equilibrium strategy, influ­
encing the scale of production of the entrant.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has been an attempt to integrate two areas of research. We have demon­
strated how the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) limit pricing model common in Industrial 
Organisation can be adapted to explain the multinational firm’s decision to invest di­
rectly in a country. Previous models from International Trade have formalised this 
decision under complete information (Mot-ta 1992, Smith 1987, Buckley and Casson 
1981), showing that cost-incentives can be used to distinguish between the different 
entry modes. These papers have done much to illustrate the relationship between 
exporting and FDI. However, their focus on the multinational has led them to ignore 
an important aspect: the domestic producer. Papers regarding dominant incumbent 
monopolists and their entry deterring capabilities are widespread in Industrial Or­
ganisation (see Martin 1995 for an overview of the most important). Being first, in 
the market gives a firm certain advantages over those that follow, allowing them to 
make entry-deterring strategic investments (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983). We have 
shown that informational advantages can be used not to deter entry but to influence 
how it takes place.
Motta (1992) and Smith (1987) have shown the importance of residual demand 
and the entry mode. The larger the demand a firm faces, the more likely it is to 
choose foreign direct investment as the mode of entry. By combining this idea with 
the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) limit pricing model, we can show conditions where
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and incumbent can use pre-entry prices to signal information about future demand. 
If the signal tells the entrant that the post-entry demand is small, exporting is the 
chosen mode of entry. On the other hand, if the signal tells the entrant that post-entry 
demand is large, then FDI is the chosen mode of entry.
Furthermore, we have shown in this chapter that a domestic producer may have 
some influence over the mode of entry. Unlike previous papers where investment 
decisions are determined by parameter values, we show that the incumbent is able 
to actively affect the entry mode by manipulating market information. This is an 
important step as it emphasizes the effect that incumbent strategies may have on 
foreign investments.
We have also seen the effect of tariffs on the signalling behaviour of the incumbent. 
We see that trade policy may not only affect the entry mode but also the strategy 
of the incumbent. We saw that for small tariffs, the limit price fell. Moreover, if the 
separating equilibrium is supported by pre-entry monopoly prices, then a small tariff 
may lead to first period distortions, thus increasing welfare. If on the other hand, a 
large tariff is imposed, FDI becomes the dominant mode of entry and there will be 
no limit pricing in the first period. Although the tariff has a monotonic effect the 
choice of entry mode (as t increases we will always switch from exporting to FDI) this 
cannot be said of the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy: an increasing tariff may lead 
to increased pre-entry price distortions as well as decreasing them. However, it must 
be noted that throughout the change in the incumbent’s prices, we remain within the 
separating equilibrium.
In the pooling equilibrium, the entry mode is exporting for both incumbent cost 
types. We see therefore, that it is possible for an incumbent to manipulate information 
such that the entrant chooses a sub-optimal entry mode. A small tariff may overturn 
the pooling equilibrium forcing the low cost incumbent to separate. The entry mode 
then changes if the incumbent is revealed to have a high cost. However, a large 
tariff will lead to FDI being the mode of entry for all cost types. Nevertheless, a 
separating equilibrium still exists although it may no longer be distortionary in first 
period prices.
I l l
Finally, we looked at the effects on welfare. We saw that tariffs may lower the limit, 
price and thus leads to first period welfare gains. By setting the tariff too high, FDI 
is encouraged and there may be no first period price distortions. However, although 
tariffs may lead to first period welfare gains, we must also consider their effect on 
second period welfare. The literature on optimal tariffs is abundant (see Levy and 
Nolan 1992), however, if a tariff forces a switch from exporting to FDI the welfare 
gains are not so clear. Switching to FDI implies that the incumbent will operate at a 
lower marginal cost than under exporting. Of course, this means that market prices 
in the domestic market may be lower but we must also remember that the profits of 
the domestic producer fall. Brander and Krugman (1983) and Levy and Nolan (1992) 
have both shown that the relationship between welfare and the marginal cost of the 
entrant is convex. Therefore, a fall in the entrant’s marginal cost through FDI may 
increase or decrease welfare. What is also apparent is that by forcing FDI as a mode 
of entry, first, period welfare as well as second period welfare may fall.
The conclusion of this chapter is that asymmetric information may lead to pre- 
entry signalling to influence the mode of entry. Furthermore, tariffs can be used to 
trigger or dampen these strategies which in turn leads to ambiguous welfare effects.
112
Chapter 4
Signalling for Entry
4.1 Introduction
Strategic entry deterrence is a subject that has interested industrial economists for 
years. The classic scenario of the incumbent monopolist faced by a potential entrant 
has been modeled in many different ways (see Gilbert 1987 for an overview). However, 
if we view firms operating in international markets, the scenario changes somewhat. 
For example, is it reasonable to consider the entrant as a new firm in the market 
or is it already an existing firm in some other market? Furthermore, should the 
incumbent be limited to its own market? The introduction of oligopoly theory to 
international trade and entry can be attributed primarily to Brander (1981) and 
Brander and Krugman (1983). By assuming that a potential entrant is an incumbent 
in a foreign market immediately leads to the possibility of reciprocal entry, whereby 
incumbent monopolists decide to simultaneously enter each other’s markets. In this 
chapter we explore these issues, defining firms as both entrant and incumbent. By 
imposing incomplete information on certain parameters, we see that the firms use 
their pre-entry strategies not only to deter entry but to enhance their own entry in 
other markets. Using limit pricing as the vehicle for entry deterrence we are able to 
complement and contrast some of the results of Mailath (1989). Firms indeed use the 
limit price to deter entry but it also serves to enhance market share abroad.
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4.1.1 Literature
The origins of limit pricing can be found in Bain (1949,1956). The informational 
link that we use in this paper is due to Milgrom and Roberts (1982). They focus 
on how an incumbent monopolist can use informational asymmetries to deter entry. 
However, Mailath (1989) extends their results by showing that signalling behaviour 
emerges even when entry is not deterred. He shows that two firms in a market who are 
uncertain over each other’s costs will attempt to signal in an attempt to preserve their 
market share. For example, if a low cost incumbent does not signal it has a low cost, its 
rival will consider it have a high marginal cost and thus produce more. By signalling 
its cost type, the low cost incumbent is able to preserve its market share. A crucial 
difference in the set-up of the Mailath model is that information is not necessarily 
fully revealed in the second period, as is the case in the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) 
model. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) make the simplifying assumption that on entry 
all information is revealed. If this assumption was used in the Mailath model, the 
low cost incumbents would not signal their cost type for the simple reason that in the 
second period, the other firm will learn its cost type and produce accordingly.
Extensions of the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model have been considerable. A 
multi-market model of limit pricing was formalised by Srinivasan (1991) and Bagwell 
(1993). It is interesting to note that Srinivasan (1991) also highlights the impor­
tance of foreign markets to the incumbent. In his model, the incumbent operates in 
two markets before the entry stage. If the markets are symmetric, independent and 
combined signalling yield the same results on the limit price. However, if differences 
do exist in terms of the demand parameter, combined signalling reduces the cost of 
signalling for the incumbent. However, we will show that the existence of another 
market enhances signalling behaviour, even if the markets are identical in terms of 
cost and market demand.
The reciprocal entry model that we use is similar to that of Brander (1981) and 
Brander and Knigman (1983) (from now on the B-K model). They modeled two 
monopolistic incumbents who simultaneously enter each other’s home market. The
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interesting point is that trade takes place although the goods are identical. The 
upshot is that transportation costs raise costs and hence prices, resulting in lower 
firm profits. However, due to the Cournot conjectures where each firm assumes the 
other’s output is given, reciprocal entry takes place. We can use this result to explain 
why incumbents would want to enter a foreign market only to compete with a firm 
producing exactly the same product. The introduction of incomplete information 
allows the incumbents to protect their home markets as well as enhancing their foreign 
market share. The final result is that the B-K result may still arise.
Initially, we assume, as B-K, two monopolists in two geographically separate 
markets which at some point in time are able to enter each other’s home market 
simultaneously. Both incumbents have restricted information about the other firm’s 
marginal cost, which is of either a high or low type. This game of two-sided asym­
metric information closely resembles that of Mailath (1989). Similarly, we find that 
signalling for market share exists in the separating equilibrium as firms attempt to 
protect their own market and increase their market share in the foreign market. How­
ever, pooling behaviour represents a fall in market share for the low cost incumbent 
and therefore, a loss in profits. Therefore, a low cost firm in Mailath’s model would 
never pool. In this paper, pooling might arise because of deterring entry from the 
home market. Although such behaviour will lead to a loss in expected market share 
in the foreign market for the low cost incumbent, the gains in the home market may 
be sufficient to compensate. If this is the case, a high cost incumbent is able to deter 
entry from the home market and increase its market share in the foreign market. If 
entry cannot be deterred from the home market, then no pooling equilibrium will 
exist. Furthermore, when conditions are such that a high cost incumbent cannot 
profitably imitate the strategy of a low cost incumbent in order to deter entry, a 
pooling equilibrium may still be possible if the gain in market share in the foreign 
market is significantly increased by the signal. In other words, signalling for entry 
may arise as an equilibrium strategy in the pooling equilibrium.
The importance of market share becomes more acute when we extend the model 
to n + 1 markets and firms. In this scenario, the limit price might either rise or fall as
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the number of firms increases. If a priori beliefs are such that an incumbent believes 
all other firms to have a high marginal cost then the limit price falls. In fact, the 
fall might be so large that this leads to negative prices and hence the equilibrium 
breaks down. However, pricing below marginal cost is possible. On the other hand, 
if a priori beliefs are such that the incumbent believes all the other firms to have a 
low marginal cost, then the limit price increases towards the monopoly price. This is 
because expected market share gains fall over all the markets and hence the firm tries 
to maximise its pre-entry profits. Pooling still occurs in the n +1 firm case, although 
as n increases, the low cost type requires a lower discount factor in order to bind it to 
the pooling strategy. This is because a low cost incumbent loses market share across 
markets in the pooling equilibrium, but gains in the first period from not signalling. 
The opposite is the case for the high cost incumbent. It sacrifices first period profits 
in order to gain market share across markets in the second period. As a result, as the 
number of markets increases, the range of discount factors that bind it to imitating 
the low cost incumbent’s first period strategy, increases.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 the reciprocal entry model in 
a setting of incomplete information is outlined. In Section 4.3 the existence of the 
separating equilibrium is demonstrated for differing fixed costs. Section 4.4 shows 
the conditions required for the pooling equilibrium. In Section 4.5 we show the effect 
on the limit price by increasing the number of markets where entry can take place. 
Section 4.6 concludes.
4 . 2  T h e  M o d e l
Let us consider a two period game with two countries 1 and 2. In the first period, 
a homogenous good is produced by quantity setting incumbent monopolists 1 and 
2 whose home markets are 1 and 2 respectively. The inverse demand function is 
assumed linear and is given by p* =  a — Qx where Q% = q\ +  <?* for q* > 0 and qj > 0, 
i , j  E { 1 ,2 }  (we use superscripts to denote market and subscripts for the firm identity, 
throughout). Each firm always produces in its own market but if entry takes place 
in the second period, then q* > 0 and the firms compete as Cournot duopolists. The
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marginal cost of each incumbent is constant where c,=lt2 € {c^, ch} , cH > ci. On 
entry into the other market, each incumbent must cover a fixed cost Ft (i.e. the fixed 
cost that i covers when entering a market—a firm’s fixed cost is already covered for 
production in its own market).
In the second period, we have four possible outcomes:
1. 1 enters 2, 2 does not enter 1.
2. Both 1 and 2 enter the other’s market.
3. 1 does not enter 2, 2 enters 1.
4. Neither 1 nor 2 enter the other’s market.
However, neither of the firms knows the other’s marginal cost (although they know 
their own marginal cost). Following Harsanyi (1967-68) we assign probabilities to the 
incumbents’ cost types. At the beginning of the first period, incumbent 1 assigns a 
prior probability p2 € [0,1] that the incumbent in market 2, namely firm 2, has a 
high cost type, cm and probability (1 — p2) € [0,1] that firm 2 in market 2 has a low 
cost type, ci. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) have shown how first, period strategies 
may be linked to the marginal costs of the incumbents. At the end of the first period, 
these beliefs can be updated using Bayes’ rule. Firm 1 is able to form posterior beliefs 
H2 € [0,1).
4.2.1 Second Period Profits
Before we turn to the signalling game, we need to know the second period outputs and 
profits that result after trade has taken place. As neither firm knows the actual cost 
type of the other, they are forced to use their prior beliefs in deriving their expected 
profits. However, they know their own cost type and the cost type that the other 
firm will be believe they have at the end of the second period.
Let us now compute equilibrium outputs and profits when cost types are unknown. 
Firms have marginal costs cu and cL with prior probabilities pt and (1 — pi) and
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i 9 firm i of cost type 0, where i € {1,2} and 0 € {H, X}.
QiO first period output of firm i9
monopoly output of firm i of cost type 0.
Fi fixed entry cost of firm i.
monopoly profits of id in market i.
(9i) first, period profits of iO in market i when producing <?,.
(p *^ p j) second period duopoly profits of i9 when beliefs are /x, and pj.
^ j (Pi i Pj ) i ’s expected second period duopoly profits of firm j  in market i.
F\0 (PiyPj) entry decision for i into j.
Vs expected entry decision for j  into i.
PùPi prior and posterior beliefs regarding i ’s cost type.
Table 4.1: Notation
posterior probabilities pi and (1 — pi) respectively. Firm i in market i maximises,
4j = “¡J* (° ~ °« - ?•’» “ M i“ * ~ Vi) ?ji.) 9,'fl
Incumbent i anticipates firm j  to maximise,
*>• =  max (a — Ce — -  Mitf/i -  (1 -  Mi) 9.x) 9>«
The first order conditions for firm i are,
■ g ^  —a - c $  — 2q]„ -  fi}q)H -  (1 -  fij) q'jL =  0
and for j t
= a - C g - 2 q*j$ -  ¿49,7/ -  (1 “  Mi) 9.x = 0
We can then rearrange these into matrix format,
a - C H  ^ f 2 0 Mj (1 ~P j) ) ( H ^
a - c i 0 2 pj  (1 — Pj) QiL
a - c H Pi (1 - P i )  2 0 QjH
a - c L j ^P i ( 1 - Pi) 0 2 j l  W  J
(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3) •
(4.4)
(4.5)
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which yields equilibrium values,
9 ,7 / (Mi,Mi)
9,x (Mi, Mi) 
9/x (m„Mj) 
9j/z(Mi,Mi)
2o — 3c// +  cx + (c// — cx) (2/jj — //,) 
6
2 (a -  g .) + (c// -  cL) (2m/ -  ft)
6
2a -  3crf +  cx +  (cH — cx) (2;/, — f t )  
6
2 (a -  cx) + (cw -  cx) (2ft -  //,)
6
(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
This leads to equilibrium profits,
/ 2a — 3ch +  ex +  (c// — cx) (2//, — "  2
^//(MoMi) = ‘j - M i ) V
i , . , i 2 ( a - c L) + (cH- c L)(2tii - n i) \ 2
*ix(Mi,Mi) = ( ------------------ g-------------------- I
( , , _  ( 2a — 3ch +  cx + (c/i -  cx) (2//, — Mi) Y
*i/j(Mi,Mi) ~  I g I
/ f \ /2  (a -  cx) +  (c// — cx) (2/// ~ Mi) \
*jX (Mi, M;) = I ------------------ g-------------------- I
(4.10)
(4.11)
(4.12)
(4.13)
As we see, equilibrium outputs and profits are dependent on the firm’s own cost, 
type, the signal it sends and its beliefs about the other firm’s cost. Therefore, the 
output of firm j  is given by qs (ft,Mj) = Mj9)h (M„Mi) +  (1 -  Mi)9;X (ft,Mi) which
6C|U£lls
4’ (M,M/) = ^ ^ V ^ ^  (4-14)
which yields expected equilibrium profits,
-  Cx) +  (cw -  Cx) (M i-
*i (Mi, Mi) = f — *i 2Mj)\ (4.15)
We drop the subscript 0 indicating j ’s cost type because the weighting is already 
given by fij.
4-2.2 The Entry Decision
The firms have two objectives: to increase profits in the domestic market and to enter 
the foreign market. If fixed entry costs for all firms are low (perhaps zero) then both 
firms will be able to enter each other’s domestic market. Signalling will merely serve
120
to increase each firm’s market share, as in Mailath (1989). However, signalling may 
also deter entry from the domestic market and assist entry into the foreign market 
if fixed costs are considerable. For example, entry deterrence in the Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982) scenario would be represented by,
< Fj < irj (0,fij) (4.16)
where the entrant’s cost type is Cj =  p3Ch +  (1 — Pj) ci. Hence, a low cost incumbent 
i, denoted iL  can deter entry. Nevertheless, iH  cannot deter entry. More generally, 
the entry condition requires that iO will only enter market j  when 7if0 (pi,pj) > Ft 
but i anticipates entry when 7r’ (^ , /i; ) > Fj.
However, this is not entirely the case in this chapter. One problem is that both 
incumbents i and j  are forced to consider deterring entry or entering the market, 
respectively, in the first period, before any signalling has taken place. Indeed, the 
limit price they choose in the first period depends on their expected profits. As they 
don’t know the other firm’s cost, they must use their prior beliefs in estimating their 
expected profits. In other words, although the second period equilibrium may be 
a separating equilibrium, the firms do not know this when they consider their first 
period strategy. Therefore, incumbent i expects to earn profits ir- (p,, pj) in the second 
period, using its prior beliefs to estimate the cost of the other firm. Similarly, firm 
i expects firm j  to earn 7r* (pi,pj) on entering the market, even though firm j  may 
expect to earn different profits on entering market i (firm j  expects to earn n) (pj,pj) 
because it knows its own cost, but not that of firm i). From now on, expected profits 
will be rewritten accordingly using the relevant prior beliefs.
First, define Eie € {0,1} as the entry decision for firm id € {1,2} >0 € {HtL} 
where Ete (/a , pj) =  0 and E& (pi, pj) = 1 denote no entry and entry, respectively. In 
order words,
Ei$ (pit Pj) = *
1 when 7T¿(/i<tpj) > Fi 
0 when7r{e (in,Pj) < Fi
(4.17)
The value of Eio (p,,pj) depends implicitly on the incumbent's first period output 
qi and the prior beliefs the firm holds regarding the other firm’s marginal cost.
J
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An important point, to make is that E& (a*i>0>) represents expected entry. In fact, 
Eie (/i*,Pj) = 1 may not lead to entry in the second period by firm i into market j. 
However, given the prior beliefs that i has about j  it can form expectations about its 
future profits which it must make if it is to signal in the first period. As we shall see, 
this may lead to higher first period outputs than in the Milgrom and Roberts set-up.
Secondly, define £> 6 {0, l} as firm i’s expected entry decision for firm j.
In other words, when 7rj (/i*,pj) > g e n try  is expected and Ej pj) ~  1. When 
7rj (fiijpj) < Fj entry is not expected to take place and Ej (/¿t,Pj) =  0.
We have a range of entry equilibria that might exist in the second period. Take 
firm 1 as an example. It can expect the following scenarios:
1. E2  (0, pj) =  £ 2(1. 02) =  1, free entry: (mi*/^) > £2
2. E2 (0, p2) — 0, E2 (1, P2) = 1, low cost entrant only: 7rj (1, pj) > F2 > ttJ (0, pj)
3- E2 (0, pj) =  E2 (1, pj) = 0, no entry: F2 > (#*i, P2 )
Note that E2 (0, pj) < E2 (1, 02). In other words, E2 (1, pj) =  0 and E2 (0, pj) = 1 
is not possible because it implies that entry is profitable for firm 2 in market 1 only 
when the incumbent 1 has a low cost type. However, as 7120(1, 02) > ^ 2 0  (0,02)» 
E2 (1, pj) may also equal 1.
In the foreign market, firm 1 will enter according to the following.
1. E ie(0}p2) = £ 10(1, 02) = 1, free entry: ^ ( p u p j )  > £1
2. £10 (0,^2) = 1, £10 (1, 02) =  0, signal low cost to enter: ^ ( 0,02) > £1 > 
*U>(1.P2)
3. Eu. (m<, P2 ) =  1, Eih (Mi, P2 ) =  0, low cost firm enters, only: (mi, Pj ) > F j >
<Ml,
4. E u  (0, M2) =  Fie (1, Pi) = 0, no entry: Fi > Jr?, (mi , P2)
We see that E\$ (0,02) > £10 (1,02) because signalling a low cost will not reduce 
post-entry profits. Furthermore, as E u  (/i*, P2) > £ ih (fM^pj) a low cost entrant will
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not expect to earn lower post-entry profits than a high cost entrant. As we see, there 
exist a considerable number of equilibria.
4.2.3 Optimal Strategies
In the first period the incumbents are monopolists. They are aware that in the second 
period entry is threatened and that they too can enter the other market. They must 
therefore find an optimal strategy that maximises expected profits. From Milgrom 
and Roberts (1982) the firms must consider whether entry can be deterred or not 
while from Mailath (1989) they must check to see whether they can enter the other 
market or not.
Incumbent i$ optimises the following:
*  6 argmax{7r,„ (?,) + 6(Ej <9 (/W 'j) +  (1 -  (l‘<,Pj)) < 0)
+  (/*»/>;)}
where i yj  € {1,2},i ^  j ,6  € {H, L) and 6 6 (0,1) represents the discount factor 
in each firm’s expected future profit. Finally, we state Bayes’ rule for consistency of 
beliefs,
if 4iL 7^  ÇiH then fit =  0 and /i* =  1 
if =  Qiif then fu =  Pi
Combining the incumbent’s optimisation strategy and Bayes’ rule we have defined 
the conditions necessary for a sequential equilibrium.
To summarise, the game unfolds as follows:
• Nature chooses all firms types.
• Period One: Firms choose their first period outputs.
• Firms observe the outputs across all markets.
•  Period Two: Firms enter markets where they expect positive profits.
123
Entry may or may not be deterred in the second period, depending on the fixed 
cost of entry. In the following two sections, we consider the incentive constraints that 
lead to both separating and pooling equilibria.
4.3 Separating Equilibrium
Let us consider the separating equilibrium. This is when the low cost incumbents find 
it profitable to reveal their cost type to the entrants by finding a first period output, 
(which implies the limit price) that cannot be imitated by a high cost incumbent. 
Initially, we assume that fixed costs are very small so that entry is always profitable 
both into the domestic market and into the foreign market. This is so that the model 
closely resembles that of B-K in the second period equilibrium.
The incentive constraint for the low cost incumbent 1L can be written,
*iIt (<?;) +  àEj (0, ft) *\L (0, Pi)
+<5(1 -  E2 (0, Pj)) Trfi. + 6Exl (0,ft) [irjt  (0, ft) -  Fi]
> VIL + 6E2(1,P2)*]l ^>P2)
+ 6 ( 1  P j ) 7t } i  +  0 2 E i i ( 1 , P 2 )  -  Fi (4.18)
In order that all fixed costs can be considered in the model, the ent ry decision remains 
in the incentive constraints.1 In the proof of Proposition 4.1 that follows, each case 
will be examined.
For 1H, the incentive constraint, is similarly,
*11/ W.)+ <5£2 (o, ft) *J// (o. ft)
+ ¿(1  -B 2 (0 ,ft))7 r} „  +  i£ :IH (0, ft) [irfH (0, f t )  -  f i]
< irjfl +  SEi (1, ft) irj„ (l,ft)
+ 6 ( 1 - E 2(l,pj))ir\„ + 5£ i« (l,ft) [irj„(l,ft) -  f\] (4.19)
although this time we require that imitating the low cost incumbent’s first period 
output will lead to lower profits than playing the complete information monopoly
1 Note that we write the first period output of firm *0 as q, instead of q,g as the cost type of the 
incumbent is indicated by the subscript on tt^ .
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output in the first period.2 Equations 4.18 and 4.19 are necessary conditions for a 
separating equilibrium.
For a separating equilibrium to exist, we need to show that the high cost incumbent 
finds it more expensive to deviate from its first period monopoly output than the 
low cost incumbent. This follows in fact from the concavity of the profit functions. 
However, the profitability of signalling must satisfy the two following conditions which 
are sufficient for obtaining a separating equilibrium. For the home market, we have,
E 2 ( l . f t )  ([ffu, -  * I l ( l .f t ) ]  “  [*•}„ -  Tt\ h  (1,P2)])
> e 2 (0, ft) ( -  TrJi (0, ft)] -  [tt}w -  (0, ft)]) (4.20)
We can see that 4.20 suggests several sufficiency conditions. Remember that and 
£2 (11P2 ) > E2 (0, Pt)> Therefore, we require,
~  *1L (1.P2) > *1H ~  *\h ( l . f t ) (4.21)
and
w}t (O.ft) -  * \ l ( l.ft)  > * \ h  (0,ft) -  w}H (l,ft) (4.22)
for E2(l, f t)  =  1 ,£2(0, f t)  = 0 and f^ ( l,f t)  = E2 (0, ft) = 1, respectively. In- 
equality 4.21 expresses the profitability of signalling when entry is deterred. This 
outcome is similar to that of Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Inequality 4.22 shows the 
profitability of increasing post-entry market share, similar to the result of Mailath 
(1989).
For the foreign market we have, 1
E lL (Q,p2) [?iu,(0,P2) -  Fi] -  E\l ( 1 »P2) A l (liPa) -Ex]
> Exh (0,P2) [Ah (°»P2) -  Ex] -  E xh (1,P2) [ir?//(I1P2) -  Fi] (4.23)
For Exe ( l,p 2) =  Ee (0,p2) — 1 the following condition arises,
A l (°^2> -  A l U>P2) > A h (°.P2) -  A h (i.Ps) (4-24)
2 We ignore case of equality.
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Given the symmetry, this is identical to inequality 4.22. If Eie ( 1, pj) = 0. E\$ (0, p?) = 
1, then we obtain,
"ii(O,0»)>»?ff(O,fc) (4.25)
and finally, for EXL (p^p?) -  l,£iw  (MnP2> “  0,
kIl (O’Pi ) > *11 (l.Pi) (4.2G)
The last two conditions clearly hold because a low cost incumbent always earns higher 
profits than a high cost incumbent and signalling a low cost type will always enhance 
profits. The inequalities 4.21, 4.22, 4.24, 4.25 and 4.26 provide the conditions neces­
sary for a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 As long as Ej {pi,pj) + Ea(pitpj) > 1, there exists at least one 
separating equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.1 requires that only one of the inequalities 4.21, 4.22, 4.24, 4.25 and 
4.26 hold for a separating equilibrium to hold. If at least, one of the conditions holds, 
then Ej (pi,pj) + Exq (pi,pj) can be no less than one because entry will take place 
somewhere. Indeed, this is what drives the separating equilibrium: either firm 1 will 
enter market 2 or firm 2 will enter market 1. Either way, this leads to limit pricing 
behaviour in the first period.
We have shown that whether or not entry takes place, limit pricing may emerge 
as an equilibrium strategy in the first period. In other words, we might find that 
pre-trade prices might be lower than the monopoly price levels. From Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982), limit pricing emerges to deter entry. However, Mailath (1989) has 
shown that this is not necessary for signalling behaviour to exist. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that limit pricing exists: if entry can be deterred, we have the model 
of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and if it can’t, we have the model of Mailath (1989). 
Indeed, if Milgrom and Roberts (1982) had made less simplistic assumptions about 
post-entry information, they would also have obtained the same result, as Mailath 
(1989).
Let us look again at the possible entry scenarios.
L A
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1. £ 2(0,p2) = E2 (l,p 2 ) = 1, free entry: Tt2 (pup 2 ) > F2
2. E2 (0,p2) = 0 ,E 2 ( l,p 2) =  1, low cost entrant only: ttJ (l,p2) > F2 > (0^ )
3. E2 {0 ,f>2 ) = E2 ( l 1p2) = 0, no entry: F2 > ?r](pi,p2)
This symbolizes the entry decision of firm 2 according to firm 1. In case 1 fixed 
costs are so low that firm 2 always enters market 1 whatever its cost. Nevertheless, a 
low cost incumbent may still limit price in order to protect its market share (Mailath 
1989). In case 2 only a low cost firm 2 will enter market 1. As prior beliefs are such 
that tt\ (1, p2) > F2 (as we are in the separating equilibrium) a low cost firm I will 
signal its cost in the first period (Milgrom and Roberts 1982), Finally, case 3 shows 
that entry is completely blockaded, whatever firm l ’s cost. As a result there will be 
no limit pricing in the pre-entry stage.
However, this is half the story. We now have to consider firm l ’s entry decision 
which is also dependent on it cost and first period strategy. In the foreign market, 
firm 1 will enter according to the following.
1. E x9 (0, p2) “  Ei$ (1, p2) =  1, free entry: (/ij, P2 ) > F\
2 . £ ’1^ (0,p2) = l,E ]0(l ,p 2) =  0, signal low cost to enter: 7^ ( 0,p2) > F\ >
^ ( 1^ 2)
3. E h  (Pi, P2 ) = 1, E\h [Px,Pi ) =  0, low cost firm enters, only: (pi, p2) > Fx >
{PixP2 ) 1
4. Ei${Qtp2) = £ 10(1,p2) = 0, no entry: Fi > 7rJi>(p1,p2)
In the first case, firm 1 can always enter market 2 whatever its first, period strategy 
and its cost type. However, signalling in the first period will enhance firm l ’s market 
share in market 2, hence raising its profits. In case 2 we see that firm 1 can only enter 
the other market if it signals a low cost type, regardless of its actual cost. In other 
words, it must signal to enter, otherwise its market share will be too small to make 
sufficient profits to cover the fixed entry cost. In case 3 only the low cost firm can
i
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enter the other market signalling and finally, in the fourth case neither type of firm 1 
can enter market 2 and so there will be no first period signalling.
If we compare the two sets of entry decisions, we see that limit pricing will not 
occur when entry is entirely deterred in both markets. Otherwise, the low cost firm 
will always want to separate from the high cost type. Therefore, it is possible that 
firm 2 will never enter market 1 because its fixed entry cost cannot be covered i.e. 
F2 > (/ii,p2)- Under these circumstances, firm 1 does not need to signal to deter
entry. On the other hand, if it is considering to enter market 2, signalling will both 
ensure profitable entry (case 2) and enhance market share (case 1,3). As we can see, 
limit pricing may be purely for entry, not only for entry deterrence.
4.3.1 The Effect on Limit Price
It is worthwhile considering the effect on the limit price when the firm has the possi­
bility of entering a foreign market. The least cost separating output is the smallest 
output that the incumbent can choose for which the separating equilibrium still holds. 
We find this output defined by the level of production needed to set inequality 4.19 
to equality. Thus we can rearrange 4.19 and define
7T1IH $
E2 (0, Pi) 7r}„
E i{ l,p 2)Tr
(0, i»2) +  (1 — £2 (0, P2» Wh]
1H ( ! .P i )  +  (1  -  Ei  (1 ,P 2 ) )  ’f}//]
+E 11/ {0,Pi) [ tt,h ( 0 ,Pi) — i \ ]
~E\h (1 j P 2 ) [»r?«(l,/>2)-F1]
(4.27)
(4.28)
as a proxy for the limit price. If ^  increases then the least cost separating output 
increases. We can now compare this to the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) case without 
the foreign market (i.e. E\h (O.P2) =  E \h (LP2) *= 0). We obtain
^IH — n\H (5l) 'i'MfcR
E2 (0, p2) n\H (0, p2) + (1 -  E2 (0, P2)) *■}ƒ,]
-  [E2 (l.Pa) 7r}„ (1,P2) +  (1 -  E2 (1,P2)) *\h (4.29)
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Clearly, 'I'm&r < V which implies that the limit price (least cost separating output) 
in the Milgrom and Roberts model is higher (lower) than that obtained when the firm 
can enter a  foreign market.
This result is driven by the larger profits available in the foreign market to the 
high cost incumbent, if it is able to signal effectively that it has a low marginal cost.
4.4 Pooling Equilibrium
In the pooling equilibrium of Milgrom and Roberts (1982), the entrant learns nothing 
about the incumbent’s marginal cost by observing its output and so updates its 
posterior beliefs using its priors. However, if beliefs are such that entry is deterred, the 
low cost incumbent has an incentive to pool deterring entry without using costly pre- 
entry price distortions. The high cost firm has an incentive to imitate this strategy, 
hence both firm types will deter entry in the second period. Unfortunately, Mailath 
(1989) is unable to show the existence of a pooling equilibrium for the reason that 
entry cannot be deterred. Consequently, the low cost firm will always separate in 
order to protect its market share and expected profits. In the present chapter, the 
low cost incumbents are faced with deterring entry and enhancing market share. By 
pooling, they can deter entry costlessly although at the expense of their foreign profits. 
Clearly, pooling has a double-edged effect: on the one hand it. implies that entry can 
be deterred without costly pre-entry price distortions whilst on the other, profits in 
the foreign market are reduced.
In the following section we shall look at the incentives (and disincentives) of the 
low cost firm to pool. Furthermore, we need to check to see whether the high cost 
firm finds it profitable to imitate such a strategy. As we shall see, pooling equilibria 
do exist, although under more restrictive conditions than those provided by Milgrom 
and Roberts (1982). Indeed, we shall see that the decision to pool depends on the 
relative gains in the home and foreign markets.
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4.4.1 Incentives of the Low Cost Firm
The incentive for a low cost incumbent to pool is that it can deter entry without 
having to signal in the first period (which is costly). Pooling equilibria are driven by 
the fixed cost of entry and the prior beliefs of the entrant. For example, firm 1 must 
believe that the profits earned by firm 2 in the post-entry game will be
In other words, given the fixed cost and the prior beliefs, entry will not take place 
(i.e. E2 (pi,p2) = 0)- Therefore, given that in the pooling equilibrium firm 2 updates 
using its prior beliefs, firm 1 expects that this will lead to firm 2 not entering market 
1. Of course, firm 1 does not know firm 2’s true type, but it estimates it using its 
prior beliefs pi.
Allowing imitation requires a reversal of the incentive constraints. If the pooling 
strategy deters entry, then the low cost incumbent will play its monopoly output in 
the first period qn  (this is not the only pooling output, but it is the Pareto optimum 
for firm 1 as any other output would lead to lower profits). However, the incumbent’s 
profit on entry into market 2 is reduced because (0, pi) > (PuPz). In other 
words, pooling reduces its expected profits because firm 2 will produce a higher output 
than it would if it were producing against a low cost firm for certain.
Consequently, for a pooling equilibrium to exist, we require
This tells that pooling in the first period yields higher profits for the firm than could 
be obtained tmder a separating equilibrium (the separating equilibrium two-period 
profits being on the LHS of inequality 4.31).
This defines an upper bound on the discount factor 6  which supports the pooling 
eqtiilibrium. If pi =  0 the denominator gets smaller (or remains unchanged) and
F2 > * 1  (Pl>P2 ) (4.30)
*■}L (si) + s* I l + ( ° .  P2 ) [*u. (0,P2) -  F\]
< 7t\l + bn\L + 6 E il (puPi) (pi,p2) -  F,] (4.31)
6  <<f>L (pi) =
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so 4>i (0) > 4>i On the other hand, if pi =  1 then denominator gets bigger (or 
remains unchanged) and so <Pl (1) <  (pi). We can conclude that d<pi (pi) /dpi < 0.
In other words, if 5 gets bigger, we have a smaller range of beliefs over which the 
pooling equilibrium can be supported. Intuitively, the larger the discount factor, the 
higher the low cost firm’s expected future profits are in the foreign market. Pooling 
lowers these profits and so the firm requires lower values -of pi if it is to pool in the 
first, period.
Let us consider the different entry decisions in order to get. a full picture of what 
is going on. The entry decisions of the low cost firm are as follows:
1. E 1L (0, P2) = E n  (pu P2) = 1
2. E n  (0,p2) = 1, £ il (Pu Pï ) “  0
3. E n  (0, P2) =  E n  (P11P2) = 0
We need to check under what conditions a pooling equilibrium exists for each 
entry decision.
If E n  (0» P2 ) > E\l {pi, P2 ) =  1 then firm l will enter market 2 when it pools. 
Therefore, inequality 4.31 reduces to,
£ <  <J>l ( p i )  =
*\l -  * \l (2) (4.33)
for the low cost type incumbent, where q represents the least cost separating output.3
We see that inequality 4.33 imposes an upper bound on the range of the discount 
factors that support the pooling equilibrium. The numerator represents the first 
period profits lost from limit pricing while the denominator indicates the gain in 
profits in market 2 by signalling a low cost.
If the gains abroad from signalling are large, then pooling will only be supported
by a small discount factor. This means that second period profits are relatively
unimportant to firm 1 and so it is less concerned with the profits it might earn in the
3 The least cost separating output q is a  proxy of the limit price. It is the smallest output that a 
low cost type incumbent can produce a t with out overturning the separating equilibrium.
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foreign market. On the other hand, if separating is costly (i.e. j  is relatively bigger 
than the monopoly output) then pooling becomes more attractive, despite the losses 
that might result abroad.
We can compare this result with that of Nlilgrom and Roberts (19S2). They 
argue that if prior beliefs are such that entry is deterred in the pooling equilil>- 
num, the incumbent will always find such a strategy possible. To see this, tmpiwse 
E ii  (/ii,P2 ) =  0 so that the incumbent’s only strategy is to deter entry. Then in­
equality 4.31 reduces to
A l (gj) + 6k \l < tt\l + 6itjL (1.31)
which holds for all 6  for qx > qn. The impact of the foreign market on limit pricing 
behaviour is essentially Mailath’s (1989) result. In his paper pooling equilibria do not 
exist because firms always find it profitable to protect market share. However, here 
we see the two forces at work: the desire to reduce costly pre-entry price distortions 
and the enhancement of market share abroad. It is interesting to note that if
*\L ~  »11 (2i) > »1L (0.ft) ~ (ft.ft) (4.35)
a pooling equilibrium always exists as this allows discount factors h = 1.
Now let us consider a second scenario. Suppose E \i(O,/^) = l,£ a (p i,p i)  = 0. 
Firm 1 is only able to enter market 2 if it signals its cost type in the first period, 
hence in a pooling equilibrium it will not expect to enter market 2 (although it may 
once costs have been revealed). Inequality 4.31 reduces to,
6<4’"l (ft)= ~  ^ (4.36)
*11  (o,P2)-£i
As 7T?L(0,P2) > £1 > * i l {Pu P2 ) implies ^¿(O.pz) = l.Kufpi.Pa) = 0 then com­
paring this to inequality 4.33, $L (p) < <f>l (p) can be written
*1L ~  »1L (j,)  „ »it ~ »it (j,) (4.37)
»Ii(0,p2) - » i t ( p i . f t )  »it (O.ft) -  F \
Indeed, as F\ increases to ix\L (0, P2), the upper bound of discount factors that support 
the pooling equilibrium goes to 1. When ^2 (pi»P2) = £ il (0iP2) = EiiifiuPi) = 0
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pooling will always occur for all 6  > 0. This is because firm 1 does not. expect to 
make profits in market 2 and so concentrates on its own market where the pooling 
equilibrium is always preferable to the separating equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts 
1982).
4.4.2 Incentives for the High Cost Firm
We need to check whether the high cost incumbent finds it profitable to imitate the 
first period strategy of the low cost incumbent. In doing so, it deters entry from its 
home market and improves its position in the foreign market because it\H (p i,¿>2) > 
17\h (1 > P2) • The condition for pooling is thus,
* \ h  (?it) +  +  6 E i h (p i ,P i ) (pi, p j)  -  Fj]
> *\h + (> '* 1 1 1  (I.P 2 ) + 6E\h (I 1 P2 ) [»i/f (1. Pa) — Fi] (4.38)
On the LHS of inequality 4.38 we have the two period profits that 1H  can expect to 
earn if it is able to imitate the pre-entry strategy of firm 1L. On the RHS we have the 
profits that 1H  would earn in a separating equilibrium i.e. it produces its monopoly 
output in the first, period and reveals its cost as being high. Rewriting the above we 
get
6 > <t>H (Pi) =  [»}// -  *1,1 (ill.)] /  ( * I h + E \u  (Pi, P2 ) [*\„ {P uP i)  ~ Ft]
-  » i f f  ( I . P 2)  -  ¿ E m  ( l , P i )  [ t t J „  ( l , p 2 )  -  F i ] )  ( 4 . 3 9 )
which defines a lower bound on the range of the discoimt. factors that support the 
pooling equilibrium. Let us look at the range of prior beliefs that support the pooling 
equilibrium. If p\ = 0 the denominator gets bigger (or remains the same) so <j>fj (0) < 
4>h (pi)- On the other hand, if pi =  1 the denominator gets smaller (or remains the 
same) thus 4>h (p i) < <f>H (1) • We can conclude that d<j>n (pi) /dpi > 0 implying that 
if 6  is large, a larger range of prior beliefs will support the pooling equilibrium. It 
is clear that if we are to show the existence of a pooling equilibrium we will need to 
show that <j>i (px) > 4>h (pi)- We shall find later that this is indeed the case, leaving 
the proof to the appendix.
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Let ns write out the entry decisions of the high cost firm.
1* E\h (Pi * P2) = E \h (1 * P2) =  1 
2. E\h (Pi > P2) = 1) E\h (1, P2) — 0 
3- ^i// (pi * P2) = ^ 1// (1* P2) =  0
Let us see what happens when IH  is able to enter market 2. Suppose E m  (pi, P2 ) > 
E\h (11P2) =  1- Then 4*38 reduces to,
 ^ ~ nlH (1* P2 )] + 6 [tfi/f (pi f P2 ) “  ^1H P2 )] ^ v 1H “  *1H (QIl ) (4.40)
The first term on the LHS represents the gains from pooling according to the Milgrom 
and Roberts model. Entry is deterred and hence 1H earns monopoly profits in the 
second period. This gain must be sufficiently large to compensate for first period 
losses. .The second term on the LHS represents the gains from pooling by enhancing 
foreign market share. This is similar to the Mailath model in the sense that signalling 
increases market share although in his model this occurs only in the separating equi­
librium. On the RHS we have the cost of pooling: the difference in profits between 
the separating and pooling equilibria. Rearranging we obtain
*1* -  A h (in.)£ > <t>H (fll) = (4-41)M h ~ A h (I.P 2 )] +  [A h  (pl.p?) -  A h (I.P 2 ))
Contrary to the low cost firm, we now define a lower bound on the discount factor 
(pi) which is again a function of pi. Suppose
6 [*}« -  A h (I.P2 )] ^ A h ~ A h (?il) (4.42)
This is the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) incentive constraint for the separating equi­
librium. We see that the high cost firm gets a higher discounted profit by playing its 
monopoly output in the first period and allowing entry rather than deterring entry 
by imitating the low cost monopoly output. Clearly, under these conditions the high 
cost firm will not pool (<5 would have to be greater than 1). However, we must also 
consider the profits that the firm earns in the foreign market. By imitating the low
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cost firm’s first period strategy the high cost firm earns higher profits than it would 
by revealing its cost type. If the profits gained in pooling in the foreign market are 
sufficiently large such that
A h  (P11P2) -  A h  (1 . P2) > [Wtf ~ A h  (9il)] -  [ A h  ~ A h  (1»P2)] (4-43)
pooling may still exist. In other words, although it may not be profitable for 1H  
to just deter entry by imitating IL ’s first period output, the gains from increasing 
market share in market 2 may be enough to ensure a pooling equilibrium. Clearly, 
expected profits in 2 must be high in order to compensate for the loss in first period 
profits due to imitation of the low cost incumbent’s output.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that the conditions for a Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982) pooling equilibrium may be violated but pooling exists because of Mailath’s 
(1989) argument that firms will attempt to enhance their market share. The bizarre 
result is that pooling does not take place in the Mailath model because a  low cost 
incumbent will always prefer to protect its market share. However, because the low 
cost incumbent is able to deter entry by pooling, it pools. The high cost incumbent 
is then able to use the profits its obtains in the foreign market in order to finance the 
first period signal.
Next, consider E\h (p i , P2) =  l fE \h (1,P2) =  0 so that entry into 2 is only prof­
itable if IH  pools. This leads to,
6 [*!// -  A h ( ! .P2 )] +  6 [A h (Pi . P2 ) -  fi]
> A h - A h ( 1 i l )  (4.44)
Again, we see the two pooling criteria we mentioned before: the gains in the home 
market and the gains in the foreign market. Similarly, even if inequality 4.42 holds, 
we can still obtain a pooling equilibrium if,
f. jJt (n \ = _________ WlH ~ H (gll)_________
-  ^  ~  [*}„ -  n\H (1 ,* )]  +  (PuP2) -  Fl\
As H (P11P2) > (1, p2) it. must also be that 0'  ^(px) > (pj). In other
words, the lower the profits that are obtained in the pooling equilibrium, the higher
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the discount factor needed in order for the pooling equilibrium to be supported. This 
makes sense: if future profits are unimportant, the firm prefers to maximise its first, 
period profits by setting price equal to monopoly price.
In the final case, (pi,/^) =  E ih (1 * P2) = 0 which means that the high cost, 
firm can never enter the other market. Consequently, we obtain the pooling equilib­
rium of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) where
/// _  HUJTTÎn — 7T (gU.)
*Ih -  a-}// (l, pi) (4.40)
We see that. is not function of p\. It is easy to see that 0'/) > 4>'h (pi) > <t>'n (pi) 
because the denominator in is the smallest of the three. We see that foreign 
market entry allows for a larger range of discoimt factors that support the pooling 
equilibrium for the high cost incumbent. The possibility of foreign market profits 
increases expect future profit and as a consequence we can allow for lower levels of 6 . 
On the other hand, we could fix 6  and look at the range of prior beliefs that, support 
the pooling equilibrium.
So far we have discussed restrictions on the incentives of the two different cost 
type firms to pool. However, we should also check to see whether such incentives are 
plausible. For the low cost, firm there must be some 4>l (pi) > $ while for the high 
cost firm we need some <j>n (pi) < <5. If this is the case for all the different entry 
decisions then beliefs exist for all pooling equilibria. We prove this in the following 
proposition.
Proposition 4.2 There always exists a range of prior beliefs p that support the pool­
ing equilibrium for all foreign market entry decisions.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof is rather long but essentially shows that we can always find conditions 
for which a pooling equilibrium will exist. In other words, we can always find incen­
tives for both cost types to pool i.e. there exists some p such that 4>i (p) > (¡>n (p). 
Thus, all the equilibria discussed above may exist.
To conclude this section, we have shown the existence of a pooling equilibrium 
when entry can be deterred from the home market. However, pooling behaviour
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also enhances the expected market share of the high cost firm in the foreign market. 
Although the low cost incumbent loses profit in the foreign market, the gains in the 
home market may compensate. If this is the case (as it is for low enough 6), pooling 
may be an equilibrium strategy.
4 . 5  n  +  1 M a r k e t s
We have seen that the limit price is indeed influence by the existence of a foreign 
market. In this section we explore the extent of this effect. Before we were able 
to show that the existence of another market leads to a  fall in the limit price. The 
question we ask ourselves now is whether this is true if we increase the number of 
markets and firms.
The problems of extending the Cournot model to n markets is illustrated briefly in 
Friedman (1977) and in more detail by Ruffin (1971) and Okuguchi (1973). Obtaining 
stability and uniqueness in the equilibrium if the number of firms is increased to 
infinity can create problems and for this reason we assume a simplified, more specific 
modeling for the following analysis. Hence, from now on consider that,
n+l
t*  (?) =  1 -  E  *  (4.47)
1=1
is the linear inverse demand function for market. ¿ 6 (1 ,  n +  l}. Indeed, this is exactly 
the same for all the other n markets as the number of firms equals the number of 
markets. Therefore, if we increase the number of markets that a firm can enter, we 
increase the number of firms in those markets, simply because of reciprocal entry. 
The beliefs that each firm i holds regarding the other incumbents can be given by the 
V ecto r P-~i { P lj  P2> Pi— 11 Pi-t-1» ***i Pn+1 }*
4.5.1 Separating Equilibrium
The incentive constraint for iL  can be written,
* \l (n )  +  &K\l (o, p-0 +  s Y , [* il (°>p -i) ~  fi]
>  K l +  <5*,x (1. P-i) +  i  £  [tffx (1, P -i) ~
i?j
(4.48)
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and similarly for iH ,
x'iH (<7i) + fa'ill (0. P-.) +<5H  [*Ïh (0, P-i) -  ^.]
«#>
< ir\„ + i>x\H (l,p -i) + \fiH -  F>]
(4.49)
Note that, the profit that i earns in the foreign markets is the same for each market 
regardless of the prior beliefs as each firm enters the others* market.
It is easy to show that there exists a separating equilibrium. In the proof of 
Proposition 4.1 we see that the output of 2 is dependent only on p.i and not on the 
actual cost type of 1. As long as signalling increases the residual demand that 1 faces 
in the second period in all markets, then a separating equilibrium will exist. However, 
we shall show below that conditions exist where signalling breaks down because a low 
enough limit price can no longer be found.
Effect on the Limit Price
We can see how the limit price is affected by the increase in the number of firms that 
can enter i and the number of markets that i can enter. Assume that the limit price 
is the highest price that iL can charge without upsetting the separating equilibrium. 
In the Cournot setting, this means the lowest equilibrium output q. This can be 
obtained by finding the point at which inequality 4.48 reaches equality, i.e.,
n+1
(n) =  n iH -  n iH ( q )  =  6  ["iff (°.P-<) ~  n iH 0 .  P-<)] (4 *50)
i=i
Therefore, the least cost separating output in i is a function of the expected profits 
of iH  if it were able to successfully imitate the strategy of iL. To see the effect of 
increasing the number of firms on the limit price, it is necessary to use the parame- 
terised example. Assume firms have marginal costs Cft and Ci with prior probabilities 
Pi and (1 — pi) and posterior probabilities and (1 — yu,) respectively. Each firm 
maximises,
K i  = “ 2* t a -  Ct -  qu, -  £  (p,qlH +  (1 -  pj) qj t )J qa (4.51)
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However, first period outputs influence the outputs of the other firms in the market. 
Therefore, the expected residual demand that each firm faces is dependent on prior 
beliefs /v  Therefore, incumbent i anticipates firm j  to maximise,
ir'j0 = max [ a -  Cg -  qlS -  £  (P/tïiH +  (1 -  pk) qti) -  M iH  ~  (1 -  P.) I Qjl 
“ \  ifttk  J
(4.52)
The first order conditions for firm i are,
dqg =  a - C g -  2q,g -  ]T (pjqjH + (1 -  pj)qlL) = 0 (4.53)
and for j ,
^ 7— = a — Co -  2Qjo -  J !  (pkQkH +  (1 “  Pk) -  PiÇiH -  (1 -  Pi) Qn =  0 (4.54)
' To simplify, suppose pk = pi = Pj — P so we can the write the first order conditions
for j9  as,
C?7T
dqj$— =  a -  co -  2qjd -  (n -  1) (pqjH +  (1 -  p) qjL) -  Piqw -  (1 -  Pi) qn  =  0 (4.55)
The first order conditions can be rearranged and solved for output. The results for 
both output and profit are indicated in the appendix. i f t the profitability of signalling 
is now given by,
if = £ (n +  1) 
_  ^2(o
/ 2 (a — ch) -  n (ch — cl) (1 — 2p) V
2 (n +  2) 7
~ c//) -  2n (cff -  cL) (1 -  p)'
2 (n + 2) (4.56)
p is an estimate of the other firms’ cost types. This is because i maximises its expected 
profits given that it knows that it can send a signal /j , to the other firms. However, i 
must wait till the second period to receive the signal p j . Therefore, i is forced to use 
its prior beliefs in estimating the cost type of the other n  firms. A change in if infers 
a change in the least cost separating output and hence a change in the limit price. If 
'1' rises, the least cost separating output falls (to retain the equality) and hence the 
limit price rises. We are interested in how the limit price changes as n changes. We 
can now make the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.3 I f p > 3/4 the limit price will fall with large enough n. If p < 3/4 
the limit price will rise with large enough n.
Proof. Remember that we proxy the limit price by $ knowing that as 4* increases, 
the limit price increases. We need to see whether the limit price increases or decreases 
with respect to n. By differentiating 'l' we get,
¿ ^  C// —  * - -  18cLn2 +  16ncLp -  12ncL -  3ctn3 + Aclti*p 
dn 4 (n +  2)
+24cr,n2p -  4cfjnzp + 24nc// + 18n2c// -  12an -  1Cncup 
+8ex -  24cht? p + 3n3C// -  8a (4.07)
Then, we take the limit of the derivative,
ji™, ( ^ )  \ 6 <-c«+Ci>2 -  3> o-58)
This tells us that for a large enough number of markets and firms, the slope will he* 
either positive or negative depending on whether p is greater or loss than 3/4. ■  
Increasing the number of firms and markets has two effects. First, the nurntxT of 
firms in a market reduces the profits a firm can expect to earn. However, the number
of markets that a firm can enter increases and so total profits across markets ris<*. 
If all the firm have exactly the same cost type and they have complete information 
about this, the total profits of each firm would be,
n i =.<n + 1 ) ( ^ ) ’ (',M >
where we assume that c, — c_, = c for all firms. Differentiating this with respect to n
yields,
r)TL tl (n -I- *2\(n — rl2 (‘1 GO)dUidn
n (  + 2) (a -  c f
----- < u(n 4- 2)
which tells us that as the number of countries and firms increases, total profits across 
markets will fall. However, this result arises because all firms have equal marginal 
costs. If marginal costs are different, the result will also be quite different. Suppose 
firm i has marginal costs Ci while all the other firms have the same marginal cost, c. 
The output in each market for firm i is,
. / a - ( n  + l)c1 + ncJV
* = ( --------n + 2------- ) (4-61)
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Taking the limit of this function gives us,
lim
n—*oo
(a — (n 4- l)c* +  r?Cj
¡TT2 ) — Cj d (4.62)
so we see that as long as c* < c,, firm i will still produce a positive output. If the 
firms have equal marginal costs, then output is zero, as we would expect in the case 
of perfect competition. Clearly, a positive output (and hence positive profits) over 
an infinite number of markets implies an infinite profit. Nevertheless, we see that 
when cost asymmetries exist, increasing the number of firms and markets may lead 
to higher profits.
Similarly, for the case of incomplete information, the output of the incumbent iL 
in the second period is given by,
Qn = 2 ( a - c L) - n  (cH -  cL) (to -  2p) (4.63)2 (n + 2)
When firm iL  signals it has a low marginal cost, to = 0. The limit of this output as 
n goes to infinity is,
lim
n—*oo
2 (a -  cl) +  2pn (cH -  cL) 
2 (n +  2) ~ p (c n - c L) (4.64)
which clearly states that the low cost firm will always have a positive output when 
there are an infinite number of firms in the market. It is for this reason that the limit 
price rises with n as long as there is a sufficiently high probability that the other firms 
have a higher marginal cost.
Using parameter values, we can show how the least cost separating output depends 
on p. Find some q which equalises inequality 4.48. This gives us,
6  (n+  1)
f2 (a
/2 (a
-  cH) — n (ch — cL) (1 ~  2p) 
2 (n +  2)
-  cH) -  2n (cH -  cL) (1 -  p)'
2 (n + 2)
’m ( ± T s )  - ( a - c" - 2 ) 2 (4.65)
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p=.74
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Figure 4.1: Least Cost Separating Output for Increasing n.
Solving for g yields,
2 =  a^  + 2 ^ T T ) [6n(CH~ CL){n+l)
(4 neap — 3riCff — Ancip + 3ncj, — 4c# +  4<i)]1^ 2 (4.66)
For the following parameter values a = 24, Ch — 18, ci =  16,6 =  .5, p € {.74, .75, .76}, 
we can plot the least cost separating output for n € (1,200] (figure 4.1). As we can 
see, for p =  .75 the least cost separating output settles at around 5.4 while it is 
increasing for p > .75 and decreasing for p < .75.
4.5.2 Pooling Equilibrium
In the pooling equilibrium, the entrant learns nothing about the true cost type of 
the incumbent by observing its first period output. For a low cost incumbent to find 
pooling profitable, we require a non-trivial fixed cost or a considerable difference in 
marginal costs, so that a pooling strategy will deter entry in the second period. In 
the pooling equilibrium, entry is deterred from market i when,
*){PuPi)<Fi
i
t
i
l
(4.67)
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This states that any potential entrant j  will expect non-positive duopoly profits when 
entering market i given p,. If duopoly profits are non-positive, then tripoly profits 
must be negative.
However, can i enter the other markets? Two scenarios arise.
1. EiH (1 .Pj) =  1, free entry: (1,Pj ) > F
2. Eia (pi) P j )  = 1 ,E iH ( P i , P j )  = 0, entry when poohng occurs, only: tt/,, (p„p>) > 
F  > (l,pj)
These assumptions have considerable implications. First, if i can deter all entry 
into its own market and yet enter the other markets, it seems reasonable that i will 
be the only entrant in all the other n markets. Quite simply, if duopoly profits do not 
cover the fixed entry cost, then tripoly profits (this is the maximum profit possible in 
each market because i enters for sure) certainly cannot cover this cost, hence i is the 
only entrant. The only way to change this would be to allow for differing fixed costs 
among the other n firms. However, this would mean that i may not be able to deter 
all firms from entering its home market. If entry were sequential although production 
remains simultaneous, this scenario could exist. However, this is beyond the scope of 
this chapter.
We saw that in the separating equilibrium entry deterrence was not essential for 
signalling as the limit price can also be used to establish market share. However, this 
kind of strategy cannot be supported in the pooling equilibrium because a low cost 
incumbent will always do better by signalling. Nevertheless, when the fixed cost of 
the entrant is such that pooling will deter entry, then the following condition ensures 
that the low cost incumbent will pool. Assume that priors are the same for all the 
firms, denoted pj. The incentive constraint for iL  is,
Kl (?) +  to *  +  n<5 [niL (0, pj) -  F ]
< * il + to \L +  nb [tt{l (l,p j) -  F ]
(4.68)
which reduces to
6 < 6 l =
* 1L -  K\L (2 )
n [jrft (0, Pj) -  wJt (1, Pj)]
(4.69)
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Note that the LHS of equation 4.69 will eventually increase in n as we saw above 
in Proposition 4.3 and that XL pools at its Pareto optimal complete information 
monopoly output, qiL. Note that as n increases, the denominator gets smaller and 
thus the range of 6  < 8 i  that support pooling behaviour gets smaller. The reason for 
this is simple: as n increases, the profits made from increasing market share by sig­
nalling become more important. The profits from deterring entry get relatively small 
compared to the expected profits in the foreign markets. For the low cost incum­
bent, market share is lost by pooling and consequently, an increase in its importance 
reduces the desire to pool. Note that as n —► oo, 6 i  —* 0 which means no pooling 
equilibrium can exist.
For iH  let us first assume that Em  (l,p>) =  1. The necessary condition for the 
high cost incumbent is similarly,
K h  ( in )  + Sirin +  nS [iri„ (pitpj) -  fi]
> 7rj„ +  Sir[H (1, p_i) + n& [^„ (1 , Pj) -  ƒ)]
which rearranges to,
(4.70)
<5 > <5„ = ---------------------*'lH ~ (iiLl ----------=--------- T (4.71)
k'/i -  ir\H (1. P-0] +  " (Pi. pO - ^ h U .pO]
As n increases, the denominator increases defining a lower value of In other 
words, increasing the number of markets a firm can enter increases the incentive to 
pool.
Now consider Em  (1 ,/>j) = 0, Em {pi,pj) = 1. The incentive constraint for iH  is 
now,
ir'iH ( in )  +  Siri„ +  nS (Pi, Pj) -  fi]
> ir\H + 6 n\H (1, p_i)
Similarly, we can rearrange to get,
6 > 6 „ = ---------------------ir\H -irlH(ln )----------;---------  (4.73)
-  ir'iH (1. P-0] +  n [k/f (Pi< Pj) ~  irin (1. Pj)\
Again, as we increase n, we obtain a wider range of discount factors that support 
the pooling equilibrium. Indeed, as n —► oo, 6 h —1► 0 implying that if a low cost
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incumbent can deter entry by pooling, a high cost incumbent will always imitate its 
strategy (because 6  > 0). However, as shown above, a low cost incumbent will not 
pool when n is infinitely large.
Proposition 4.4 We can find parameters {6 , p ,F ,n} for which pooling equilibria ex­
ist However, for finite n*, the pooling equilibrium breaks down and the low cost 
incumbent will separate.
Proof. We see that inequalities 4.43 and 4.45 are virtually identical to inequalities 
4.71 and 4.73 and so following Proposition 4.2 we can find conditions under which a 
pooling equilibrium exists. However, we saw that as n —* oo, 6 i  —* 0 and 6 h —> 0. 
Choosing some 6 ' > 0 there must exist some n for which 6 i  < 6'. Hence, the 
low cost incumbent will prefer to separate rather than pool, overturning the pooling 
equilibrium. ■
The rationale behind this result is that the low cost incumbent, incurs a loss in 
the foreign markets by pooling. It is giving up market share that, it could win if it 
separated in the first period. As the number of foreign markets increases, this loss 
gets bigger. What is interesting when we compare the results to the previous section 
is that n > 1 i.e. we need at least two foreign markets otherwise pooling remains the 
dominant equilibrium. Of course, it should be pointed out that this result relies on 
the fact that when firms pool, information about their cost type is not revealed on 
entry into a market. This is the assumption that Milgrom and Roberts (1982) use 
to simplify their model of entry deterrence. If it were retained here, Mailath’s result 
would collapse and limit pricing woidd serve no purpose in enhancing foreign market 
share.
Overall, the extension to n +  1 markets does change some of the previous results. 
We see that the limit price in the separating equilibrium may not always fall in the 
presence of foreign markets and that there may not always exist a pooling equilibrhim, 
even if prior beliefs are such that entry will always be deterred.
p4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown how the B-K model can be adapted to a model of limit 
pricing by restricting the cost information available to the incumbents. We see that 
the limit price may not only be used to deter entry but also to increase market share 
in the target country. The existence of the foreign market increases the willingness 
of the high cost incumbent to imitate the strategy of a low cost firm. As a result, 
the low cost incumbent is forced to choose a lower limit price in order to signal its 
cost type. This is similar to the results of Srinivasan (1991) who finds that combining 
signals across markets may lower the limit price in one of the markets. However, we 
do not require market demand or cost differences to drive this result.
We were also able to show the existence of pooling equilibria despite the fact that 
this reduced foreign market profits for the low cost incumbent. However, the gains 
from not deviating from the monopoly output level in the first period always com­
pensate for the foreign loss. What is interesting is that even under conditions where 
pooling would not exist in the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model, the equilibrium 
is supported because of foreign market profits. This is unusual as pooling equilibria 
do not exist in Mailath (1989) because entry deterrence is not. a feasible strategy. 
However, because pooling raises foreign market profits for the high cost firm, it. helps 
to finance the first period deviation from the monopoly output.
Increasing the number of markets and firms we see that the limit price either 
increases or decreases depending on the size of the prior beliefs. If a firm believes 
that all the other firms have a high marginal cost, the expected profits of a low cost 
incumbent will increase with n and hence the limit price falls. However, when the 
firm believes that all the other firms have a low marginal cost, its expected profits 
fall with n and therefore the limit price rises. Moreover, for certain n, the limit price 
may be negative and hence the equilibrium breaks down.
For finite n we see a break down in the pooling equilibrium: the low cost incum­
bent’s losses in the foreign market from pooling are so high that it prefers to incur 
first, period losses and limit price in the first period. Hence, although priors may deter
I
i
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entry, limit pricing may still occur. This is contrary to all results so far seen in the 
literature on limit pricing.
This chapter has shown that in an international context we can see two aspects;
Indeed, we have shown that the type of equilibrium that emerges may depend on 
which of these two effects dominates.
A p p e n d i x
4.6.1 Complete Information
Assume an inverse linear demand function for n +  1 firms, p (g) = a — ^ qt, where
firms have marginal cost d  € {cj, C2, ..., c„+i}. Firm t maximises profit in each market
7rf =  max [ a -  d  -  q{ -  £  q, ] (4.74)
\  /
for i ,k , j  6 { l , . . . ,n + l} . To simplify things, assume that all firms j  ^  * have 
marginal cost c, . As all the other n  firms of cost type c, are the same, their outputs 
will be the same. The first, order condition for i is,
of limit pricing: its ability to deter entry and its ability to enhance market share.
—1 =  a -  d  -  2$ -  nqj =  0dq{ (4.75)
and for the other n firms,
(4.76)
We can solve these two first order conditions for the equilibrium outputs,
a -  (n +  1) d  +  ncj 
n + 2 
a — 2 Cj 4- d
(4.77)
(4.78)
n +  2
This yields equilibrium profits for the both types,
(4.79)
(4.80)
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The total profits of firm i over the n +  1 markets is simply, (n +  1) r*. If all firms 
have equal marginal costs, i.e. c, = Cj =  c then the profits are,
(4.81)
4.6.2 Incomplete Information
Let us now compute similar equilibria when costs types axe unknown. Firms have 
marginal costs cn and ci with prior probabilities pi and (1 — p,) and posterior prob­
abilities ^  and (1 — Pi) respectively. Each firm maximises,
<9 =  max -  c" -  ifc, -  £  (ft?,// +  (1 - f t )  9 ,i) j  ?,« (4.82)
However, first, period outputs influence the outputs of the other firms in the market. 
Therefore, the expected residual demand that each firm faces is dependent on prior 
beliefs px. Therefore, incumbent i anticipates firm j  to maximise,
7Tfl = max 
3 »
l a - c  - Q j e -  53 (PkQkH + (1 - P k ) q k L )  -  m m  -  (1 ~ P i ) < J i L  ]
\  I
(4.83)
The first order conditions for firm i are,
Ô7T
dqte— -  a -  cfl -  2qiB -  5 3  (PjQjH +  (1 -  pj) qiL) = 0 (4.84)
and for j,
dn
d<lô ^  a ~  ° ê ~ “  53 (PkQkH +  (1 -  Pk) qki) -  PiqiH -  (1 -  pi) q a  — 0 (4.85)
To simplify, suppose pk = pj — p so we can the write the first order conditions for jO
as,
dnij*
dqjô - a  -  c6 -  2 qje -  (n -  1) (pqjH +  (1 -  p)qji) -  Piqm -  (1 -  /x*) qiL — 0 (4.86)
We can then rearrange these into matrix format,
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 ^ a — ch ^ f  2 0 np n ( l - p )  > /
a —cl 0 2 np n ( l - p )
a - c H Vi (1-M i) 2 +  (n -  l)p (n 1) (1 — p)
V a “ cW  ^ Vi (1 ~ rt) (n —  1) p 2 +  (n —  1) (1 —  p) , \
<JiH
QiL
QjL
yielding equilibrium outputs,
_  2 (a -  c h ) —  n ( c h -  Cl ) (1 +  Vi — 2p)
9iH  ~  2  (n +  2)
_  2  (a -  c l ) -  n ( c h -  c i )  ( m  -  2p)
?iL “  2 (n +  2)
2 (a -  c H ) +  (c h  -  eL) (n (p -  1) -  2  (p -  p t)) 
9 i H  ~  2 (n +  2)
_  2  (a —  Ci) +  ( c H - C i ) ( ( n - 2 ) p  +  2/ij)
-  2  (n +  2)
This leads to equilibrium profits,
t , , (2 (a  — c//) — n(cH — cl) (1 +  m  — 2 p )\2
= ( ------------------ 2^tT+2)------------------J
=  / 2 ( a - c L ) - n ( c H - c , ) > , - 2 p ) y
2 ( n  +  2) J
_  ( 2 ( a - c H )  +  ( c H -  cj.) (n (/> -  1) -  2  (p -  / u ) ) \  
V  2 (n +  2) )
_i -x _ ( 2 ( a - c L) +  (cH - C L ) ( ( n - 2 ) p  +  2iii ) \ 1
^-------------------2 K f 2 j -------------------J
The profitability of signalling is given by,
a _  s ( 2 ( a - c H) - n ( c H -  cL) ( 1  -  2p,)\ 2 (
l  2 (n +  2) )  ~ '
, (2 (a — cH) — n (cH — cl) (2 -2 /ij) \2
l  2 (n + 2) J
If we differentiate ^  we obtain,
^  = S (n +1) (CH -  Cz.)n (c" ~ Cd i i ^  -  3) -■(" -  2) (a -  
9 1 1  (n +  2)
+ni (cH -  ct) 4 (a ~ c"> + nSS!L~ ct) (4^ j ~ 3)
2(n + 2 f
\
/
(4.87)
(4.88)
(4.89)
(4.90)
(4.91)
(4.92)
(4.93)
(4.94)
(4.95)
(4.96)
(4.97)
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This tells iis something about the way the limit price changes with respect to the 
number of firms and industries which a firm can enter.
Proof o f Proposition 4.1: We can divide the proof into two parts. In the first 
part we demonstrate the single crossing condition. In the second part a separating 
equilibrium is shown to exist for zero fixed costs.
(i) Considering the case of limit pricing (i.e. strategies where ft > qn) the single 
crossing condition (Spence 1974) shows that it is more costly for a high cost firm to 
increase its output than it is for a low cost firm. Essentially, this requires that the 
slope of the low cost incumbent’s profit when producing above the monopoly output 
is greater (less negative) than that of the high cost firm.
Show that 7Tiz, -  nlL (ft) < 7TiH- ^ ih (ft) for ft > qu ,. Monopoly profits are given 
by 7ri L = max (a -  cq — q\o) q\$ which yields equilibrium output qie =  ( a -  ce) / 2  and 
profits iris =  (o — Co) 2  /4. Therefore,
*1L — JflJL (h) < *1H “  *1H ($l) (4.98)
yields,
( ~ T ^ )  ~  (a-C f, -  ft) ft < 2C- )  - ( a - C t f - f t ) f t  (4.99)
and rearranging gives us,
7 (ch -  cl) (2a - c H - c L -  4qi) < 0 (4.100)
4
for (2a -  cH -  cL) /4  =  (qlL +  qlH) /2 < ft. Therefore, a sufficient condition is that 
ft > 9lL-
(ii) Rearrange the incentive constraints to obtain:
6  (E 2 (0, P2 ) [ttij, (0,^2) “  H (0tP2) “  niL
-  E 2 ( l,p 2) [* a  (I1P2) -  ?t}h (l.Pz) -  +  7ri//])
+<S ( [Eh  (0,0 2 ) [*21L (0, P2) -  Ft] -  Exl (1, P2) (1, P2 ) -  Ft}]
-  [F ih (0,P2) [jt?// (°iP2 ) -  Fi] -  E\h (1»P2) \x\h ( I j P2 ) -  Fi]])
> h i L -  7Ti l (9l)1 -  Kw -  * i h  (it)] (4.101)
150
From the single crossing condition in (i),
*IL “  * 1L (q\) < TTlH -  TTiH (qi) (4.102)
for qi > Qil which means that the RHS is negative. The profitability of separating is 
greater for the low cost type than it is for the high cost type. The conditions for a 
separating equilibrium are:
S 2 ( l ,f t) ( [n 1i - ’rl1L (1-ft)] -  [7rlW — Tr}// (1.P2)])
> E2  (0, Pi) ([^lL — L (Oift)] — [” 1;/ “  H (^’ P2)]) (4.103)
and
E \l (0, P2 ) [tf?L (0, P2 ) -  Fi] -  E1L (1, P2 ) [njL (1, P2 ) -  Fi]
>  E \h (0,p2) [ ? r (0,p2) *- FiJ — Eiff (1, pa) [ttJw (l,p2) -  Fj] (4.104)
for domestic and foreign investment, respectively. There are several cases to prove.
First, for the domestic market. We know that E2 (0,p2) < F 2 (1,/^) because an 
incumbent signalling a low cost cannot raise the entrant’s post-entry profits.
1. F 2 (0, p2) =  F 2 (l,p2) =  1, free entry.
2. F 2 (0,p2) — 0, E2 (1 ,^ ) =  I» low cost entrant only.
3. E2 (0, p2) =  E 2 (1, ft)  = 0) no entry.
(i) If E2 (0, p2) = E2 (l,p 2) — 1, (entry always takes place), inequality 4.103 
reduces to,
*1 l (O.P2) -  A l (I.P2) > A h (O.P2) “  A h (I.P2) 
Substituting in the parameter values, this can be rewritten as,
(4.105)
^ 2 (a — cl) -f (ch — cj,) (2p2) ^ 2 _  ^ 2 (a — cl) +  (eg ~~ ci) (2p2 — 1)^
^ ^ 2a — 3cH +  cl + (eg ~  ci) (2p^^
2a — 3Cfj +  cl + (c// — c^) (2p2 — 1)
- ( ):6 (4.106)
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which reduces to,
g (cH -  CL)2 > 0 (4.107)
(ii) If E2 (0, p{) =  0, Et (1, pi) =  1, then 4.103 rearranges to,
A t  ~  A\l U.Pî) > A h ~  A h (f.ft) (4.108)
Again, substituting in the equilibrium values yields,
2 (a  -  cL) + {cH -  cL) (2pj -
2a — 3 ch +  cl + (ch — cl) (2 pj — (4.109)
which reduces to,
i  (cn -  cl) (a -  2ci, +  ch -  2pj (c# -  cl)) > 0 
o
(4.110)
which is positive.4
(iii) Finally, suppose E2 (0,p2) — £2 (I1P2) = 0. Inequality 4.103 no longer holds 
and the equilibrium fails.
For the foreign market, similar equilibria occur. Firm l ’s investment into market 2 
is given by inequality 4.104. Clearly, Eie (0, P2 ) > Ew (1, P2 ) because signalling a low 
cost type cannot lower a firm’s own post-entry profits. Furthermore, E \i{pup 2 ) > 
E m  (p^ P2) because a low cost inciunbent will always be able to enter a market when 
it is profitable for a high cost firm, although the opposite may not be the case.
!• Ei$ (0, P2) = Eie (1, P2) = 1, free entry.
2. E iq (0, P2 ) = 1, £10 (1, P2 ) — 0, signal low cost to enter.
3. E\l (p*, P2 ) = 1, E m  (pi,p2) =  0, low cost firm enters, only.
4. E \ 0  (0, P2 ) = E iq (1, P2) = 0, no entry.
4 For g u  > 0 and q m  >  0, P2  = 1, a — c h  > 0  and P2  = 0, a — 2c*. + c» > 0.
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(i) If E\$ (0, P2 ) = E\e ( I1P2) =  1, i.e. entry always takes place. Inequality 4.104 
reduces to,
A l (M 2) ~  A l (1.P2) > A h ( M 2) -  A h (M 2) (4-111)
We know that Ae (/¿m, P2) =  ^  (/**, P2 ) and so by 4.105 we obtain,
\ ( c H - e i ? > 0  (4.112)
(ii) If Eie (O,/^) =  UE 10 ( I1P2) =  0. Then 4.104 reduces to,
wil (0, P2 ) > (0, pi) (4.113)
which holds for all c# > c/,.
(iii) If E n  (a^ *,P2) = 1, E m  ( M 2) =  0 then we get,
* u (0 ,f t )> ^ i .( l ,P 2 )  (4.114)
FYom the equilibrium profits, we know that 7r\o (pupz) =  Ae (Pi> P2 ) which means 
that the same holds for inequality 4.104.
(iv) Finally, suppose £ 10(0, ¿>2) =  E\e (1 > P2) =  0 then 4.103 no longer holds and 
the equilibrium fails. ■
P ro o f of Proposition 4.2: We need to check that a range of discount factors 
exists such that both the high and low cost firms will want to pool. The low cost 
incumbent finds pooling profitable when we have the following inequality:
A l (2i) +  (0» P2) [A l (0» P2) ~  ^ 1]
< n\L + fa\L + &E\i (Pi 1 P2) [*n. (Pi>P2> -  ^l] (4.115)
Rearranging for <5 we obtain 
à <4>l (pi) = *\l -  *} i  («O
E h  (Q,Pj) ["(l (O.Pî ) -  f j]  -  E n  (PuPi) ["u, (Pi .Pï ) ~ * 1) 4^116
We define the upper boimd on the discount factor <j>i (pi) as a function of pj. For the 
high cost firm, the conditions for a pooling equilibrium are
A h (9il) + + &Eih (pi,P2 ) [ A h (P1 1 P2 ) -  * 1]
> 7r}ff 4- ôn\H (1, P2 ) +  6Eih (1, P2 ) [A h (*> P2 ) “ -Fi] (4.117)
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which can be rearranged to give
-  *} h (I.P2) “  E xh (l.Ps) [Ah (l.Pa) “  Fi\) (4.118)
where 4>h (pi) defines the lower bound on the discount factor. We need to find some
exist. For the low cost firm, the following entry decisions yield the subsequent, upper 
bounds on the discount factor.
1. (0,P2) = E h  (puPi) =  1, yielding <f>L (pi) = <f/L (p,)
2. E il (0, P2) = 1, E n  (pi, P2) =  0, yielding <f>L (pi) =  4>"L (Pi)
3. Eh  (0,P2) = E iL (Pi,p2) =  0, yielding <j>L (pi) =  4% (Pi)
Similarly, lower bounds on the discount factor exist for the high cost firm.
1- Em  (pi, p2) = E ih (l,p2) =  1, yielding <f>H (p2) =  (p j
2. ElH(pu p2) = 1,E ih (l,p2) =  0, yielding 4>h (P\) =  4>h (Pi)
3. E ih (Pi ,P2) =  E iH (1 ,p2) =  0, yielding <j>H (pi) =  (px)
First, we need to check that (pj) > $  (p 1) > <jf9  (p!) and that <j/L (Pl) > (Pl) 
for some range of beliefs. This can be written as:
The first term is clearly the largest, and the second term dominates the last because 
A l (pup?) < ■F’l which proves that 4>l (P i ) >  <t>"L ( p i )  >  <t>'L (P l ) for aU p. Next, let’s
pi such that 4>l (pi) > 4>h (p i) to see under which entry decisions pooling equilibria
A t  -  A l (gi)
0
A l -  A l (a,) 
A l (°<p?) -  Fi 
A l ~  A lV _______________ (4.119)A l (O.P2) -  A l (P1.P2)
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do the same for 1H.
h ~  (9il)
*IH “  ^ ltf  (1>P2)
> ~  A h (9n)
>
n IH +  H (Pi> P2) — F\ -  7r\H ( l ,p 2) 
___________ fflH ~  A h (gll) (4.120)A h +  A h (Pi ,P2) -  A h (hp i) -  A h (I.P2)
which proves that </># (pi) > <$>H (pi) > <t>'fj(pi) for all pj. We can now prove the 
existence of a pooling equilibrium for each of the cases.
Now, we can show that for some p^ such that we can find some 6 * where <f>'L {p{] > 
6 * > <j>u (pi). Thus, suppose
Let pi —► 0, 4>l (Pi) -* co, <fi'H (pj) is an unchanged positive number. Clearly, 
<fi’L (0) > (p'H (0). If <f)fL (1) > fix (1) then there exists a range of 6 * which sup­
ports the pooling equilibrium for all pi. If 4>'L (1) < <p% (1) we can find p\ such 
that <ffL (pfx) — 4>'h (p\) hence, <f>'L (p\ — e) > (fix (pi — e) which again provides a range 
of Sm € [<j>'L (pi -  e ), <f)(L (0)] that supports the separating equilibrium. ■
A l (0<Pi ) -  (Pl.ft) A h -  A l l (I.P2 )
*>l ~  A l (?,)  ^ _ A h -  jr\H (<?,!,)
'rt _ \ 1 / V _ 0 % 1 > (4.121)
Chapter 5 
Conclusion
The aims of this thesis were analyse the effects of trade policy on the strategic be­
haviour of firms. Overall, we can see that extending 10 models to an international 
context, deepens our analysis in two areas. First, it allows us to look at the effects of 
a multinational entrant on the strategic behaviour of an incumbent monopolist and 
secondly, we can see the impact of trade policies on firms’ actions.
We have seen how an domestic producer can use informational advantages to 
deter or reduce the extent of entry. In Chapter 2 we looked at the entry decision 
of a multinational entrant faced with two similar markets. This scenario allowed us 
to look at the effects of a national and joint quota on the pre-entry strategy of the 
domestic incumbents. FYom a strategic point of view, we saw how joint quotns link 
the actions of the domestic producers. Although tariffs and quotns generally hail 
opposite effects on the actions of an incumbent, certain conditions were found where 
a very small joint quota could lead to similar incumbent behaviour as with a joint 
tariff. The welfare effects were ambiguous. First period welfare gains from lower 
pre-entry prices may or may not outweigh possible welfare losses resulting from entry 
deterrence. The welfare results complement rather than contrast those of Levy and 
Nolan (1992) showing that under certain conditions, quotas may enhance two-period 
welfare.
In Chapter 3 the analysis focused on the mode of entry. A multinational has a 
choice of two entry strategies: either exporting or foreign direct investment. We were 
able to show conditions under which it is advantageous for an incumbent to signal
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its cost type in order to affect the mode of entry. We saw that first period welfare 
increases with the limit price and that a small tariff decreases the limit price. Indeed, 
a tariff (or subsidy) may affect the type of equilibrium that emerges. The welfare 
effects of the second period were again similar to those of Levy and Nolan (1992).
Finally, Chapter 4 looked at reciprocal entry, where incumbents in separate mar­
kets were also able to enter each others’ markets. The model brought together two 
aspects of limit pricing models, that of entry deterrence (Milgrom and Roberts 1982) 
and market share protection (Mailath 1989). The existence of foreign markets en­
hanced limit pricing behaviour although as the number of markets grew pooling equi­
libria disappeared for certain prior beliefs.
Clearly, when we consider firms in an international environment, their strategic 
behaviour differs from that of the standard closed economy. This provides a more 
realistic picture of firm behaviour, as well as illustrating the greater effect of govern­
ment, trade policy. There are no clear-cut conclusions that can be made regarding 
trade policy except that the effects of such policies may have more profound effects 
than usually considered. The sensitivity of partial equilibrium analysis to changes in 
parameter values is a considerable problem in estimating effects. Moreover, empiri­
cal analysis supporting limit pricing behaviour is rather weak. On the other hand, 
evidence of limit pricing might be easier to obtain when considering an international 
context. For example, one of the problems with the closed-economy entry-deterrence 
models is that potential entrants are not observed. However, if we consider the case 
of Chapter 3, exporting and FDI are observed and so we should be able to see if 
there is a link between pre-entry prices and the mode of entry chosen. If this could 
be achieved, it may be possible to measure the extent of strategic firm behaviour on 
prices in the economy and hence the possible effects of trade policy.
Future research may focus on other types of entry-deterring behaviour such as 
investment into excess capacity (Dixit 1980) within an international context. This 
may lead to a more general formalisation of strategic firm behaviour in international 
markets as well as clarifying the clearly extensive effects of trade policy.
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